VS: Nyhetsbrev fra Balkan
Magne Haagen Flatval (magne@kvalito.no)
Wed, 28 Apr 1999 16:14:11 +0200
> WELCOME TO IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 25, 27 April 1999
>
> IN THE POLICY BUNKER. Belgrade continues to take a pounding, but only
> becomes more entrenched. Rather than cracks in the regime, Draskovic's
> statements about the impact of the bombing may only indicate his own
> powerlessness. A journalist in Belgrade reports.
>
> KOHA PHOENIX. In the first days of the war, the offices of Pristina's
> leading daily were destroyed and all of its journalists scattered. But as
> Iso Rusi reports, the team has reassembled and relaunched from exile, and
> Kosovo Albanians once again have a voice.
>
> CATCHMENT FROM A CRISIS. The war in Kosovo is throwing Albanians together.
> Expelled and bussed and broke, they are herded from place to
> place--bringing with them all of their terrible tales. Fron Nazi in Korce
> reports.
>
> *****************************************************
>
> IWPR's network of leading correspondents in the region provide inside
> analysis of the events and issues driving crises in the Balkans. The
> reports are available on the Web in English, Serbian and Albanian;
> English-language reports are also available via e-mail. For syndication
> information, contact Anthony Borden <tony@iwpr.net>.
>
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> Editor: Anthony Borden. Assistant Editing: Christopher Bennett, Alan
> Davis.
> Internet Editor: Rohan Jayasekera. Translation by Alban Mitrushi.
>
> "Balkan Crisis Report" is produced under IWPR's Balkan Crisis Information
> Project. The project seeks to contribute to regional and international
> understanding of the regional crisis and prospects for resolution.
>
> The Institute for War & Peace Reporting (IWPR) is a London-based
> independent non-profit organisation supporting regional media and
> democratic change.
>
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> The opinions expressed in "Balkan Crisis Report" are those of the authors
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> Copyright (C) 1999 The Institute for War & Peace Reporting <www.iwpr.net>.
>
> *************************************************
>
> IN THE POLICY BUNKER
>
> Belgrade continues to take a pounding, but only becomes more entrenched.
> Rather than cracks in the regime, Draskovic's statements about the impact
> of the bombing may only indicate his own powerlessness.
>
> By a journalist in Belgrade
>
> Far from suggesting cracks in the regime, the recent televised statements
> by Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic seem only to underscore the
> determination of the government to maintain its current course. Between
> NATO's decision to step up its bombing campaign and Belgrade's
> determination not to back down, it seems there is little room for an early
> resolution of the Kosovo crisis.
>
> In his overtures to the West--rejected by NATO--Yugoslav President
> Slobodan
> Milosevic has not changed his basic position: namely, that the bombing
> must
> stop before negotiations can resume and that NATO is not welcome on
> Yugoslav territory. For this reason, he also rejected UN Secretary General
> Kofi Annan's peace initiative.
>
> Amid this, the Belgrade media have maintained domestic morale by repeating
> continuously that Serbs are successfully defending themselves from the
> bombing, even though they have been attacked by the combined might of the
> 19 most militarily and technically developed countries of the world.
>
> It is this facade that Draskovic attacked so openly in a call-in programme
> aired on Belgrade's Studio B Sunday night, April 25, and repeated again
> Monday evening. In an extended discussion, Draskovic urged Yugoslavs not
> to
> fool themselves about the possibility of defeating NATO. He said that if
> the bombing campaign continues for another three weeks, the country will
> be
> completely destroyed. And he urged Serbs to understand that world opinion
> is firmly against them and that the Russians will not come to their aid
> militarily.
>
> The programme on Studio B, which is controlled by Draskovic's Serbian
> Renewal Party, sparked strong and largely positive reactions from Belgrade
> listeners, for whom such simple truths marked some kind of breakthrough.
> Opposition leaders also called Draskovic to offer their support.
>
> But security forces also threatened to pay a less friendly call, obtaining
> authorisation the next day to take over the station. Draskovic responded
> that he would call a demonstration on the streets of Belgrade, and he held
> an impromptu press conference in the Hyatt Hotel with foreign journalists,
> expressing fear that he would be attacked. But in the event the station
> was
> not touched and the interview was rebroadcast Monday night.
>
> Western media have latched onto the episode as evidence that opposition to
> Milosevic is opening up, even at senior levels. But the reality is that
> despite his exalted job title, Draskovic has only been a co-opted
> decorative figure in government. From a Serbian nationalist, to a
> democratic oppositionist, to an effective government spokesman, he has
> discredited himself as the chameleon of Serbian politics.
>
> He has thus been largely left to make his chaotic statements largely on
> his
> own, indeed criticised more for the regularity of his appearances on the
> Western press than whatever it is he might actually say-which few pay
> attention to. Recently, his position has only weakened, and he has little
> or no direct communication with Milosevic himself.
>
> The attention to his statements may suggest that some proportion of the
> population truly support a change in government and media policy in the
> crisis. But it seems that most viewers latched onto his comments in a very
> simplistic way, as if he was giving some kind of signal for an early end
> to
> the bombing.
>
> Whatever the details of the Draskovic episode, it has only confirmed the
> government's position within its own policy bunker, from which it remains
> unwilling to emerge. Indeed, although the Western alliance is yet to state
> publicly that it intends to launch a ground offensive against Yugoslavia,
> Yugoslav military planners are reading between the lines of NATO
> statements
> and are already planning their defence. The issue is not if but when they
> will face NATO ground troops, whether in the summer or in the autumn.
>
> Although the Belgrade media report cracks appearing within NATO, most
> analysts believe that, with its credibility on the line, the alliance is
> now determined to see its campaign through to the end, which may entail
> the
> destruction of the Milosevic regime.
>
> Sources within the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Yugoslav Army predict
> that the earliest NATO could assemble ground forces for an invasion is the
> end of May or beginning of June. Until then, they expect no let up in the
> air campaign, despite the collateral damage in civilian lives and private
> property.
>
> Pessimists fear that the bombing will continue until the autumn and that a
> similar fate awaits Serbia to that of Germany in 1945. In this scenario,
> NATO will not deploy ground troops until October or November and will, in
> the interim, step up the air offensive.
>
> "During the summer NATO missiles may destroy everything that can be
> destroyed, even that which is not exclusively linked with military
> structures," says a source close to military circles. "We can soon expect
> the list of targets to be widened to include power stations,
> thermo-electric plants, the sewage system, highways, and similar objects
> whose destruction would obstruct normal life."
>
> In this scenario, the expectation is that the Serbian population will be
> able to withstand the bombing campaign through the summer. However, by the
> beginning of November and the onset of cold weather, the effects of a fuel
> shortage, power cuts and the lack of certain foods will begin to take
> their
> toll.
>
> The destruction of the oil refineries in Novi Sad and Pancevo and of
> numerous fuel storage depots throughout Serbia, including Valjevo, Pozega,
> and Smederevo, threatens to cause a serious shortage of fuel, regardless
> of
> any blockade of imports from the coast.
>
> As a result of damage to the nitrogen plant in Pancevo, fertilisers are in
> short supply, and without fuel and fertilisers the agricultural sector
> will
> not be able to produce or deliver sufficient quantity of food to market.
>
> By that time, analysts believe, the bulk of the population--whose disposal
> income is likely to be as little 700 dinars ($30) a month--would be
> demoralised and facing serious existential problems. Meanwhile, the
> Yugoslav army would likely be exhausted from waiting and low on fuel,
> military hardware and ammunition.
>
> Optimists here remain confident that, as so often in the past, the master
> strategist Milosevic will yet find a way out. His rejection of peace
> proposals, they argue, simply indicates that he considers the potential
> costs of signing an accord higher than those of not signing, even if this
> implies continuation of the bombing.
>
> Since NATO has thus far failed to achieve the aims stated at the outset of
> its intervention, Milosevic's position has not been weakened by the air
> offensive. Indeed, as things stand now, Milosevic can with some
> justification claim to be winning the war.
>
> That said, despite the bravado of the Serbian media, the Yugoslav
> president
> knows that the Yugoslav Army cannot win a protracted war of attrition with
> NATO. Moreover, he is aware that, from his own point of view, it is better
> to accept NATO deployment in Kosovo than to goad the alliance into
> attempting the conquest of Serbia proper.
>
> If the optimists are right, Milosevic is likely to seek accommodation some
> time this summer once he has achieved his military aims of the ground.
> Having cleansed strategic swathes of territory of ethnic Albanians, he
> should in a position to offer NATO an accord based on partition and then
> withdraw his forces from much of the province.
>
> It's not the settlement the West prefers. But it could be a face saver for
> both sides and spare NATO the risk of a full-scale invasion. If
> so--whatever the demands of the West and the ruminations of Draskovic--it
> wouldn't be the first time the Yugoslav president has had the final word.
>
> The reporter is an independent journalist in Belgrade.
>
>
> KOHA PHOENIX
>
> In the first days of the war, the offices of Pristina's leading daily were
> destroyed and all of its journalists scattered. But the team has
> reassembled and relaunched from exile, and Kosovo Albanians once again
> have
> a voice.
>
> By Iso Rusi in Skopje
>
> Koha Ditore, the leading Kosovo Albanian daily, has been relaunched in
> Macedonia, just over a month after its offices in Pristina were burnt down
> by Serbian security forces and its editor Baton Haxhiu wrongly reported
> executed.
>
> The first issue since March 22 was published Friday by a skeleton staff of
> 23 journalists working out of tiny offices in Tetevo and Skopje. They have
> no phones, no faxes, no emails. But they produced an issue to match the
> paper's usual professional style. "Unbearable lightness of Crimes," ran
> the
> leader, an article about the atrocities continuing in Kosovo.
>
> The team is again being led by Haxhiu who arrived safely on the Macedonian
> border in the first days of April, shortly after his death was announced
> to
> the world at a NATO press conference in Brussels. Thirty-one other staff
> members of the paper remain unaccounted for.
>
> Using the borrowed e-mail and Internet facilities of local internet cafes,
> Haxhiu's journalists now produce a 16-page daily paper which is
> distributed
> freely to Albanian readers inside Macedonia's refugee camps. With
> financial
> support from both the British and French governments and private donors,
> 10,000 copies are printed in Skopje, with a further 25,000 published in
> Frankfurt and distributed to the ever-growing Kosovo population in Western
> Europe.
>
> In the coming weeks, Koha Ditore ("Daily Times") is hoping to relaunch its
> Web site and to start distributing a further 10,000 copies to Kosovo
> refugees currently languishing inside camps in neighbouring Albania.
>
> The rebirth of Koha is a substantial boost for the Kosovo Albanian
> community, once again giving a direct voice to a people who for a month
> have only been known as nameless victims. But Haxhiu takes the
> breakthrough
> in stride, saying that he is merely trying to produce a paper. One of the
> paper's main functions, he says, is to give a sense of reality to the
> Kosovo Albanians, making sure that they understand that they will not be
> returning home in a few weeks. But Haxhiu remains convinced the return
> will
> be relatively soon: in two months, he says, "accompanied by NATO troops".
>
> In Kosovo, Koha Ditore had emerged as the leading Kosovo daily, managing a
> clean presentation and a broad readership throughout the province.
> Inevitably affected by the conflict and related political debates, it
> nevertheless sought to be an independent and professional journalistic
> publication produced by a young and highly enthusiastic staff.
>
> Shortly before the start of NATO's bombing campaign, Koha Ditore fell foul
> of Serbia's draconian new Law on Public Information and was fined a total
> of US $26,800 for publishing a statement by Kosovo Liberation Army leader,
> Hashim Thaci--even though the statement had been distributed by the
> Belgrade news agency Beta. Koha chose to shut down rather than pay or
> contest the fine. Two days later, on March 24, Serbian police shot and
> killed Koha Ditore's guard and burnt down the office.
>
> Iso Rusi is a journalist with Focus in Skopje.
>
> Note: To help support the relaunch of Koha Ditore, contact IWPR Programme
> Director Alan Davis <alan@iwpr.net>.
>
>
> CATCHMENT FROM A CRISIS
>
> The war in Kosovo is throwing Albanians together. Expelled and bussed and
> broke, they are herded from place to place--bringing with them all of
> their
> terrible tales.
>
> By Fron Nazi in Korce
>
> In towns and villages across the region, the strands of the Albanian
> disaster are pulled together. Bordering Macedonia and Greece, the small
> Albanian town of Korce encompasses all of the elements of the recent
> tragedy. Haxhi Qereti from the Kosovo village of Landareic, recounts how
> Serb forces killed his son and daughter. A family from Fshatit Lismir
> talks
> about returning to Kosovo to fight with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).
> And Servet Feka, a local businessman, is hosting 55 refugees. Brought
> together by the war, they have one thing in common--no idea of what the
> future may bring.
>
> Prior to the explosion of anarchy in Albania in spring 1997, Korce's
> 80,000
> inhabitants used to enjoy a daily stroll along the main boulevard, a
> picnic
> in the park, and evening concerts by the local high school orchestra. In
> the past two years, in the aftermath of the collapse of the pyramid
> schemes, two local gangs, the Shepherds and the Five-Store gang, have been
> terrorising the community. So at dusk the streets of this once lively
> town,
> nestled between mountain peaks near lake Ohrid, became deserted.
>
> Then on April 8, at 6 in the morning, 12,000 Kosovo Albanians arrived in
> Korce via the Kosovo-Macedonian border crossing of Blace. They were some
> of
> the "missing" refugees, expelled from Kosovo and then bussed out of
> Macedonia, too.
>
> According to refugee testimonies, Serb forces surrounded the village of
> Fhsatit Lismir on April 4. They herded the villagers into the main square
> and ordered them to throw all their identity papers on to a blanket that
> was placed on the ground. They were told that anyone who refused would be
> shot dead.
>
> Serb forces then burned the identity papers and torched the houses. The
> entire village of a few thousand then had to walk to the capital Pristina
> where, together with 50,000 other Kosovo Albanians, they were put on
> trains
> for Macedonia.
>
> Since Macedonia refused to open its border with Kosovo, the new arrivals
> were forced to spend three days without food and water in the no-man's
> land
> at the Blace border crossing.
>
> "If it weren't for the ethnic Albanians from Macedonia who forced their
> way
> into our camps to give us food and water, we would have starved," said the
> elder of the family from Fhsatit Lismir, who asked not to be named.
>
> On April 7, at 5:30 in the afternoon, Macedonian authorities forcibly
> packed some 12,000 Kosovo Albanians, mostly women, children and the
> elderly, onto 50 buses. Officials told them that they are being sent to a
> camp 7 kilometres away.
>
> After a 12-hour ride without food, water or access to toilets, the Kosovo
> Albanians arrived in Korce.
>
> Sitting in the Korce sports complex which is now home to 800 Kosovo
> Albanians, the youngest of the four men from Fshatit Lismir, a
> 30-year-old,
> said: "We had no idea that we had crossed into Albania. The Macedonian bus
> drivers opened the door and told us to get out. We have been here ever
> since."
>
> Thus, since April 4, the extended family of 125 has been split up: 14 of
> the old men stayed behind in Kosovo; 35 are in Korce; and the rest are
> unaccounted for. "As soon as we settle our children and women we will
> return to fight alongside the KLA," said the elder.
>
> Haxhi Qerti is from the small village of Landareic next to the city of
> Prizren. Between March 26 and April 1, Qerti hid in the woods. On April 1,
> he crossed by foot into the northern Albanian border of Kukes.
>
> The next day he and about 300 other deportees were transported by bus to
> Korce. They were among the first Kosovo Albanians to arrive in the town.
>
> The local government has converted what was built as a communist student
> resort into a temporary shelter for 355 people. Sitting in the dormitory
> room with his wife, two daughters, 9 and 7, and his 5-year-old son,
> Klishak, he recounted how he had to flee without burying his 10-year-old
> son and 15-year-old daughter, who had been killed by Serb shelling.
>
> "The Serbs were shooting and bombing our village. They refused to allow us
> to bury our dead. My children's bodies were left unburied," he said.
>
> On Friday 26 March at 11:30 in the morning, Qerti's wife was setting the
> table for lunch. His son had gone outside to fetch some water. Just as
> they
> were about to sit down to eat, his son ran into the house screaming: "The
> Serbs are firing on us."
>
> Qerti immediately took his family to his neighbour's house. The Serbs
> first
> shelled the village. After the shelling, Serb gunmen wearing Yugoslav army
> uniforms came into the village and began shooting. They killed Qerti's
> neighbour, a 45-year-old lawyer, his mother and 16-year-old son.
>
> Another neighbour and her 15-year-old daughter were also shot dead, as
> were
> two of Qerti's female cousins, aged 33 and 29.
>
> "I was carrying my son Klishak as we were running from the Serbs. They
> were
> shooting at us," he said.
>
> "They hit my son Klishak in the leg and then my other son was hit. At
> first
> I thought he was only injured. He yelled "father, father" and died. When I
> looked up I saw my daughter lying on the ground. I escaped with the rest
> of
> the family into the woods."
>
> As he spoke he pulled Klishak's trousers down to show the bullet wound.
>
> In the afternoon, a meeting of host families was scheduled at the town
> hall. About 200 people gathered to pick up their numbers that would
> indicate when they can pick-up their weekly humanitarian rations.
>
> For 16 people for 10 days, the local government provides 10 kg of
> macaroni,
> 10 kilos of oil, and 6 toothbrushes. The host family and the Kosovo
> Albanians must come to the warehouse together to sign for the items.
>
> Servet Feka, 49, co-owner of Korce's wine and cognac distillery said:
> "It's
> impossible to maintain a family of 16 on those rations."
>
> Servet has taken in 55 people. Mostly women and children. He has turned
>
> part of his warehouse into accommodation with four bedrooms, a kitchen and
> a bathroom.
>
> These 55 are better off than most not only because of the privacy they
> have
> but also because Servet has set aside a food budget of $100 per day for
> his
> guests.
>
> "I have a business and it's a bit easier. But most people have to survive
> on a $200 per month salary," he says.
>
> Servet and some of the other locals have created the Korce for Kosova
> Foundation to assist the 12,000 Kosovars. "How can anyone of us complain
> when you learn what these people have been through?"
>
> Fron Nazi is a senior editor with IWPR in Tirana.
>
>
> IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT, NO. 25
>
> -- ### --
>
> ______________________
> Hans Skotte
> PGU, Programme for Reconstruction and Development
> Dept. of Town and Regional Planning
> NTNU, Norwegian University of Science and Technology
> N7491 Trondheim
> Norway
> Tel.: (47) 73 59 50 27
> Fax.: (47) 73 59 50 18
> E-mail: hans.skotte@ark.ntnu.no
>