KK-Forum,
noen klipp fra en artikkel av Israel Shahak fra 1995. Fremdeles aktuell.
Spørsmålet er om vi nærmer oss det Shahak nevner i det aller siste avsnittet.
Jeg vil tippe at Arafat også denne gangen - etter at han nå har høstet en
viss politisk gevinst - slår ned opprøret med CIA og Israels hjelp. Vi
hørte nettopp på radioen at arrestasjoner er i gang. Han bøyer kne:
lynsjingen av de israelske soldatene ble f.eks. fordømt av ham, uten at han
krevde at drapene på 100 palestinere til gjengjeld ble fordømt av Israel
(så vidt nyhetsbyråene forteller) så det kan se ut til at også Arafat ser
på jødiske liv som av en annen karakter enn palestinske. Og Barak sier han
ikke vil ha krig, osv. osv.
Se også
Israels politikk i de okkuperte områdene: "herredømme fra utsiden"
(i Klassekampen 29. desember 1998)
http://home.online.no/~knrognes/utsiden.html
gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org/00/peace/mideast.gopher/26
**************
REPORT NO. 154 ISRAEL SHAHAK, 12 MAY 1995
Analysis of Israeli policies: the priority of the ideological factor
....
In other words, empirical evidence (valid as anything in politics can be
valid) shows that Israeli policies are primarily ideologically motivated
and that the ideology by which they are motivated is totalitarian in
nature. This ideology can be easily known since it is enshrined in the
writings of the founders of Labor Zionism, and it can be easily inferred
from Israeli laws, regulations and pursued policies. Those who, like
Arafat, his henchmen and most Palestinian intellectuals, have through all
these years failed to make an intellectual effort to seriously study this
ideology, have only themselves to blame for being stunned by all the
developments of the 20 months after Oslo. Whoever after Oslo stopped
denouncing Israeli "imperialism" for the sake of a meaningless "peace of
the brave" slogan, only showed that he learned nothing and forgot nothing.
Their blunder is all the greater since Israel has by no means been unique
in pursuing ideologically determined policies. Strict ideological
considerations determine policies in plenty of other past and present
states. In other cases an ideology underlying a given policy, however, is
not only openly admitted by a state concerned, but also well-known and
discussed beyond its borders.
Israel is indeed unique in that the discriminatory Jewish ideology
dictating its policies is hardly ever discussed beyond its borders, due to
the fear of offending the Jews of the diaspora and of being labelled by
their powerful organizations as an "anti-Semite" or "Jewish self-hater". At
the same time in Israel the ideology of discriminating against all non-Jews
is not only openly admitted but also advocated as guaranteeing the
character of Israel as a "Jewish state" mandated to preserve its "Jewish
character".
The Jewish supporters of Israeli discriminatory practices freely admit that
they thus want to preserve the "Jewish character" of Israel, conceived of
by them and by the majority of Israeli Jews, as legacy of historical
Judaism. Indeed, if we overlook the modern times, there is sufficient truth
in this claim. Until the advent of modern times all Jews firmly believed
that non-Jews should be discriminated against whenever possible. It now
turns out that the Jewish Enlightenment failed to change the attitudes of
all, or perhaps even of most, Jews in this respect. Many completely
irreligious Jews still believe that for the sake of the Jewish religious
law and tradition which commanded to discriminate the non-Jews the latter
should be discriminated in the "Jewish state" forever. This is professed in
spite, or perhaps even because of the undeniable fact that this
discrimination has the same character as that which the anti-Semites want
to apply against the Jews.
How come the experts of the Israeli government expect acquiescence to this
situation on the part of the Palestinians (including the Israeli citizens
among them, whose influence in Knesset can be considerable) and on the part
of international public opinion? The two questions seem to have a single
answer. Israeli experts and the government apparently anticipate to make
those realities palatable for both as long as Israel confines itself only
to "control from outside", while leaving "control from inside", (i.e. the
job of actually enforcing order) in the hands of Israel's Palestinian
proxies who will be granted a semblance of an independent authority. (I am
not going to discuss international public opinion separately, because Latin
American and African precedents make me convinced that the response of the
world at large to the "control from inside" will be as tame and as
acquiescent as in Palestine.) Much as I abhor the Israeli government's
plans on moral grounds, this anticipation strikes me as well-grounded.
After all, a large majority of Palestinians have tamely acquiesced to the
numerous violations of human rights committed directly by Arafat's regime
in the Gaza Strip and by his secret polices in the West Bank. (The
potentially violent dispute between Arafat and Hamas is about power rather
than about human or any other rights.)
...
The second point where I differ from the Israeli Security System's
assessments concerns the "Rainbow of Colors". The Israeli experts assume it
can last forever, whereas I think it is bound to be rather short- lived.
Even if Arafat commits indescribable atrocities in smashing all opposition
to his rule, I doubt if he can keep the Palestinian population inside their
enclaves under his effective control. After all, the facts on the ground
will be all too tangible for the Palestinians, and the arguments of the
opposition particularly of Hamas, (unless destroyed by Arafat's victory in
a civil war) will be bound to undermine Arafat's standing in a relatively
short period of time. So far his attempts to suppress the opposition,
half-hearted at best, have alternated with attempts to make a compromise
with it. His oppression can be said to have intimidated individuals and
small groups like the PDFL, but it has made Hamas stronger, more
influential and more outraged than before.
It is impossible to say whether Arafat will decide to accede to Israel's
demands to smash the opposition, or continue to play the same game of
serving Israel covertly and to opposing it in words. In any event, however,
the Palestinian masses see with increasing clarity that their situation is
rapidly deteriorating. At present it is only Arafat's vestigial prestige
which prevents them from beginning to organize a popular resistance
movement. Once all his credibility is gone, which may occur quite soon, the
only Israeli alternative for still exercising "control from outside" would
be through a naked Palestinian dictatorship, whether Arafat's or somebody
else's. Oppression then unleashed is bound to surpass anything experienced
in the period of "control from inside". I am fully conscious of the immense
human suffering which such an oppression is bound to cause. Yet I do not
attribute much political importance to the question whether it can succeed
and for how long. In any event, it will mark the failure of the "control
from outside" scheme as an easy and cheap method of domination, which can
be "sold", Peres- style, to the international public. In the last analysis
the failure of the "control from outside" cannot but mark the end of
Israeli policies based on the absolute priority of Zionist ideology.
************
Knut Rognes
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