"Globaliseringen" er i dag et annet journalistord for den ufravikelige og
skjebnebestemte "Utviklingen". Nedenfor følger et innlegg fra det utmerkede
tidsskriftet Monthly Review som ligger uten på nettet i sin helhet.
Forfatteren er PETER Marcuse, ikke å forveksle med den berømte
franfurterskoleteoretikeren HERBERT Marcuse. At ordet "globalisering"
er så diffust og altomfattende er i følge Marcuse viktig for dets
makt over sinnene. Det kommer til å stå for noe overveldende og
uimotståelig.
Karsten Johansen
http://www.monthlyreview.org/700marc.htm
The Language of Globalization by Peter Marcuse
The language of globalization deserves some explicit attention. To begin
with, the word globalization itself is a nonconcept in most uses: a simple
catalogue of everything that seems different since, say, 1970, whether
advances in information technology, widespread use of air freight,
speculation in currencies, increased capital flows across borders,
Disneyfication of culture, mass marketing, global warming, genetic
engineering, multinational corporate power, new international division of
labor, international mobility of labor, reduced power of nation-states,
postmodernism, or post-Fordism. The issue is more than one of careless use
of words: intellectually, such muddy use of the term fogs any effort to
separate cause from effect, to analyze what is being done, by whom, to whom,
for what, and with what effect. Politically, leaving the term vague and
ghostly permits its conversion to something with a life of its own, making
it a force, fetishizing it as something that has an existence independent of
the will of human beings, inevitable and irresistible. This lack of clarity
in usage afflicts other elements of the discussion of globalization as well,
with both analytic and political consequences. Let me outline some problem
areas, and suggest some important differentiations.
First, the concept of globalization itself: it hardly needs reiteration in
these pages that globalization is not something new under the sun, but is a
particular form of capitalism, an expansion of capitalist relationships both
in breadth (geographically) and in depth (penetrating ever-increasing
aspects of human life). But there are two distinct aspects to the
development of capitalist relations since 1970 that are often lumped
together under the rubric of globalization: developments in technology and
developments in the concentration of power. Separating advances in
technology from the global concentration of economic power, and seeing how
their combination has changed class relations, is critical both for analysis
and for political strategy.
The link between advances in technology and the concentration of economic
power is not an inevitable one. Computerization, the speed of communications
made possible by advances in information technology, the ability to expand
the span of control from one center across continents, the increased speed
and efficiency of transportation (both for people and for goods),
facilitating the flexibilization of production, and the automation of
routine tasks are all indeed essential for the substantial increase in the
concentration of economic power we are witnessing. But these advances in
technology could be used in quite different ways (although it may be that,
if their intended use were different, they would in fact be quite
different). Advances in technology could mean either that the same quantity
of useful goods and services could be produced with less effort or that,
with the same effort, more could be produced. Either way, everyone would be
better off, either working less or having more. That is not the way things
are going, not because technology could not go that way, but because it is
directed and harnessed by the power-holders to increase and concentrate
their power. It has been used to change the balance of power between
classes. Attention needs to be focused on this, not on the technology itself.
The distinction between technological globalization and the globalization of
power is critical—not only analytically but also politically. It raises the
question, "What might the other possibilities be if the two were separated?"
We should speak of the existing combination of technological globalization
and the globalization of power as really existing globalization; that would
highlight the possibilities of an alternative globalization. Opponents of
the damaging consequences of really existing globalization, from left as
well as from liberal perspectives, are divided on the appropriate response
to it. The slogan from Seattle in regard to the World Trade Organization
(WTO)—"fix it or nix it"—and the equivalent suggested in the Washington
demonstrations in April as to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
(IMF)—"shrink it or sink it"—and the related questions about whether we want
a seat at the table or a different table or no table at all show an
ambivalence about goals. The issues are difficult indeed. But the
realization that an alternative globalization can at least be conceived of
should be an important part of the debate on goals; speaking of what we now
have as really existing globalization may help to keep the broader
possibilities open.
By the same token, frequent references to the diminished or vanished power
of nation-states to control globalization need some conceptual and
linguistic clarity. The myth of the powerless state is a concept that clouds
intelligent analysis of what is actually going on. The importance of state
action in enabling the capitalist system of the industrialized world to
function is increased, not reduced, as that system spreads internationally.
If states do not control the movement of capital or of goods, it is not
because they cannot but because they will not—it is an abdication of state
power, not a lack of that power. The very importance attached by
international business interests to the WTO, tariff agreements, the
government enforcement of contractual rights and the protection of
intellectual property interests attest to the continuing if not growing
importance of the national state.
Furthermore, a strong element of fetishization often creeps into the very
use of the term "state," with a very distinct political bias. It might be
called the fallacy of the homogenous state and it appears in such
formulations as those that speak of "the competitive state" (or, in my own
field, the constant call for the "competitiveness of cities") or of benefits
or harms to the "states" of the North or of the South. States and cities are
internally divided; what is good for one group, class, or other interest
within a state or city may have very different consequences for others.
Governments indeed have a certain autonomy and, in this limited sense, one
may speak of states or cities as actors with interests of their own, meaning
their specific political leaders and bureaucracies—or, more broadly, the
regime in power; but it is even more true that governments are responsive to
multiple interests and that particular interests regularly dominate the
actions of most. To speak of a "national interest" usually conceals some
very particular interests; to speak of states as if they represented all
those living within them obscures reality.
In that sense, to speak of "U.S." domination of international
affairs—important in one sense—requires a clear distinction between those
who, in turn, dominate U.S. policy and those who are excluded from its
formation. The same is true of other countries, as was clear in some of the
discussions in Seattle, in which individuals from countries of the South
took positions strongly divergent from those of their governments. If this
distinction between a state and its people is important in terms of the
political and formal actions of the state, it is even more important in
terms of economic representation. Those who represent states in
international economic negotiations are not representing any homogeneous set
of national economic interests; the homogeneity may be better considered a
characteristic of the interests at the bargaining table, that is to say,
clusters of businesses and financial interests perhaps diverging on a
sectoral basis but similar in their class character. The key divisions are
not among states, but among classes; the homogeneity is not within states,
but within classes.
Other language in discussions of globalization, while emanating from its
proponents, frequently slips into use by its critics and obscures what is
actually happening. "Human capital," for instance, is a twisting of
meanings: calling it "labor skills" puts it in its proper context.
"Governance" is a euphemism for diminished government and should be
recognized as such. "Investment" may mean an expansion of productive
capacity, or it may be pure speculation. "Free" markets are hardly costless,
as in free public education; the true term is "private markets," and they
limit, rather than expand, most notions of human freedom. "Reform," of
course, means privatization in its media use. "Producer services,"
indiscriminately used, strips the term "producer" of its social meaning.
Printing stock reports should not be called "producer services:" printers
are workers who operate machines, not "service providers," and stockbrokers
should not be called producers if the word is to retain any real content.
These issues are not merely issues of terminology. No clear consensus has
yet emerged among the various groups attempting to confront the ills
produced by really existing globalization. The most moderate goals simply
call for participation and transparency; the stronger liberal view asks for
restructuring of the system of global institutions and regulations; radical
views include both calls for eliminating global institutions entirely or
replacing them with a completely different system of relations, both
economic and political, within nation-states and among them. Discussions
after Seattle have not yet widely coalesced around specific programmatic
demands at the national level, such as actions demanded of the U.S.
Congress, the U.S. trade representative, its United Nations delegate, or its
representatives on various international agencies and bodies. A number of
groups and many individuals are wrestling with the difficult problems of
formulating goals, platforms, and specific demands for action. Demands
consistent with one view are not necessarily inconsistent with other views;
both commonalities of goals and differences among them, and both strategy
and tactics, need further thought and clarification. Fuzziness of language
may facilitate coalition formation in the short run, but more solid and
long-term alliances are based on full mutual understanding. Being careful
about the difference between technological globalization and the
globalization of power, keeping the concept of alternative globalization on
the table, dispensing with the myth of the powerless state and avoiding the
fallacy of the homogenous state, and watching the traps of the Orwellian
language of globalization, may all help in coming to a common agreement as
to both long-term goals and next steps.
PETER MARCUSE teaches in the Division of Urban Planning in the School of
Architecture, Planning, and Preservation at Columbia University. He is
co-editor of Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order? (Oxford: Blackwell,
2000).
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