Med dei meldingane som tikkar inn om vestlig militærpress og åpenlyse
bestikkelsar, så er det nesten så ein kan byrje å tru på dei som hevdar at
NATO innerst inne helller vil behalde den gode fienden Milosevic. Men berre
nesten.
Først om bestikkelsane og den USAnske strategien generelt for
Kostunica-alliansen spesielt. LA Times hevdar at dei skal kaste seg på den
andre valomgangen, men det er jo ikkje mykje som tyder på det så langt.
Dei hevdar også at house of representatives mandag bevilga 500 millionar$
til det vidare undergravingsarbeidet. Eg har sett andre tal andre plassar,
meiner det var 105 mill., men det er i alle fall ikkje småpengar.
U.S. Calls On Milosevic to Concede Election Loss
http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/updates/lat_usyugo000926.htm
Yugoslavia: Citing "massive irregularities," officials urge president to
submit to popular will. If he refuses, the international community faces a
daunting task in exerting pressure.
By ROBIN WRIGHT, Times Staff Writer
-----------
Washington also has a plan if Milosevic's regime insists that neither side
won more than 50% of Sunday's vote and holds a runoff election Oct. 8.
Rather than considering a boycott, the U.S. will encourage the opposition
to run again--and harder--by organizing demonstrations and energizing
voters. The objective would be an even more convincing win the second time
around, officials said, adding that a boycott would only play into
Milosevic's hands.
Already Monday, the House of Representatives passed a bill
authorizing financial aid for opposition groups in Serbia, the larger of
the two Yugoslav republics. The bill authorizes $500 million to help
finance democratic forces in Serbia and Montenegro, its junior partner,
including $50 million to fund the activities of pro-democracy and dissident
groups.
Still, that leaves open the more difficult issue of what
steps can be taken if Milosevic succeeds in hijacking the electoral
process, either now or after a runoff. That's the scenario U.S. officials
fear is most likely, because they believe Milosevic will not easily cede
control.
On the evening before the vote, Milosevic summoned the
diplomatic corps in Belgrade--the capital of Yugoslavia and Serbia--to
complain that "international factors" were manipulating the presidential
election and implied he might invalidate the results, U.S. officials said.
On Monday, U.S. officials said they had reason to believe
the Yugoslav leader was "panicked" and his inner circle "in disarray."
When aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo, a
province of Serbia, was the issue facing the international community, the
options were fairly obvious. But the use of force would be neither feasible
nor practical in this case.
The choices under consideration this time are more subtle,
more time-consuming and less certain to win widespread backing. Russia,
especially, has advocated free and fair elections in Yugoslavia but is also
Belgrade's most important ally.
(......)Because Moscow's role is so pivotal, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright has engaged in a round of intense telephone diplomacy
with Russian Foreign Minister Igor S. Ivanov, according to State Department
officials.
(........)"We could do all that's possible with the rest of the world to
say the government is unacceptable, to say Milosevic is history and to say
no one will deal with him," said Morton Abramowitz, former head of the
State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, founder of the
International Crisis Group and an expert on the Balkans. "Whether we can
get the Russians on board is the big question."
The second key response would be to announce that the
United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies would
reserve the right to come to the assistance of Montenegro if Serbia moved
against it.
---------
Daniel Serwer, a former U.S. special envoy for Bosnia and
now director of the Balkans Initiative at the U.S. Institute of Peace,
outlined other options available to America and its allies if Milosevic
clings to power:
* Reconsidering independence for Kosovo and Montenegro.
* Recognizing the opposition if it opts to form a separate government at
home or in exile.
* Increasing the U.S. military presence in the Adriatic.
* Engaging NATO in formal discussions of an allied response.
* Urging China and Russia to curtail financial credits to Milosevic.
* Supporting International Monetary Fund and World Bank assistance to
Montenegro.
* Opening a U.S. diplomatic office in Montenegro's capital, not as a
consulate under the auspices of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade but as an
autonomous authority.
"A great deal now depends on international reaction and
U.S. leadership in crafting a response," Serwer said. "There's every
indication that Milosevic now has the loyalty of the army and police, which
have both demonstrated their willingness to use violence at critical
points. So we have to be creative in the way we respond, but also forceful
if necessary."
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stratfor med gode analyser av propagandastrategien så langt:
The accuracy of polling in the Balkans is questionable. But the impact was
not. Even if Milosevic had managed to honestly rustle up enough votes to
win on Sunday, the polls made it impossible for him to claim that he had
done so fairly.
og
Even now in Yugoslavia and abroad, the fact that Milosevic trailed but
didn’t lose outright is being shrewdly turned against him. In effect, it
has become impossible for Milosevic to again lay claim to being
democratically elected – even if he wins next month.
Og generelt om Clinton-regimets undergravingsstrategi:
As a result, the Clinton administration supported a range of his opponents,
labeling them democratic alternatives when in fact they comprised a mixed
bag of ideologies and interests, linked only by opposition to the
president. The campaign ended earlier this year in abysmal failure.
Regardless of their view on Milosevic, Serbs hated NATO and the United
States; the support of either was the kiss of death. And the West’s
favorites were, in fact, a crew of losers who wasted precious time
jockeying for position against one another.
But something changed in Western capitals a few months ago. Instead of
seeking to overthrow the entire Milosevic regime – including friends and
supporters – the Clinton administration signaled a shift, claiming it
wanted to get rid of Milosevic only.
---------
But more immediately, it appears Milosevic has walked into a trap. He
called an election nine months before the constitution required, saw
unreliable polls constructed into iron-clad arguments against him and
watched as his own circle of followers considered their futures independent
of his.
---------
After years of bumbling, it appears the West has trapped Milosevic. An
important discussion will now take place within the Serbian political
elite: Will Kostunica protect them if he wins, cleaning out only those
closest to Milosevic? The elite is likely posing the same self-interested
questions to Washington.
If the right answers are delivered to the right people, the trap will
finally be closed.
Heile artikkelen følger nedanfor.
Takk for i dag.
Asgeir Bjørkedal
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Checkmate in Yugoslavia?
25 September 2000
http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/archive/WEEKLY.ASP
On their face, the Yugoslav elections appear to have failed in clarifying
the country’s political situation. Slobodan Milosevic is still president,
has succeeded at least in postponing a day of reckoning and the West’s
crafty old enemy sits, for the moment, in Belgrade.
But in reality, a clarifying moment is unfolding. Amidst the riot police,
the fights and the mixed results – another round of voting in two weeks –
an important change has occurred. Milosevic may be replaced, but by another
hard-line Serbian nationalist, Vojislav Kostunica. Kostunica will not
necessarily be the easy ally Washington and London have hoped for, but he
is most likely too strong for Milosevic to defeat.
The run-up to the voting created tremendous problems for Milosevic.
Seeking to dispel the notion that he is not a democratic leader, he called
an early election and quickly trailed in public opinion polls by
Beografiti, Beta and Strategic Marketing. The accuracy of polling in the
Balkans is questionable. But the impact was not. Even if Milosevic had
managed to honestly rustle up enough votes to win on Sunday, the polls made
it impossible for him to claim that he had done so fairly.
Even now in Yugoslavia and abroad, the fact that Milosevic trailed but
didn’t lose outright is being shrewdly turned against him. In effect, it
has become impossible for Milosevic to again lay claim to being
democratically elected – even if he wins next month. He can govern if the
police and military continue to back him, but he cannot extract what he
wanted from the elections – a new stamp of authority.
How did Milosevic, as crafty a politician as there is, allow himself to get
boxed in? The answer goes back over a year ago, to the campaign waged by
the West in general and the United States in particular since the end of
the Kosovo war. Washington hoped that the loss of Kosovo would topple
Milosevic and his regime.
As a result, the Clinton administration supported a range of his opponents,
labeling them democratic alternatives when in fact they comprised a mixed
bag of ideologies and interests, linked only by opposition to the
president. The campaign ended earlier this year in abysmal failure.
Regardless of their view on Milosevic, Serbs hated NATO and the United
States; the support of either was the kiss of death. And the West’s
favorites were, in fact, a crew of losers who wasted precious time
jockeying for position against one another.
But something changed in Western capitals a few months ago. Instead of
seeking to overthrow the entire Milosevic regime – including friends and
supporters – the Clinton administration signaled a shift, claiming it
wanted to get rid of Milosevic only. Subsequent offers by the European
Union echoed this, suggesting that certain Serb-owned companies might do
business with the EU, while those with nefarious ties to the regime might
not. Most likely, the U.S. government realized that to extricate itself
from the morass in Kosovo, the only choice was to deal with the faction
around Milosevic.
In months since, the real tension in Belgrade has not been between
democrats and the oligarchs of the regime, but within the circle of
oligarchs itself. There have been two camps. In one are members of the
elite who have decided to end the impasse and protect their positions. In
the other is Milosevic, who decided to play the nationalist card one more
time with the election and bring followers in the Socialist Party of Serbia
back into his camp.
But Milosevic may have miscalculated. He did not count on the emergence of
a nationalist like himself as the main challenger. Vojislav Kostunica
derives his popularity from a track record that reflects Milosevic’s own.
Kostunica is a hard-line Serbian nationalist and a committed opponent of
the West. He condemned last year’s war and labeled NATO’s prosecution of
the air campaign as a series of “criminal acts.” He has said that he would
not cooperate with the international war crimes tribunal in the Hague. And
Kostunica has flatly stated he would not turn in Milosevic, according to
the Yugoslav press.
Most importantly, Kostunica draws his own popularity from the same well as
Milosevic. Kostunica has gone out of his way to clarify that, unlike the
rest of the opposition, he has accepted no money from the United States; a
top U.S. official has confirmed the claim. To some degree, Kostunica spells
trouble for Washington. If he wins, he will not take orders or transform
Yugoslavia into a portrait of Western hopes, all neatly fulfilled.
But more immediately, it appears Milosevic has walked into a trap. He
called an election nine months before the constitution required, saw
unreliable polls constructed into iron-clad arguments against him and
watched as his own circle of followers considered their futures independent
of his.
The West, too, may have lent a helping hand, albeit indirectly. The United
Nations announced it would allow Serbs in Kosovo to vote, for example, but
peacekeeping troops would neither escort Serbs to the polls nor safeguard
polling stations and ballot boxes. Finally, the EU’s promise to lift
economic sanctions if Milosevic is defeated sweetens the deal for members
of the Serb elite.
After years of bumbling, it appears the West has trapped Milosevic. An
important discussion will now take place within the Serbian political
elite: Will Kostunica protect them if he wins, cleaning out only those
closest to Milosevic? The elite is likely posing the same self-interested
questions to Washington.
If the right answers are delivered to the right people, the trap will
finally be closed. Even if Milosevic moves to stage a coup, the people he
will need the most will be ready to turn on him.
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