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www.MiddleEast.Org CHOMKSY on the Iraq Crisis - Part II
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CHOMSKY ON THE IRAQ CRISIS - Part II
MER - Washington - 2/24/98:
Recently we published an extensive interview with the world-
renowned political analyst Professor Noam Chomsky.
Chomsky was subsequently interviewed again, a few days ago on
February 19th. With "Desert Thunder" now on-hold, but likely to go
forward at some point in the future, understanding the background
and complexity to today's situation in the Middle East is of more
importance than ever.
QUESTION:
Will a conflict between US (and allies) with
Iraq be a further and perhaps disastrous step in
marking out a coming conflict between the West and
Islam? Does America's boldness flow from the
weakness of Russia?
PROFESSOR NOAM CHOMSKY:
Caution is in order in speaking of "a coming conflict between
the West and Islam." The lines of conflict cut rather
differently, and a good part of such rhetoric gives a distorted
version of long-standing conflicts between Western power and
independent nationalism in the South, often taking new forms.
Consider some cases. The most populous Islamic state in the
world is Indonesia, which shifted from enemy to friend when
General Suharto took power, presiding over an enormous slaughter
that elicited great satisfaction in the West. Since then Suharto
has been "our kind of guy," as the Clinton administration
described him, while carrying out murderous aggression and
endless atrocities against his own people. Indonesia will again
become an enemy if it steps out of line. The most extreme
fundamentalist Islamic state in the world is Saudi Arabia, long a
close US ally; its status too will shift if it tries to go its
own way. Among non-governmental actors, it would be hard to find
more fanatic Islamic fundamentalists than the segments of the
resistance to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan that were strongly
supported by the US. Prior to August 1990, Saddam Hussein was a
favored friend and trading partner of the US and UK -- "our kind
of guy," not part of the "conflict between the West and Islam."
All of this has been going on for a long time. To take one
critical moment, in March 1958 Secretary of State Dulles informed
the National Security Council that the US faced three major world
crises: the Middle East, North Africa, and Indonesia, all in the
Islamic world. He also insisted, with the "vigorous" endorsement
of President Eisenhower, that the USSR was not involved, even
obliquely.
That brings us to the second part of the question. The
disappearance of Soviet power surely allows the US and Britain
more freedom to resort to military force. That has long been
clear. In a review of security issues for the New York Times in
December 1988, Dimitri Simes, senior associate at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, observed that decline of
concern over "Soviet counterattack" would "liberate American
foreign policy from the straightjacket imposed by superpower
hostility," making "military power more useful as a United States
foreign policy instrument...against those who contemplate
challenging important American interests." He mentioned
Nicaragua, Cuba, and OPEC to illustrate the opportunities for
"greater reliance on military force in a crisis." The point was
reiterated by former Undersecretary of State Elliott Abrams when
the US invaded Panama a year later; resort to force is more
feasible than in the past, he commented, with the deterrent
removed. A few months later, the Bush Administration made its
annual presentation to Congress calling for a huge Pentagon
budget, including maintenance of the intervention forces that
could now be used with less concern. These had been aimed
primarily at the Middle East, where the "threats to our
interests" that require military engagement "could not be laid at
the Kremlin's door" -- or at the door of Iraq, still a friend and
ally in March 1990. There are many other examples. Thus in
secret discussions with top planners during the Cuban missile
crisis, the Kennedy brothers expressed concern that Castro might
use the missiles to deter US military intervention in Venezuela,
so that "The Bay of Pigs was really right," JFK observed.
In 1990, the US/UK would not have risked deploying half a million
men in the desert if the USSR has still been a factor. The same
is true of subsequent use of force.
Does military action lack UN sanction and will
it be an act of war?
The resort to force not only lacks UN sanction, but is
strongly opposed by the people of the region, and apparently by
the Iraqi democratic opposition. The last comment I have to
qualify. I know of their views only from the foreign press; as
before, during, and after the Gulf War they remain virtually
barred from US media, in keeping with Washington's stand,
announced again in mid-March 1991 when the State Department
explained that "Political meetings with ÆIraqi democratsÅ would
not be appropriate for our policy at this time." The time was 14
March 1991, as Saddam was decimating the opposition under the
eyes of General Schwartzkopf and the US was even denying captured
Iraqi arms to rebelling military officers.
One might contrive a tortured legal argument holding that the use
of force is justified by Iraqi failure to meet the cease-fire
conditions, so that Resolution 678 (29 Nov. 1990) is "reinvoked."
Doubts about the matter could readily be resolved by a US/UK
request for endorsement of their plans by Security Council, but
that option has not been pursued. The framework of international
law is reasonably clear. Use of force is barred unless properly
authorized by the Security Council (with exceptions that do not
apply here).
But these considerations have little real world relevance.
Washington's position was admirably summarized by Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright, then UN Ambassador, when she informed
the Security Council during an earlier US confrontation with Iraq
that the US will act "multilaterally when we can and unilaterally
as we must," because "We recognize this area as vital to US
national interests" and therefore recognize no external
constraints. That position apparently stands, as Washington's
reaction to Kofi Annan's mission makes clear enough. "We wish him
well," Albright stated, "and when he comes back we will see what
he has brought and how it fits with our national interest," which
will determine how we respond.
Washington's contempt for international law is revealed as well
by its interpretations of the UN Charter, as when the Reagan
Administration justified its bombing of Libya as "self-defense
against future attack," or when the Clinton Administration
justified a missile attack on Baghdad on grounds of
"self-defense" against alleged Iraqi involvement in an attempt to
assassinate George Bush months earlier. The absurdity is patent,
even without knowledge of the wording of Article 51 of the
Charter, authorizing self-defense against armed attack under
narrow conditions. To take another highly relevant case,
consider Washington's reaction to the demand by the UN Security
Council (Dec. 1975) that Indonesia withdraw immediately from East
Timor and that all states "respect the territorial integrity of
East Timor as well as the inalienable right of its people to
self-determination." The US, later joined by Britain, reacted by
sending new arms to the aggressors, accelerating the arms flow
once again as the attack reached near-genocidal levels in 1978,
while in his memoirs Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan took
pride in having rendered the UN "utterly ineffective in whatever
measures it undertook" in accord with the instructions of the
State Department, which "wished things to turn out as they did
and worked to bring this about." The US/UK also cheerfully
endorse the robbery of East Timor's oil in violation of any
reasonable interpretation of solemn conventions. The analogy to
Iraq/Kuwait is close, though there are differences: to mention
only the most obvious, US-backed atrocities in East Timor were --
very quickly -- far beyond anything attributed to Saddam Hussein
in Kuwait.
Great powers rely on the rule of force, though they are happy to
invoke the rule of law as a weapon against others. On that, the
historical record is sufficiently clear.
Is there such a thing as rogue states and if
so what can be done about them?
There surely are states that engage in international
terrorism and aggression. One has even been condemned by the
World Court for the "unlawful use of force," ordered to desist
and pay reparations. It responded by escalating the crimes and
vetoing a UN Security Council resolution calling on all states to
observe international law, later forcing the victim to withdraw
its claims for reparations. The record is long and ugly.
Iraq certainly qualifies as a leading criminal state. Defending
the US plan to attack Iraq at a televised public meeting on 18
February, Secretaries Albright and Cohen rightly stressed the
fact that Saddam had even gone so far as "using weapons of mass
destruction against his neighbors as well as his own people," his
most awesome crime. They failed only to note -- and commentators
have been kind enough not to point out -- that those horrifying
acts did not turn Iraq into a "rogue state." Rather, the US and
UK continued their strong support for Saddam, and there were no
passionate calls for a military strike against the perpetrator of
the crimes. When ABC TV correspondent Charles Glass revealed
some sites of Saddam's biological warfare programs, Washington
simply denied the facts, and the story died. It was not his
massive crimes that elevated Saddam to the rank of "Beast of
Baghdad."
The concept "rogue state" is highly nuanced. Thus Cuba has been
a "rogue state" because of its alleged involvement in
international terrorism, but the US does not fall into the
category despite an extraordinary record of terrorist attacks
against Cuba for close to 40 years, apparently continuing through
last summer according to a plausible interpretation of important
investigative reporting of the Miami Herald, which failed to
reach the national press. Cuba was a "rogue state" when its
military forces were in Angola, backing the government against
South African attacks supported by the US. South Africa, in
contrast, was not a rogue state then, nor during the Reagan
years, when it caused over $60 billion in damage and 1.5 million
deaths in neighboring states according to a UN Commission, not to
speak of some events at home -- and with ample US/UK support.
Indonesia was not a rogue state when it massacred its own
population, nor when it invaded East Timor in defiance of
Security Council resolutions, carrying out what may be the worst
slaughter relative to population since the Holocaust.
The criteria are fairly clear: a "rogue state" is not simply a
criminal state, but one that defies the orders of the powerful.
There are many ways to respond to the threat of criminal and
dangerous states, some quite simple. One option is to accept the
rule of law; the US could have chosen to accept the World Court
judgment, to mention only one obvious example. Another is to
stop supporting their crimes, as in the case of Iraq (pre-Kuwait)
and Indonesia, among many others. The framework of international
law provides many means, including diplomatic options that are
rarely exhausted and often simply avoided; and also the ultimate
use of force when properly authorized. Each case has to be
considered in its own terms.
Do you accept the picture of Saddam painted
by Western propaganda, as the brutal head of
a barbarous regime?
The word "accept" is not quite accurate. Rather I am pleased
that "Western propaganda" has finally agreed to join me (and many
others) in accepting the picture, instead of denying it or
choosing to ignore the facts, including readily available
evidence about Western support for Saddam's crimes.
If he is a threat to world peace, what
should be done about him?
As noted, there are a variety of legitimate ways to react to
the many threats to world peace. If Iraq's neighbors feel
threatened, they can proceed, with the support of others, to call
on the UN Security Council to authorize appropriate measures to
respond to the threat. If Britain feels threatened, it can
follow the same course. But the US and UK have no authority to
make their own determinations on these matters and to act as they
choose -- and would have no such authority even if their own
hands were clean, hardly the case.
In the current situation, there are numerous options. To mention
one, the proposals of the Iraqi Democratic Opposition should
surely be taken very seriously, rather than simply dismissed.
How realistic they are, I cannot judge. And I do not think we
can know as long as the US remains committed -- as apparently it
still is -- to the preference for "an iron-fisted Iraqi junta,"
without Saddam Hussein if possible, a return to the days when
Saddam's "iron fist...held Iraq together, much to the
satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia," not
to speak of Washington (NY Times chief diplomatic correspondent
Thomas Friedman, 7 July 1991).
What do you think would happen if the
UN packed up its tent and he was left alone?
I would certainly not advise that. Saddam would then subject
Iraqis to greater violence and repression while pursuing his
weapons programs without interference. These might also be
consequences of military strikes, as US military analysts and
others have warned. An attack might end the inspection system,
which, though seriously hampered by Saddam's interference, has
eliminated a large part of his weapons stock, far more than the
1991 bombings did. An attack might also gain regional support
for the brutal dictator, not exactly a welcome consequence.
What, if any, are the connections between
US economic interests and the threatened action
against Saddam?
There are connections, but they are indirect, and are not the
immediately operative factors. Nor, in my opinion, were they in
1990-91. Since World War II, the US has been firmly committed to
maintaining control over Middle East oil, which the State
Department described as "a stupendous source of strategic power,
and one of the greatest material prizes in world history." But
there is no persuasive evidence that in 1990-91 the US was
concerned about an Iraqi threat to this control. There is,
however, good reason to believe that Washington saw the Iraqi
invasion as an opportunity to extend its control -- to
demonstrate that "what we say goes," as George Bush announced
triumphantly while the missiles and bombs were falling. These
are crucial considerations, but in the background.
Britain's Foreign Secretary Robin Cook has
hinted at the use of nuclear weapons if Saddam
uses chemical weapons. What is your reaction?
The proposal is too shocking for comment.
The Iraqi people are hungry, in many
instances starving. What responsibility does
the UN have for this situation?
The sanctions have taken a terrible toll on the Iraqi people,
while leaving Saddam unaffected, possibly even strengthened as
potential resistance is undermined among people struggling to
survive. Washington's not so subtle support for his crushing of
the March 1991 rebellion surely had the same effect. Today,
senior UN and other international relief officials in Iraq warn
that bombing might have a "catastrophic" effect on people already
suffering miserably, and might terminate the humanitarian
operations that have brought at least some relief.
One might question, however, whether the awesome human costs of
these policies are properly termed a "UN responsibility." The US
and Britain have taken the lead in blocking aid programs -- for
example, delaying approval for ambulances on the grounds that
they could be used to transport troops. Meanwhile, western
diplomats point out, "The US had directly benefited from Æthe
humanitarianÅ operation as much, if not more, than the Russians
and the French," for example, by purchase of $600 million worth
of Iraqi oil (second only to Russia) and sale by US companies of
$200 million in humanitarian goods to Iraq.
Saddam Hussein remains a monster and a serious threat, as he was
while he conducted his most awful crimes with US/UK support. But
the reaction of his former backers reeks of cynicism and
hypocrisy. And their current designs -- even putting aside
elementary considerations of international law -- may well make a
terrible situation even worse.
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