[Ilan Pappe is one of Israel’s foremost historians.]
The fence at the heart of Palestine
By Ilan Pappe
Al- Ahram weekly, 11-17 July 2002
http://www.ahram.org.eg/weekly/2002/594/op10.htm
Israel wants to do more than keep the suicide bombers out, writes Ilan
Pappe. It wants to erase the Palestinian nation once and for all
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In the middle of last month, Israel began building a fence to separate
itself physically from the West Bank. Among my friends on the Israeli left,
there are those who received this news with great enthusiasm. These are the
same friends who were convinced that the Oslo process would inevitably lead
to a lasting and comprehensive peace. Now, they are rejoicing again, because
they believe that this separation is the first step that will ultimately
lead to the creation of an independent Palestinian state. In their eyes, the
fence will serve as demarcation of the future border between Israel and
Palestine.
If they are right, and the planned fence is indeed meant to delineate these
boundaries, then Palestine -- the geopolitical entity for which the PLO had
been struggling ever since its inception -- is probably lost. For in that
case, the fence will virtually complete the process which was begun by the
Zionist movement in 1882, and has been continued vigorously by Israel since
1948 -- the process of de-Arabising the land of Palestine.
So far, the process has been advanced by settlement, expropriation and
expulsion. The putative Palestinian state was already reduced to a
ridiculously small patch of land by the Oslo Accord. Through Oslo, many new
and strange conceptions of statehood first emerged into international
discourse. One of these was the concept of a state composed of two parts
which have no geographical continuity, each of which is itself bisected and
bifurcated into cantons deprived of any territorial integrity.
Alas, my friends' optimistic interpretation of the fence is utterly wrong,
just as their interpretation of Oslo as a genuine peace process was wrong
before it. Far from heralding the arrival of a new chapter in the history of
Palestine, the erection of the fence is simply the continuation of an old
policy through new means. This policy is that of erasing Palestine as a
geographical, political and cultural entity from the map. In this article, I
want to situate the proposed fence in its context -- not just in relation to
Sharon's policies and objectives, but also as part of a wider historical
process which began in the late 19th century.
The fence has been widely welcomed in Israel. The only people who oppose it
are a few extremist settlers. For most Jews in Israel, what attracts them to
the fence is not the idea that it defines some final border, but rather its
potential to act as a security device and thus put an end to attacks by
Palestinian suicide bombers. However, the politicians (mainly Labour) who
first conceived the idea some six months ago see things rather differently.
For them, the fence's role is strategic, not simply tactical.
The two main contenders for the chairmanship of the Labour Party, Haim Ramon
and Benyamin Ben-Eliezer, have described the fence as a 'peace plan', not
just a means to prevent infiltration. This should come as no surprise. The
Labour Party has always sought a peace which would be based on a dividing
line. Indeed, this was their main slogan in the 1992 general elections: 'We
are here and they are there'. For Labour, the Zionist dream can only be
fulfilled through total separation between Palestinians and Jews. The
question of what exactly may happen on the other (Palestinian) side of the
fence never seems to bother these peace visionaries. They are not interested
in the economic viability of life on the other side, or in how it will
manage its natural and water resources (most of which Labour intends to keep
on the Israeli side of the divide), nor what its sovereignty will amount to
(which Labour in any case does not intend should be full or complete, since
Labour's 'Palestine' would incorporate many extra-territorial blocs of
Jewish settlements), nor even how it will achieve security (since security
is meant to remain exclusively in Israeli hands).
Not to mention the even more intricate question of what such a division
might mean for the one million Palestinians inside Israel. Are they 'We', or
are they 'They'?
One thing is clear though about this vision: it is quite compatible with
Sharon's basic approach to 'solving' the Palestine question. Of course,
Sharon originally intended to do it without a fence. But he has been
reconciled to the fence, for the sake of national unity. After all, the
Labour Party is proposing that he build a fence which will cut the West
Bank's present 5000 square kilometres in two, leaving 2500 of them in
Israel's hands. Why should Mr. Sharon refuse?
The fence may be part of an age-old scheme, but the decision to promote the
idea at this precise point in time is the consequence of the Israeli
population's despair at their government's inability to ensure their
personal security ever since the eruption of the Intifadat Al-Aqsa.
This is not the first time Sharon has exploited temporary fears, the better
to implement his long-term plans. In the summer of 1982, as the PLO's war of
resistance reached a new level of intensity, including the launching of
Qatusha missiles into Israel, he enlisted the Israeli settlers along the
northern border with Lebanon to support the invasion of their northern
neighbour. Then, not only did Sharon fail to achieve his tactical
objective -- the end of violence -- but he succeeded in provoking far worse
forms of violence. Today, the fence will inevitably produce the same result:
more violence against Israel -- and, of course, as always, more violence
against the Palestinians.
As in 1982, so now, there is an alternative. On the eve of Lebanon's
invasion, the PLO offered a way out, proposing a cease-fire and an
armistice. But Sharon had other plans. Violating the de facto cease-fire, he
sent the Israeli army to invade Lebanon, so as to install a government of
his liking in Beirut and destroy the PLO's infrastructure there. This time
round, the fence around the West Bank is Sharon's ploy to undermine the
opportunity opened up by the Saudi peace plan, which was endorsed by both
the Palestinians and the Arab League.
The peace track has the potential to offer lasting security to both Israelis
and Palestinians. But in a secure world, generals like Sharon do not thrive,
and indeed, may not even survive.
Sharon's approach to both Lebanon and the fence are a reflection of a global
Zionist- Israeli vision of imposing a settlement on the conflict by force,
thus erasing the concept of 'Palestine' from both memory and reality, and
substituting for it the name of its rival, Eretz Israel. This Eretz Israel
contains the regions of Judea and Samaria. These areas may be home to a
considerable number of 'Arabs', but these Arabs will have no power to
determine either the name of the country or its character. In due course,
they may well be expelled, when the time is ripe.
Palestine the country was scratched out of the Zionist consciousness very
early on; in fact, from the moment the first wave of Jewish immigrants
arrived on the land in 1882. As long as the Jewish community in Palestine
was a minority, living under the auspices of the British mandate,
Palestine's effacement remained symbolic, for there was as yet no military
power which might eliminate it physically on the ground. But it was already
totally excluded from the Zionist settlers' discourse and narrative.
When the opportunity came to translate that vision into reality in 1948,
Palestine was erased not only in word, but by the sword as well. The UN
partition resolution gave the Zionist movement 56 per cent of Palestine; the
1948 war allowed them to occupy 88 per cent of the country. To all intents
and purposes, it seemed that Palestine as a geo-political and cultural
entity had been destroyed.
But Palestine would not die. It lived on in the refugee camps, in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as among the Palestinian minority in Israel
itself. It survived the 1967 War and the passing of 100 per cent of
historical Palestine under Israeli control. During the first decade of the
occupation, the Labour government hoped that Palestine would finally be
expunged from regional and global consciousness when they proposed fusing
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with Jordan. But all their efforts were to
no avail.
And then in 1977 the Likud rose to power, bearing with it the Greater Israel
ideology. Now, the concept of 'Palestine' was to be drowned beneath the
massive waves of Jewish settlement that flooded into the occupied
territories, blocked out by the adamant refusal to even discuss the future
of the refugees, and silenced by the insistence that the Palestinians within
Israel were not a national group, but rather religious communities --
Christians and Muslims -- who had no right to self- determination or
collective national identity.
But this strategy too failed, and in 1987 the first Intifada broke out. The
uprising forced the Israelis, for the first time since 1948, to consider
Palestine as a possible political entity, which might take the form of an
independent state alongside Israel, to be established in the occupied
territories. Or at least, this was the principle to which they agreed in the
Oslo Accord. In retrospect, it would seem that the Israeli government never
had any intention of creating a Palestinian state on 22 per cent of
historical Palestine. At the same time, it would seem that the PLO, which
had by now evolved into the Palestinian Authority, did in fact make the most
significant concession ever granted by the Palestinian side, when it
consented to make do with a miniature Palestinian statelet as the
geopolitical realisation of its vision of liberation.
But even that limited wish was not to be granted. Micro-Palestine was no
sooner born, than it was dissected into areas A, B, and C, and the Gaza
Strip was cordoned off and encircled by an electric fence, as if it were one
huge prison. The result was to leave much of 'Palestine' -- 42 per cent of
the West Bank and about 20 per cent of the Gaza Strip -- under direct or
indirect Israeli occupation. This was the situation throughout the 'peace
process'. And yet the Israelis and Americans still cannot understand why the
Palestinians did not learn to put their faith in diplomacy and negotiation
as the best way to fulfil their dreams of self-determination and
independence! (At least the Europeans seem to be slightly more clear-
sighted in these matters.)
President Arafat was presented with this fait accompli at Camp David in the
summer of 2000, where he was told to simply 'take it or leave it'. Shortly
afterwards, the second Intifada broke out.
This unarmed uprising was turned into an armed revolt by harsh Israeli
retaliation to demonstrations and street protests. Gradually,
micro-Palestine was reoccupied. Yet whether under direct or indirect rule,
conditions for the occupied population were equally dismal. They found
themselves unemployed, starved and strangled, unable to move or properly
make a living. It is this situation which produced the suicide bombers. We
should not be surprised when people such as Cherie Blair, the wife of the
British prime minister, recognise this fact. To many people, the genesis of
these attacks is perfectly obvious. Reprehensible as they may be when the
targets are innocent civilians, they are the direct product of despair. This
fact was recognised also in a recent petition signed by Palestinian
intellectuals, which both condemned the attacks, and explained the context
which made them possible.
The Israelis have used all possible means to try and crush what they call
the 'terror infrastructure' -- as if F-16s, tanks and commando units could
instil much fear into young Palestinian men and women who are willing to
turn themselves into fireballs in the midst of a crowded Jerusalem street.
The human loss on the Israeli side has reached catastrophic proportions, in
relation to the country's history and population; tragedies that are
amplified by the fact that, in some cases, entire families perish in such
attacks. The almost incomprehensible cowardice of the Israeli press -- and
particularly the audiovisual media -- protects Jewish society from any real
knowledge of the context which has produced these personal calamities. There
is no mention of the occupation, the humiliations and assassinations, the
mass arrests, the destruction of houses and the starvation, which together
have bred these suicide attacks. With the public mind so carefully and
meticulously closed, it is little wonder that the fence has been accepted
unconditionally by most Israelis, for whom it has the power of a magic
formula.
Yet even an amateur can see that the fence will hardly pose any obstacle to
future suicide bombers. Instead, it will serve the past and present
ideological ambition of Israel to wipe out Palestine one time for all. After
all, the total disappearance of one's enemy is a far more 'convenient'
solution than compromise, reconciliation or accountability for the past.
With the help of this fence (in actual fact, a wall), Sharon is defining
what Palestine will be for future generations: half the West Bank, bisected
into isolated cantons, and an island consisting of 75 per cent of the Gaza
Strip. In these areas, Palestinians will be able to run their own municipal
affairs, though only just; they will even be allowed to call these fragments
a 'State'. To judge by President Bush's statement of 24 June 2002, America's
current vision of a solution to the Palestine problem coincides exactly with
that of the Israeli regime. Yet it is within this straight jacket that
President Bush expects democracy, transparency and economic prosperity to
flourish! This cynicism can only sour American- Palestinian relations
further, and may in a more distant future substantially harm the US's status
throughout the Arab world. For Bush will now be perceived as the facilitator
of Israel's attempt to wipe Palestine out of existence.
The fence, or rather wall, is also likely to work against Israel's interests
in a number of ways. Just as in the case of the Israeli siege of the
Muqata'a, where the Israelis isolated Arafat, only to find themselves in
their turn ostracised by most of the rest of the world, so here too the
consequences may be the contrary of those expected. For the wall encircles
Israel just as much as it cordons off Palestine. Stretching along Israel's
longest border, the Eastern front, such a wall can only increase the
country's already overwhelming sense of isolation, and reinforce the siege
mentality from which Israelis have suffered for so many years, and which has
fed support for the intransigent and aggressive policies of their
governments.
But of course, whatever it may do to Israel, the fence is far more
destructive for the Palestinians who are under occupation. It is hard to
talk of deterioration in their conditions, when those conditions are already
so grim and so inhuman; but unfortunately, however bad things are, they can
always be made worse.
So. will the international community listen to the wise words of Cherie
Blair, Desmond Tutu, Jose Saramago, Oliver Stone, Ted Turner, and many
others, who have understood what is happening and warned against the
impending calamity -- at the risk of being immediately branded anti-Semites,
if not neo- Nazis? Or will they remain silent, as they have for so many
years, in the face of yet another attempt to erase Palestine -- just as CNN
has succumbed to Israeli pressure and abandoned its previously balanced
coverage of the conflict? (The Israeli minister of communication is now
trying to remove the BBC World Service from the Israeli satellite and cable
networks, as punishment for its 'biased' coverage. One can only hope the BBC
will not give in as CNN did).
Since President Bush's latest statement on the Palestine issue essentially
gave a green light to the Israelis to do whatever they wished until the
congressional elections in the autumn of 2002, it seems likely that the
voices of wisdom will have to continue crying in the wilderness for some
time yet. Not so long ago, Palestine stretched from the Mediterranean to the
Jordan. Now, its indigenous Arab population is going to be fenced into an
area that represents less than 15 per cent of their country's original size.
Where are Europe and the Arab world, while all this is happening? Where are
the Asian and African nations? One can understand why Germany hesitates to
take a clear stand on the issue, although it is high time that it learned
the moral lesson of its own past conduct -- its moral obligation for the
Holocaust should place it in the vanguard of those nations which oppose
crimes against humanity, occupation and abuses of human rights, even if the
crimes are committed by those whose parents and grandparents were the
victims of that very same Holocaust. But what about the other member states
of the EU and the UN? As I have warned before, by the time they all wake up,
it may be too late. Too late not only for the Palestinians, but also for the
Israelis, who will certainly find it even more difficult to be accepted --
or even simply to survive -- in the Middle East, after a second Nakbah of
their making.
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