Fwd: Bush's U.N. Ambassador pick

From: Per I. Mathisen (Per.Inge.Mathisen@idi.ntnu.no)
Date: Mon Mar 12 2001 - 09:22:02 MET

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    http://www.inthesetimes.com/web2509/allen2509.html

    In From the Cold
    Bush's Pick for U.N. Ambassador Has
    some Spooky Stuff on his Resumé
    By Terry J. Allen

    Like spooks from an abandoned B-Movie graveyard, officials of the
    Reagan-Bush era are emerging from the dirt and showing up inside the
    George W. Bush administration. The latest resurrection is John Negroponte,
    whom Bush recently nominated as ambassador to the United Nations.

    As U.S. ambassador to Honduras from 1981 to 1985, Negroponte abetted and
    covered up human rights crimes. He was a zealous anti-Communist crusader
    in America's covert wars against the leftist Sandinista government in
    Nicaragua and the FMLN rebels in El Salvador. The high-level planning,
    money and arms for those wars flowed from Washington, but much of the
    on-the-ground logistics for the deployment of intelligence, arms and
    soldiers was run out of Honduras. U.S. military aid to Honduras jumped
    from $3.9 million in 1980 to $77.4 million by 1984. So crammed was the
    tiny country with U.S. bases and weapons that it was dubbed the USS
    Honduras, as if it were simply an off-shore staging ground.

    The captain of this ship, Negroponte was in charge of the U.S. Embassy
    when, according to a 1995 four-part series in the Baltimore Sun, hundreds
    of Hondurans were kidnapped, tortured and killed by Battalion 316, a secret
    army intelligence unit trained and supported by the Central Intelligence
    Agency. As Gary Cohn and Ginger Thompson wrote in the series, Battalion
    316 used "shock and suffocation devices in interrogations. Prisoners often
    were kept naked and, when no longer useful, killed and buried in unmarked
    graves." Members of Battalion 316 were trained in surveillance and
    interrogation at a secret location in the United States and by the CIA at
    bases in Honduras. Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the chief of the
    Honduran armed forces who personally directed Battalion 316, also trained
    in the United States at the School of the Americas.

    Negroponte tried to distance himself from the pattern of abuses, even
    after a flood of declassified documents exposed the extent of U.S.
    involvement with Battalion 316. In a segment of the 1998 CNN mini-series
    Cold War, Negroponte said that "some of the retrospective effort to try
    and suggest that we were supportive of, or condoned the actions of, human
    rights violators is really revisionistic."

    By the time Negroponte was appointed ambassador by President Reagan in
    1981, human rights activists in Honduras were vocally denouncing abuses.
    Former Honduran congressman Efrain Diaz Arrivillaga pleaded with
    Negroponte and other U.S. officials to stop the abuses committed by the
    U.S.-controlled military. "Their attitude was one of tolerance and
    silence," Diaz told the Sun. "They needed Honduras to loan its territory
    more than they were concerned about innocent people being killed."

    Negroponte ignored such protests, and annually filed State Department
    reports from Honduras that gave the impression that the Honduran military
    respected human rights. But in an interview with In These Times,
    Negroponte's predecessor as ambassador, Carter appointee Jack Binns, tells
    a different story: "Negroponte would have had to be deliberately blind not
    to know about human rights violations. ... One of the things a departing
    ambassador does is prepare a briefing book, and one of those issues we
    included [in our briefing book] was how to deal with the escalation of
    human rights issues."

    Binns considered the U.S. support for Alvarez and Battalion 316
    "counterproductive" to the declared objective of "establishing a rule of
    law." This lack of enthusiasm, Binns says, led to "my being cut out of the
    loop" by the Reagan administration, which he served for several months
    before Negroponte took over. In the summer of 1981, Binns recalls, "I was
    called unexpectedly to Washington by Tom Enders, the assistant secretary
    of state. He asked me to stop reporting human rights violations through
    official State Department channels and to use back channels because they
    were afraid of leaks."

    As Binns explains, back-channel messages "don't officially exist. The
    message is translated over CIA channels, decrypted and hand-carried from
    Langley, one copy only. No record."

    Binns did not agree to use back channels and when he returned to Honduras,
    he received no further reports of human rights violations from the CIA. "I
    was deliberately lied to," says Binns, who later found out that Reagan
    administration had been working behind his back.

    Honduras was only one of many hot spots where Negroponte served. He spent
    four years as a political officer in the U.S. Embassy in Saigon during the
    height of the Vietnam War. As an aide to then National Security Adviser
    Henry Kissinger at the Paris Peace Talks, he fell out of favor with his
    boss, wrote Mark Matthews in a 1997 article in the Sun, "by arguing that
    the chief U.S. negotiator was making too many concessions to the North
    Vietnamese." Negroponte also served in the Philippines, Panama and Mexico,
    where he was a strong booster for NAFTA.

    Rumored to have been Colin Powell's pick for the job of U.N. ambassador,
    Negroponte has a reputation as a loyal bureaucrat and efficient fixer. He
    also has a Cold War mentality characteristic of many of the old
    Reagan-Bush people surrounding the new president.

    The lessons Negroponte has learned from the past may shed light on what
    kind of U.N. ambassador he will be if his nomination is approved by the
    Senate. When he appeared in 1981 before a Senate committee for
    confirmation as envoy to Honduras, he said, "I believe we must do our best
    not to allow the tragic outcome of Indochina to be repeated in Central
    America."

    The tragedy to which he referred, of course, was the defeat of the United
    States, not the devastation and death caused by U.S. intervention.



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