http://www.cycad.com/cgi-bin/Upstream/Issues/decon/chomsky2.html
Artikkelen (også vedlagt nedenfor) er et innlegg fra Noam Chomsky til
en rekke andre debattanter i en diskusjon om postmodernismen. Chomsky
er kanskje den aller fremste amerikanske opposisjonelle, som i mer enn
en generasjon har holdt koken med en enorm radikal politisk aktivisme,
skribent-, og forfattervirksomhet. Han er samtidig en av verdens
fremste vitenskapsmenn, kanskje _den_fremste_ i faget lingvistikk, som
han er professor i ved Massachussets Institute of Technology (MIT) i
USA.
For min del er det meget hyggelig å observere at Chomsky argumenterer
helt parallellt med den måten vi motstandere av tåkefyrster og
jålebukker har argumentert på, i avisa KK, på KK-forum, på møtet i
Oslo.
Denne artikkelen bør leses spesielt nøye av de i KK-redaksjonen som
_ikke_ i utgangspunktet sokner til det postmodernistiske miljø, men
som av en eller annen grunn har begynt å tro at pomo er noe "nytt" og
"viktig" som folk som "bare" har bakgrunn i aktivisme og marxisme må
nærme seg med stor respekt. De bør nå innse at den postmoderne
keiseren ER naken, og at dette må få følger for redaksjonelle
prioriteringer i avisa.
Ellers bør KK trykke denne eller lignende artikler av Chomsky. Han
stiller ingen krav om honorar etc. Jeg tilbyr meg å oversette. Hva
sier redaksjonen?
Trond Andresen
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NOAM CHOMSKY ON "THEORY" AND "POST-MODERN CULTS"
I've returned from travel-speaking, where I spend most of my life, and
found a collection of messages extending the discussion about "theory"
and "philosophy," a debate that I find rather curious. A few reactions
-- though I concede, from the start, that I may simply not understand
what is going on.
As far as I do think I understand it, the debate was initiated by the
charge that I, Mike, and maybe others don't have "theories" and
therefore fail to give any explanation of why things are proceeding as
they do. We must turn to "theory" and "philosophy" and "theoretical
constructs" and the like to remedy this deficiency in our efforts to
understand and address what is happening in the world. I won't speak
for Mike. My response so far has pretty much been to reiterate
something I wrote 35 years ago, long before "postmodernism" had erupted
in the literary intellectual culture: "if there is a body of theory,
well tested and verified, that applies to the conduct of foreign
affairs or the resolution of domestic or international conflict, its
existence has been kept a well-guarded secret," despite much
"pseudo-scientific posturing."
To my knowledge, the statement was accurate 35 years ago, and remains
so; furthermore, it extends to the study of human affairs generally,
and applies in spades to what has been produced since that time. What
has changed in the interim, to my knowledge, is a huge explosion of
self- and mutual-admiration among those who propound what they call
"theory" and "philosophy," but little that I can detect beyond
"pseudo-scientific posturing." That little is, as I wrote, sometimes
quite interesting, but lacks consequences for the real world problems
that occupy my time and energies (Rawls's important work is the case I
mentioned, in response to specific inquiry).
The latter fact has been noticed. One fine philosopher and social
theorist (also activist), Alan Graubard, wrote an interesting review
years ago of Robert Nozick's "libertarian" response to Rawls, and of
the reactions to it. He pointed out that reactions were very
enthusiastic. Reviewer after reviewer extolled the power of the
arguments, etc., but no one accepted any of the real-world conclusions
(unless they had previously reached them). That's correct, as were his
observations on what it means.
The proponents of "theory" and "philosophy" have a very easy task if
they want to make their case. Simply make known to me what was and
remains a "secret" to me: I'll be happy to look. I've asked many times
before, and still await an answer, which should be easy to provide:
simply give some examples of "a body of theory, well tested and
verified, that applies to" the kinds of problems and issues that Mike,
I, and many others (in fact, most of the world's population, I think,
outside of narrow and remarkably self-contained intellectual circles)
are or should be concerned with: the problems and issues we speak and
write about, for example, and others like them. To put it differently,
show that the principles of the "theory" or "philosophy" that we are
told to study and apply lead by valid argument to conclusions that we
and others had not already reached on other (and better) grounds; these
"others" include people lacking formal education, who typically seem to
have no problem reaching these conclusions through mutual interactions
that avoid the "theoretical" obscurities entirely, or often on their
own.
Again, those are simple requests. I've made them before, and remain in
my state of ignorance. I also draw certain conclusions from the fact.
As for the "deconstruction" that is carried out (also mentioned in the
debate), I can't comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. But
if this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize
profundities, the course to follow is clear: just restate the results
to me in plain words that I can understand, and show why they are
different from, or better than, what others had been doing long before
and and have continued to do since without three-syllable words,
incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is
largely meaningless, etc. That will cure my deficiencies -- of course,
if they are curable; maybe they aren't, a possibility to which I'll
return.
These are very easy requests to fulfill, if there is any basis to the
claims put forth with such fervor and indignation. But instead of
trying to provide an answer to this simple requests, the response is
cries of anger: to raise these questions shows "elitism,"
"anti-intellectualism," and other crimes -- though apparently it is not
"elitist" to stay within the self- and mutual-admiration societies of
intellectuals who talk only to one another and (to my knowledge) don't
enter into the kind of world in which I'd prefer to live. As for that
world, I can reel off my speaking and writing schedule to illustrate
what I mean, though I presume that most people in this discussion know,
or can easily find out; and somehow I never find the "theoreticians"
there, nor do I go to their conferences and parties. In short, we seem
to inhabit quite different worlds, and I find it hard to see why mine
is "elitist," not theirs. The opposite seems to be transparently the
case, though I won't amplify.
To add another facet, I am absolutely deluged with requests to speak
and can't possibly accept a fraction of the invitations I'd like to, so
I suggest other people. But oddly, I never suggest those who propound
"theories" and "philosophy," nor do I come across them, or for that
matter rarely even their names, in my own (fairly extensive) experience
with popular and activist groups and organizations, general community,
college, church, union, etc., audiences here and abroad, third world
women, refugees, etc.; I can easily give examples. Why, I wonder.
The whole debate, then, is an odd one. On one side, angry charges and
denunciations, on the other, the request for some evidence and argument
to support them, to which the response is more angry charges -- but,
strikingly, no evidence or argument. Again, one is led to ask why.
It's entirely possible that I'm simply missing something, or that I
just lack the intellectual capacity to understand the profundities that
have been unearthed in the past 20 years or so by Paris intellectuals
and their followers. I'm perfectly open-minded about it, and have been
for years, when similar charges have been made -- but without any
answer to my questions. Again, they are simple and should be easy to
answer, if there is an answer: if I'm missing something, then show me
what it is, in terms I can understand. Of course, if it's all beyond my
comprehension, which is possible, then I'm just a lost cause, and will
be compelled to keep to things I do seem to be able to understand, and
keep to association with the kinds of people who also seem to be
interested in them and seem to understand them (which I'm perfectly
happy to do, having no interest, now or ever, in the sectors of the
intellectual culture that engage in these things, but apparently little
else).
Since no one has succeeded in showing me what I'm missing, we're left
with the second option: I'm just incapable of understanding. I'm
certainly willing to grant that it may be true, though I'm afraid I'll
have to remain suspicious, for what seem good reasons. There are lots
of things I don't understand -- say, the latest debates over whether
neutrinos have mass or the way that Fermat's last theorem was
(apparently) proven recently. But from 50 years in this game, I have
learned two things: (1) I can ask friends who work in these areas to
explain it to me at a level that I can understand, and they can do so,
without particular difficulty; (2) if I'm interested, I can proceed to
learn more so that I will come to understand it. Now Derrida, Lacan,
Lyotard, Kristeva, etc. -- even Foucault, whom I knew and liked, and
who was somewhat different from the rest -- write things that I also
don't understand, but (1) and (2) don't hold: no one who says they do
understand can explain it to me and I haven't a clue as to how to
proceed to overcome my failures. That leaves one of two possibilities:
(a) some new advance in intellectual life has been made, perhaps some
sudden genetic mutation, which has created a form of "theory" that is
beyond quantum theory, topology, etc., in depth and profundity; or (b)
... I won't spell it out.
Again, I've lived for 50 years in these worlds, have done a fair amount
of work of my own in fields called "philosophy" and "science," as well
as intellectual history, and have a fair amount of personal
acquaintance with the intellectual culture in the sciences, humanities,
social sciences, and the arts. That has left me with my own conclusions
about intellectual life, which I won't spell out. But for others, I
would simply suggest that you ask those who tell you about the wonders
of "theory" and "philosophy" to justify their claims -- to do what
people in physics, math, biology, linguistics, and other fields are
happy to do when someone asks them, seriously, what are the principles
of their theories, on what evidence are they based, what do they
explain that wasn't already obvious, etc. These are fair requests for
anyone to make. If they can't be met, then I'd suggest recourse to
Hume's advice in similar circumstances: to the flames.
Specific comment. Phetland asked who I'm referring to when I speak of
"Paris school" and "postmodernist cults": the above is a sample.
He then asks, reasonably, why I am "dismissive" of it. Take, say,
Derrida. Let me begin by saying that I dislike making the kind of
comments that follow without providing evidence, but I doubt that
participants want a close analysis of de Saussure, say, in this forum,
and I know that I'm not going to undertake it. I wouldn't say this if I
hadn't been explicitly asked for my opinion -- and if asked to back it
up, I'm going to respond that I don't think it merits the time to do
so.
So take Derrida, one of the grand old men. I thought I ought to at
least be able to understand his "Grammatology," so tried to read it. I
could make out some of it, for example, the critical analysis of
classical texts that I knew very well and had written about years
before. I found the scholarship appalling, based on pathetic
misreading; and the argument, such as it was, failed to come close to
the kinds of standards I've been familiar with since virtually
childhood. Well, maybe I missed something: could be, but suspicions
remain, as noted. Again, sorry to make unsupported comments, but I was
asked, and therefore am answering.
Some of the people in these cults (which is what they look like to me)
I've met: Foucault (we even have a several-hour discussion, which is in
print, and spent quite a few hours in very pleasant conversation, on
real issues, and using language that was perfectly comprehensible -- he
speaking French, me English); Lacan (who I met several times and
considered an amusing and perfectly self-conscious charlatan, though
his earlier work, pre-cult, was sensible and I've discussed it in
print); Kristeva (who I met only briefly during the period when she was
a fervent Maoist); and others. Many of them I haven't met, because I am
very remote from from these circles, by choice, preferring quite
different and far broader ones -- the kinds where I give talks, have
interviews, take part in activities, write dozens of long letters every
week, etc. I've dipped into what they write out of curiosity, but not
very far, for reasons already mentioned: what I find is extremely
pretentious, but on examination, a lot of it is simply illiterate,
based on extraordinary misreading of texts that I know well (sometimes,
that I have written), argument that is appalling in its casual lack of
elementary self-criticism, lots of statements that are trivial (though
dressed up in complicated verbiage) or false; and a good deal of plain
gibberish. When I proceed as I do in other areas where I do not
understand, I run into the problems mentioned in connection with (1)
and (2) above. So that's who I'm referring to, and why I don't proceed
very far. I can list a lot more names if it's not obvious.
For those interested in a literary depiction that reflects pretty much
the same perceptions (but from the inside), I'd suggest David Lodge.
Pretty much on target, as far as I can judge.
Phetland also found it "particularly puzzling" that I am so "curtly
dismissive" of these intellectual circles while I spend a lot of time
"exposing the posturing and obfuscation of the New York Times." So "why
not give these guys the same treatment." Fair question. There are also
simple answers. What appears in the work I do address (NYT, journals of
opinion, much of scholarship, etc.) is simply written in intelligible
prose and has a great impact on the world, establishing the doctrinal
framework within which thought and expression are supposed to be
contained, and largely are, in successful doctrinal systems such as
ours. That has a huge impact on what happens to suffering people
throughout the world, the ones who concern me, as distinct from those
who live in the world that Lodge depicts (accurately, I think). So this
work should be dealt with seriously, at least if one cares about
ordinary people and their problems. The work to which Phetland refers
has none of these characteristics, as far as I'm aware. It certainly
has none of the impact, since it is addressed only to other
intellectuals in the same circles. Furthermore, there is no effort that
I am aware of to make it intelligible to the great mass of the
population (say, to the people I'm constantly speaking to, meeting
with, and writing letters to, and have in mind when I write, and who
seem to understand what I say without any particular difficulty, though
they generally seem to have the same cognitive disability I do when
facing the postmodern cults). And I'm also aware of no effort to show
how it applies to anything in the world in the sense I mentioned
earlier: grounding conclusions that weren't already obvious. Since I
don't happen to be much interested in the ways that intellectuals
inflate their reputations, gain privilege and prestige, and disengage
themselves from actual participation in popular struggle, I don't spend
any time on it.
Phetland suggests starting with Foucault -- who, as I've written
repeatedly, is somewhat apart from the others, for two reasons: I find
at least some of what he writes intelligible, though generally not very
interesting; second, he was not personally disengaged and did not
restrict himself to interactions with others within the same highly
privileged elite circles. Phetland then does exactly what I requested:
he gives some illustrations of why he thinks Foucault's work is
important. That's exactly the right way to proceed, and I think it
helps understand why I take such a "dismissive" attitude towards all of
this -- in fact, pay no attention to it.
What Phetland describes, accurately I'm sure, seems to me unimportant,
because everyone always knew it -- apart from details of social and
intellectual history, and about these, I'd suggest caution: some of
these are areas I happen to have worked on fairly extensively myself,
and I know that Foucault's scholarship is just not trustworthy here, so
I don't trust it, without independent investigation, in areas that I
don't know -- this comes up a bit in the discussion from 1972 that is
in print. I think there is much better scholarship on the 17th and 18th
century, and I keep to that, and my own research. But let's put aside
the other historical work, and turn to the "theoretical constructs" and
the explanations: that there has been "a great change from harsh
mechanisms of repression to more subtle mechanisms by which people come
to do" what the powerful want, even enthusiastically. That's true
enough, in fact, utter truism. If that's a "theory," then all the
criticisms of me are wrong: I have a "theory" too, since I've been
saying exactly that for years, and also giving the reasons and
historical background, but without describing it as a theory (because
it merits no such term), and without obfuscatory rhetoric (because it's
so simple-minded), and without claiming that it is new (because it's a
truism). It's been fully recognized for a long time that as the power
to control and coerce has declined, it's more necessary to resort to
what practitioners in the PR industry early in this century -- who
understood all of this well -- called "controlling the public mind."
The reasons, as observed by Hume in the 18th century, are that "the
implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and
passions to those of their rulers" relies ultimately on control of
opinion and attitudes. Why these truisms should suddenly become "a
theory" or "philosophy," others will have to explain; Hume would have
laughed.
Some of Foucault's particular examples (say, about 18th century
techniques of punishment) look interesting, and worth investigating as
to their accuracy. But the "theory" is merely an extremely complex and
inflated restatement of what many others have put very simply, and
without any pretense that anything deep is involved. There's nothing in
what Phetland describes that I haven't been writing about myself for 35
years, also giving plenty of documentation to show that it was always
obvious, and indeed hardly departs from truism. What's interesting
about these trivialities is not the principle, which is transparent,
but the demonstration of how it works itself out in specific detail to
cases that are important to people: like intervention and aggression,
exploitation and terror, "free market" scams, and so on. That I don't
find in Foucault, though I find plenty of it by people who seem to be
able to write sentences I can understand and who aren't placed in the
intellectual firmament as "theoreticians."
To make myself clear, Phetland is doing exactly the right thing:
presenting what he sees as "important insights and theoretical
constructs" that he finds in Foucault. My problem is that the
"insights" seem to me familiar and there are no "theoretical
constructs," except in that simple and familiar ideas have been dressed
up in complicated and pretentious rhetoric. Phetland asks whether I
think this is "wrong, useless, or posturing." No. The historical parts
look interesting sometimes, though they have to be treated with caution
and independent verification is even more worth undertaking than it
usually is. The parts that restate what has long been obvious and put
in much simpler terms are not "useless," but indeed useful, which is
why I and others have always made the very same points. As to
"posturing," a lot of it is that, in my opinion, though I don't
particularly blame Foucault for it: it's such a deeply rooted part of
the corrupt intellectual culture of Paris that he fell into it pretty
naturally, though to his credit, he distanced himself from it. As for
the "corruption" of this culture particularly since World War II,
that's another topic, which I've discussed elsewhere and won't go into
here. Frankly, I don't see why people in this forum should be much
interested, just as I am not. There are more important things to do, in
my opinion, than to inquire into the traits of elite intellectuals
engaged in various careerist and other pursuits in their narrow and (to
me, at least) pretty unininteresting circles. That's a broad brush, and
I stress again that it is unfair to make such comments without proving
them: but I've been asked, and have answered the only specific point
that I find raised. When asked about my general opinion, I can only
give it, or if something more specific is posed, address that. I'm not
going to undertake an essay on topics that don't interest me.
Unless someone can answer the simple questions that immediately arise
in the mind of any reasonable person when claims about "theory" and
"philosophy" are raised, I'll keep to work that seems to me sensible
and enlightening, and to people who are interested in understanding and
changing the world.
Johnb made the point that "plain language is not enough when the frame
of reference is not available to the listener"; correct and important.
But the right reaction is not to resort to obscure and needlessly
complex verbiage and posturing about non-existent "theories." Rather,
it is to ask the listener to question the frame of reference that
he/she is accepting, and to suggest alternatives that might be
considered, all in plain language. I've never found that a problem when
I speak to people lacking much or sometimes any formal education,
though it's true that it tends to become harder as you move up the
educational ladder, so that indoctrination is much deeper, and the
self-selection for obedience that is a good part of elite education has
taken its toll. Johnb says that outside of circles like this forum, "to
the rest of the country, he's incomprehensible" ("he" being me). That's
absolutely counter to my rather ample experience, with all sorts of
audiences. Rather, my experience is what I just described. The
incomprehensibility roughly corresponds to the educational level. Take,
say, talk radio. I'm on a fair amount, and it's usually pretty easy to
guess from accents, etc., what kind of audience it is. I've repeatedly
found that when the audience is mostly poor and less educated, I can
skip lots of the background and "frame of reference" issues because
it's already obvious and taken for granted by everyone, and can proceed
to matters that occupy all of us. With more educated audiences, that's
much harder; it's necessary to disentangle lots of ideological
constructions.
It's certainly true that lots of people can't read the books I write.
That's not because the ideas or language are complicated -- we have no
problems in informal discussion on exactly the same points, and even in
the same words. The reasons are different, maybe partly the fault of my
writing style, partly the result of the need (which I feel, at least)
to present pretty heavy documentation, which makes it tough reading.
For these reasons, a number of people have taken pretty much the same
material, often the very same words, and put them in pamphlet form and
the like. No one seems to have much problem -- though again, reviewers
in the Times Literary Supplement or professional academic journals
don't have a clue as to what it's about, quite commonly; sometimes it's
pretty comical.
A final point, something I've written about elsewhere (e.g., in a
discussion in Z papers, and the last chapter of "Year 501"). There has
been a striking change in the behavior of the intellectual class in
recent years. The left intellectuals who 60 years ago would have been
teaching in working class schools, writing books like "mathematics for
the millions" (which made mathematics intelligible to millions of
people), participating in and speaking for popular organizations, etc.,
are now largely disengaged from such activities, and although quick to
tell us that they are far more radical than thou, are not to be found,
it seems, when there is such an obvious and growing need and even
explicit request for the work they could do out there in the world of
people with live problems and concerns. That's not a small problem.
This country, right now, is in a very strange and ominous state. People
are frightened, angry, disillusioned, skeptical, confused. That's an
organizer's dream, as I once heard Mike say. It's also fertile ground
for demagogues and fanatics, who can (and in fact already do) rally
substantial popular support with messages that are not unfamiliar from
their predecessors in somewhat similar circumstances. We know where it
has led in the past; it could again. There's a huge gap that once was
at least partially filled by left intellectuals willing to engage with
the general public and their problems. It has ominous implications, in
my opinion.