Vaapenhvile?

jonivar skullerud (jskuller@physics.adelaide.edu.au)
Wed, 14 Apr 1999 11:45:21 +0930

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From: "Bower, Jessica - RIUK" <J.Bower@research-int.com>
Subject: Message from Dave
Date: Tue, 13 Apr 1999 10:56:38 +0100

Dave Gee is now at the Quaker Council for Europe, and has been
working pretty hard for most of this year, and especially over the last few
weeks on the Kosovo issue. He asks everyone to pass on some proposals on
how to resolve the crisis, so here you go........
Best Wishes, Jess

Dear All

This is my last mailout type message to you. It is two sides of A4 and I
ask you to read it. I am sorry to those of you who have not wanted these
messages, but while the Kosovo/a crisis has been ongoing, I have not felt
inhibited to go over some boundaries. I am stopping my own campaign now
because I cannot sustain it alone in Brussels. I hope and know some of you
will carry it on, and my heart goes with you.

Many of you have been passing my messages on to others - thank you for that.
It is extremely important that alternative views are circulated in a climate
of media and political endorsement of the war. Please do pass this message
on if you agree with it, together with the peace plan circulated earlier if
possible.

Yours

David Gee
[acting independently]
Tel: + 32 2 230 4935 (day)
+ 32 2 231 1560 (eve)
Fax: +32 2 230 6370

Please take two minutes to read this. It shows why neither the NATO nor the
Yugoslav war campaign can be won, and presents a peace plan for Kosovo/a
based on a cease-fire.

Kosovo/a: Cease-fire only way out of deadlock

The NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia is not working, and has no chance
of bringing peace to Kosovo/a. This is why.

NATO has said it will continue its air campaign until one of two things
happens. The first scenario is that Milosevic accepts the NATO's conditions
for a cease-fire. Failing this, the second scenario is that Milosevic
becomes incapable of continuing his campaign of ethnic cleansing,
intimidation and murder of the people of Kosovo/a.

The idea that Milosevic will willingly accept NATO's cease-fire conditions,
which amount to complete capitulation on his part is unfortunately an
unrealistic and therefore hopeless one. The alternative of forcing Milosevic
to accept NATO's conditions is an equally unlikely strategy. Even if it were
successful, past experience suggests he would thwart any forced cease-fire
at every opportunity, thus making it virtually impossible to sustain, and
therefore useless.

In the absence of a cease-fire, NATO's strategy is to 'degrade' Milosevic's
ability to wage his war. This is not working because the war is being fought
by small mobile groups with small arms and light weapons which air
bombardments cannot affect. The half million refugees created since the NATO
action began testify to the ineffectiveness of the air campaign in this
regard. The callous atrocities within the territory which will only be known
after hostilities have ended will testify yet more brutally to this same
fact.

NATO's air campaign is therefore bound to fail, the conditions for
cease-fire will not be accepted willingly, and if forced would be
unworkable. Continuing and intensifying the campaign will cause the NATO
action to fail more disastrously.

Yugoslavia's campaign against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo/a is also bound to
fail. Under no circumstances will NATO accept anything less than a complete
reversal of the forced evacuation carried out under the auspices of the
Yugoslav government. Yugoslavia's strategy therefore reinforces NATO's
resolve to continue its attacks rather than ensuring any kind of victory for
Milosevic. His campaign of purging Kosovo/a of ethnic Albanians is a cynical
brutality which goes far beyond what could be described as the defence of a
sovereign country. It morally isolates Milosevic and Yugoslavia from the
peoples of the world, whose resolve is likewise confirmed against him and
the country he governs. If he continues his campaign, he locks himself and
Yugoslavia into an indefinite conflict with the rest of the world to his
personal and political detriment, leading ultimately nowhere for him or for
anyone else.

By continuing and intensifying their respective campaigns, NATO and
Yugoslavia bind themselves to a deadlock conflict whose negative side
effects become graver than the issues over which the inter-ethnic dispute is
ostensibly fought i.e. sovereignty vs. self-determination.

There is, however, a way out. It is self-evident that peace cannot begin
until war has stopped. Since neither side can win, and indeed both have
already lost, a cease-fire is the only available avenue, and is in any case
a humanitarian imperative. Yet neither Milosevic nor NATO can accept each
other's conditions to stop their war. Both sides must compromise for the
good of all. Now they must compromise also to save themselves.

A unilateral cease-fire on the part of NATO would be unlikely to bring a
like response from Yugoslavia. NATO should set at least two minimum
conditions. The first is that Yugoslavia declare its intention to withdraw
its troops from the territory of Kosovo/a. The second is that Yugoslavia
consent to a United Nations-led peacekeeping force on the territory of
Kosovo/a with a mandate which guarantees impartiality and the safety of the
Serb minority in the territory. This force should be replaced by unarmed
verifiers as soon as it is safe to do so.

In return, Yugoslavia should also set two conditions for its cease-fire. The
first is that NATO and NATO member states cease their involvement in the
dispute altogether, confining their activities to humanitarian aid support
only. The second should be that a new intermediary from a different region
be found to broker peace and justice negotiations. The intermediary should
be trusted both by the ethnic Albanian community in Kosovo/a (and
displaced), and by Yugoslavia. Nelson Mandela has been suggested.

At the time of writing, many commentators are advocating that the only way
to bring this war to an end is through a NATO-led ground invasion force.
This would be absolutely disastrous, resulting as it would in a protracted
and bloody war. Even if it were successful from the point of view of NATO,
peace between Serbs and Albanians in the territory would be impossible to
achieve, let alone sustain. A Serb terrorist culture would emerge and
reprisals against Albanians and against those from NATO member states would
be rife. Fear would be endemic throughout Kosovo/a, while at the
international level, dialogue with Yugoslavia would be completely cut off.

It is not winning the war, but winning peace and justice that is the true
challenge to both NATO and Yugoslavia. If ever this war were being fought
for either of these, now it most definitely is not. I write as a citizen of
a NATO member state and therefore as one responsible for the NATO
bombardment and the lives it has claimed. I appeal to all like myself, and
to all our brothers and sisters in Yugoslavia, as well as to decision-makers
and the media, to accept that this war cannot be won by anyone. For an
unwinnable war, it has done a lot of damage, to those injured or killed, and
to all of us. If we truly search for peace and justice in this dispute
rather than trying to teach Milosevic an expensive lesson he will not learn,
we should advocate a cease-fire now.

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