"Putin"s analyse av Russland

From: Karsten Johansen (kvjohans@online.no)
Date: Wed Jan 05 2000 - 17:10:45 MET


I følge Frankfurter Rundschau er nedenstående langtekkelige dokument av
teknokratiske og økonomiske platituder som kunne være hentet fra et
hvilketsomhelst dokument av vår tids newspeak neppe skrevet av Putin selv.
Det antydes ikke hvem ghostwriteren (-ne) er. Det har det samme upersonlige
preg som våre egne politikeres eller Clintons tomfrasete søndagsskoletaler.
Det er samtidig en underlig kontrast mellom denne tilsynelatende
humanistiske teksten og den ubetydelig utseende mannen man ser dele ut
kniver til grinende soldater.

Mannen går inn for en form for blandingsøkonomi men ser selvfølgelig helt
bort fra motsetningen mellom dette fromme ønsket og ønsket om en "økt
integrasjon i verdensøkonomien", et ønske som selvfølgelig stammer fra IMF.

Det er karakteristisk for vår tids politiske taler, at de alltid ser helt
vekk fra ethvert reelt problem og pakker det inn i økonomistiske fraser om
"effektivitet", "ledelse" osv. som kunne være hentet fra en tilfeldig
annonse etter ny adm. dir. i et eller annet firma. Vår tids politikk er
å pakke betennelser og kreftbyller inn i store bandasjer. Den problemløse
flukt framover.

Store deler av menneskehetens "ledere" er i dag mekaniske eksistenser uten
personlighet, de er språkløse og også ellers uten skapende kontakt med
virkeligheten. Den verden de medproducerer eller rettere: jatter med i, er
en lutkjedelig ørken av økonomistisk banalisme som skalkeskjul for en molok
på vei mot stupet. Direkte komisk blir det når det i et slikt produkt som
"Putin"s tales om "illitteracy". Fordi dokumentet til overmål viser, hvordan
denne bare har flyttet opp på et "høyere" nivå.

"Økonomi" er i dag en medial pseudovitenskap som består av floskler og
besvergelser. Den er et skalkeskjul for at forsvinnende mindretall
som f.eks. dem hvis interesser Putin representerer beriker seg grovt.
"Økonomien"s oppgave er å få dette tyveri til å virke "økonomisk".

Karsten Johansen

RUSSIA AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM
Vladimir Putin

The humankind lives under the sign of two signal events: the new millennium
and
the 2000th anniversary of Christianity. I think the general interest for and
attention to these two events mean something more than just the tradition to
celebrate red-letter dates.

New Possibilities, New Problems

It may be a coincidence - but then, it may be not - that the beginning of
the new millennium coincided with a dramatic turn in world developments in
the past 20-30 years. I mean the deep and quick changes in the life of
humankind connected with the development of what we call the post-industrial
society. Here are its main features.

 * Changes in the economic structure of society,
with the diminishing weight of
 material production and the growing share of
secondary and tertiary sectors.
 * The consistent renewal and quick introduction of
novel technologies and the
 growing output of science-intensive commodities.
 * The landslide development of the information
science and
 telecommunications.
 * Priority attention to management and the
improvement of the system of
 organisation and guidance of all spheres of human
endeavour.
 * And lastly, human leadership. It is man and high
standards of his education,
 professional training, business and social activity
that are becoming the
 guiding force of progress today.
 The development of a new type of society is a
sufficiently lengthy process for
 the careful politicians, statesmen, scientists and
all those who can use their
 brains to notice two elements of concern in this
process.
 The first is that changes bring not only new
possibilities to improve life, but
 also new problems and dangers. They were initially
and most clearly revealed
 in the ecological sphere. But other, and acute,
problems were soon detected in
 all other spheres of social life. Even the most
economically advanced states
 are not free from organised crime, growing cruelty
and violence, alcoholism
 and drug addiction, the weakening durability and
educational role of the family,
 and the like.
 And the other alarming element is that far from all
countries can use the boons
 of modern economy and the new standards of
prosperity offered by it. The
 quick progress of science, technologies and
advanced economy is underway in
 only a small number of states, populated by the
so-called golden billion.
 Quite a few other countries reached new economic
and social development
 standards in this outgoing century. But it cannot
be said that they joined the
 process of creating a post-industrial society. Most
of them are still far away
 from the mere approaches to it. And there are
grounds to believe that this gap
 will persist for quite some time yet.
 This is probably why the humankind is peering into
the future with both hope
 and fear at the turn of the new millennium.

 Modern Situation in Russia

 It would not be exaggeration to say that this
feeling of hope and fear is
 expressed especially graphically in Russia. For
there are few states in the
 world which faced so many trials as Russia in the
20th century.
 First, Russia is not a state symbolising top
standards of economic and social
 development now. And second, it is facing difficult
economic and social
 problems.
 Its GDP nearly halved in the 1990s, and its GNP is
ten times smaller than in
 the USA and five times smaller than in China. After
the 1998 crisis, the per
 capita GDP dropped to roughly 3,500 dollars, which
is roughly five times
 smaller than the average indicator for the G7 states.
 The structure of the Russian economy changed, with
the key positions held by
 the fuel industry, power engineering, and the
ferrous and non-ferrous
 metallurgy. They account for some 15% of the GDP,
50% of the overall
 industrial output, and over 70% of exports.
 Productivity in the real economy sector is
extremely low. It rose to well nigh
 the world average in the production of raw
materials and electricity, but is
 20-24% of the US average in the other industries.
 The technical and technological standards of
finished commodities largely
 depend on the share of equipment that is less than
five years old. It dwindled
 from 29% in 1990 to 4.5% in 1998. Over 70% of our
machinery and
 equipment are over ten years old, which is more
than two times the figure in
 the economically developed countries.
 This is the result of the consistently dwindling
national investments, above all
 to the real economy sector. And foreign investors
are not in a hurry to
 contribute to the development of Russian
industries. The overall volume of
 direct foreign investments in Russia amounts to
barely 11.5 billion dollars.
 China received as much as 43 billion dollars in
foreign investments.
 Russia has been reducing allocations on R&D, while
the 300 largest
 transnational companies provided 216 billion
dollars on R&D in 1997, and
 some 240 billion dollars in 1998. Only 5% of
Russian enterprises are engaged
 in innovative production, whose scale is extremely
low.
 The lack of capital investments and insufficient
attitude to innovations resulted
 in a dramatic fall in the production of commodities
that are world competitive
 in terms of price-quality ratio. Foreign rivals
have pushed Russia especially far
 back on the market of science-intensive civilian
commodities. Russia accounts
 for less than 1% of such commodities on the world
market, while the USA
 provides 36% and Japan, 30% of them.
 The real incomes of the population have been
falling since the beginning of the
 reforms. The deepest fall was registered after the
August 1998 crisis, and it
 will be impossible to restore the pre-crisis living
standards this year. The
 overall monetary incomes of the population,
calculated by the UN methods,
 add up to less than 10% of the US figure. Health
and the average life span, the
 indicators that determine the quality of life,
deteriorated, too.
 The current dramatic economic and social situation
in the country is the price,
 which we have to pay for the economy we inherited
from the Soviet Union. But
 then, what else could we inherit? We had to install
market elements into a
 system based on completely different standards,
with a bulky and distorted
 structure. And this was bound to affect the
progress of the reforms.
 We had to pay for the excessive focus of the Soviet
economy on the
 development of the raw materials sector and defence
industries, which
 negatively affected the development of consumer
production and services. We
 are paying for the Soviet neglect of such key
sectors as information science,
 electronics and communications. For the absence of
competition between
 producers and industries, which hindered scientific
and technological progress
 and made Russian economy non-competitive on the
world markets. This is our
 payment for the brakes, and even a ban, put on the
initiative and enterprise of
 enterprises and their personnel. And today we are
reaping the bitter fruit, both
 material and mental, of the past decades.
 On the other hand, we could have avoided certain
problems in this renewal
 process. They are the result of our own mistakes,
miscalculation and lack of
 experience. And yet, we could not have avoided the
main problems facing
 Russian society. The way to the market and
democracy was difficult for all
 states that entered it in the 1990s. They all had
roughly the same problems,
 although in varying degrees.
 Russia is completing the first, transition stage of
economic and political
 reforms. Despite problems and mistakes, it has
entered the highway by which
 the whole of humanity is travelling. Only this way
offers the possibility of
 dynamic economic growth and higher living
standards, as the world experience
 convincingly shows. There is no alternative to it.
 The question for Russia now is what to do next. How
can we make the new,
 market mechanisms work to full capacity? How can we
overcome the still deep
 ideological and political split in society? What
strategic goals can consolidate
 Russian society? What place can Russia occupy in
the international community
 in the 21st century? What economic, social and
cultural frontiers do we want
 to attain in 10-15 years? What are our strong and
weak points? And what
 material and spiritual resources do we have now?
 These are the questions put forward by life itself.
Unless we find clear answers
 to them which would be understandable to all the
people, we will be unable to
 move forward at the pace and to the goals which are
worthy of our great
 country.

 The Lessons Russia to Learn

 The answers to these questions and our very future
depend on what lessons we
 will learn from our past and present. This is a
work for society as a whole and
 for more than one year, but some of these lessons
are already clear.
 1. For almost three-fourths of the outgoing century
Russia lived under the sign
 of the implementation of the communist doctrine. It
would be a mistake not to
 see and, even more so, to deny the unquestionable
achievements of those
 times. But it would be an even bigger mistake not
to realise the outrageous
 price our country and its people had to pay for
that Bolshevist experiment.
 What is more, /it would be a mistake/ not to
understand its historic futility.
 Communism and the power of Soviets did not make
Russia a prosperous
 country with a dynamically developing society and
free people. Communism
 vividly demonstrated its inaptitude for sound
self-development, dooming our
 country to a steady lag behind economically
advanced countries. It was a road
 to a blind alley, which is far away from the
mainstream of civilisation.
 2. Russia has used up its limit for political and
socio-economic upheavals,
 cataclysms and radical reforms. Only fanatics or
political forces which are
 absolutely apathetic and indifferent to Russia and
its people can make calls to a
 new revolution.
 Be it under communist, national-patriotic or
radical-liberal slogans, our
 country, our people will not withstand a new
radical break-up. The nation's
 tolerance and ability both to survive and to
continue creative endeavour has
 reached the limit: society will simply collapse
economically, politically,
 psychologically and morally.
 Responsible socio-political forces ought to offer
the nation a strategy of
 Russia's revival and prosperity based on all the
positive that has been
 accumulated over the period of market and
democratic reforms and
 implemented only by evolutionary, gradual and
prudent methods. This strategy
 should be carried out in a situation of political
stability and should not lead to a
 deterioration of the life of the Russian people, of
any of its sections and
 groups. This indisputable condition stems from the
present situation of our
 country.
 3. The experience of the 90s vividly shows that our
country's genuine renewal
 without any excessive costs cannot be assured by a
mere experimentation in
 Russian conditions with abstract models and schemes
taken from foreign
 text-books. The mechanical copying of other
nations' experience will not
 guarantee success, either.
 Every country, Russia included, has to search for
its own way of renewal. We
 have not been very successful in this respect thus
far. Only in the past year or
 the past two years we have started groping for our
road and our model of
 transformation. We can pin hopes for a worthy
future only if we prove capable
 of combining the universal principles of a market
economy and democracy
 with Russian realities.
 It is precisely with this aim in view that our
scientists, analysts, experts, public
 servants at all levels and political and public
organisations should work.

 A Chance for a Worthy Future

 Such are the main lessons of the outgoing century.
They make it possible to
 outline the contours of a long-tern strategy which
is to enable us, within a
 comparatively short time, by historic standards, to
overcome the present
 protracted crisis and create conditions for our
country's fast and stable
 economic and social headway. The paramount word is
"fast", as we have no
 time for a slow start.
 I want to quote the calculations made by experts.
It will take us approximately
 fifteen years and an annual growth of our Gross
Domestic Product by 8
 percent a year to reach the per capita GDP level of
present-day Portugal or
 Spain, which are not among the world's
industrialised leaders. If during the
 same fifteen years we manage to ensure the annual
growth of our GDP by 10
 percent, we will then catch up with Britain or France.
 Even if we suppose that these tallies are not quite
accurate, our current
 economic lagging behind is not that serious and we
can overcome it faster, it
 will still require many years of work. That is why
we should formulate our
 long-term strategy and start fulfilling it as soon
as possible.
 We have already made the first step in this
direction. The Strategic Research
 Centre created on the initiative and with the most
active participation of the
 Government began its work in the end of December.
This Centre is to put
 together the best minds of our country to draft
recommendations for the
 government and proposals and theoretical and
applied projects which are to
 help elaborate the strategy itself and the more
effective ways of tackling the
 tasks which will come up in the process of its
implementation.
 I am convinced that ensuring the necessary growth
dynamics is not only an
 economic problem. It is also a political and, in a
certain sense, - I am not afraid
 to use this word - ideological problem. To be more
precise, it is an
 ideological, spiritual and moral problem. It seems
to me that the latter is of
 particular importance at the current stage from the
standpoint of ensuring the
 unity of Russian society.

 (A) Russian Idea

 Fruitful and creative work which our country needs
so badly today is
 impossible in a split and internally disintegrated
society, a society where the
 main social sections and political forces have
different basic values and
 fundamental ideological orientations.
 Twice in the outgoing century has Russia found
itself in such a state: After
 October 1917 and in the 90s.
 In the first case, civil accord and unity of
society were achieved not so much
 by what was then called "ideological- educational
work" as by power methods.
 Those who disagreed with the ideology and policy of
the regime were
 subjected to different forms of persecution up to
repression.
 As a matter of fact, this is why I think that the
term "state ideology" advocated
 by some politicians, publicists and scholars is not
quite appropriate. It creates
 certain associations with our recent past. Where
there is a state ideology
 blessed and supported by the state, there is,
strictly speaking, practically no
 room for intellectual and spiritual freedom,
ideological pluralism and freedom
 of the press, that is, for political freedom.
 I am against the restoration of an official state
ideology in Russia in any form.
 There should be no forced civil accord in a
democratic Russia. Social accord
 can only be voluntary.
 That is why it is so important to achieve social
accord on such basic issues as
 the aims, values and orientations of development,
which would be desirable for
 and attractive to the overwhelming majority of
Russians. The absence of civil
 accord and unity is one of the reasons why our
reforms are so slow and painful.
 Most of the strength is spent on political
squabbling, instead of the handling of
 the concrete tasks of Russia's renewal.
 Nonetheless, there have appeared some positive
changes in this sphere in the
 past year or a year and a half. The bulk of
Russians show more wisdom and
 responsibility than many politicians. Russians want
stability, confidence in the
 future and possibility to plan it for themselves
and for their children not for a
 month but for years and even decades to come. They
want to work in a situation
 of peace, security and a sound law-based order.
They wish to use the
 opportunities and prospects opened by the diversity
of the forms of ownership,
 free enterprise and market relations.
 It is on this basis that our people have begun to
perceive and accept
 supra-national universal values which are above
social, group or ethnic
 interests. Our people have accepted such values as
freedom of expression,
 freedom to travel abroad and other fundamental
political rights and human
 liberties. People value that they can have
property, be engaged in free
 enterprise, and build up their own wealth, and so
on, and so forth.
 Another foothold for the unity of Russian society
is what can be called the
 traditional values of Russians. These values are
clearly seen today.
 Patriotism. This term is sometimes used ironically
and even derogatively. But
 for the majority of Russians it has its own and
only original and positive
 meaning. It is a feeling of pride in one's country,
its history and
 accomplishments. It is the striving to make one's
country better, richer,
 stronger and happier. When these sentiments are
free from the tints of
 nationalist conceit and imperial ambitions, there
is nothing reprehensible or
 bigotedly about them. Patriotism is a source of the
courage, staunchness and
 strength of our people. If we lose patriotism and
national pride and dignity,
 which are connected with it, we will lose ourselves
as a nation capable of great
 achievements.
 Belief in the greatness of Russia. Russia was and
will remain a great power. It
 is preconditioned by the inseparable
characteristics of its geopolitical,
 economic and cultural existence. They determined
the mentality of Russians
 and the policy of the government throughout the
history of Russia and they
 cannot but do so at present.
 But Russian mentality should be expanded by new
ideas. In the present world
 the might of a country as a great power is
manifested more in its ability to be
 the leader in creating and using advanced
technologies, ensuring a high level of
 people's wellbeing, reliably protecting its
security and upholding its national
 interests in the international arena, than in its
military strength.
 Statism. It will not happen soon, if it ever
happens at all, that Russia will
 become the second edition of, say, the US or
Britain in which liberal values
 have deep historic traditions. Our state and its
institutes and structures have
 always played an exceptionally important role in
the life of the country and its
 people. For Russians a strong state is not an
anomaly which should be got rid
 of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a source and
guarantor of order and the
 initiator and main driving force of any change.
 Modern Russian society does not identify a strong
and effective state with a
 totalitarian state. We have come to value the
benefits of democracy, a
 law-based state, and personal and political
freedom. At the same time, people
 are alarmed by the obvious weakening of state
power. The public looks forward
 to the restoration of the guiding and regulating
role of the state to a degree
 which is necessary, proceeding from the traditions
and present state of the
 country.
 Social Solidarity. It is a fact that a striving for
corporative forms of activity has
 always prevailed over individualism. Paternalistic
sentiments have struck deep
 roots in Russian society. The majority of Russians
are used to connect
 improvements in their own condition more with the
aid and support of the state
 and society than with their own efforts, initiative
and flair for business. And it
 will take a long time for this habit to die.
 Do not let us try to answer the question whether it
is good or bad. The
 important thing is that such sentiments exist. What
is more, they still prevail.
 That is why they cannot be ignored. This should be
taken into consideration in
 the social policy, first and foremost.
 I suppose that the new Russian idea will come about
as an alloy or an organic
 unification of universal general humanitarian
values with traditional Russian
 values which have stood the test of the times,
including the test of the turbulent
 20th century.
 This vitally important process must not be
accelerated, discontinued and
 destroyed. It is important to prevent that the
first shoots of civil accord be
 crushed underfoot in the heat of political
campaigns, of some or other
 elections.
 The results of the recent elections to the State
Duma inspire great optimism in
 this respect. They reflected the turn towards
stability and civil accord, which is
 being completed in our society. The overwhelming
majority of Russians said
 No to radicalism, extremism and the opposition with
a revolutionary tint. It is
 probably the first time since the reforms have
begun that such favourable
 conditions have been created for constructive
cooperation between the
 executive and legislative branches of power.
 Serious politicians whose parties and movements are
represented in the new
 State Duma, are advised to draw conclusions from
this fact. I am positive that
 the feeling of responsibility for the destinies of
the nation will have the upper
 hand, and Russian parties, organizations and
movements and their leaders will
 not sacrifice the common interests of and prospects
in store for Russia, which
 call for a solidary effort of all healthy forces,
to the narrow partisan and
 time-serving considerations.

 (B) Strong State

 We are at a stage where even the most correct
economic and social policy
 starts misfiring while being realized due to the
weakness of the state power, of
 the managerial bodies. A key to Russia's recovery
and growth is in the
 state-policy sphere today.
 Russia needs a strong state power and must have it.
I am not calling for
 totalitarianism. History proves all dictatorships,
all authoritarian forms of
 government are transient. Only democratic systems
are intransient. Whatever
 the shortcomings, mankind has not devised anything
superior. A strong state
 power in Russia is a democratic, law-based,
workable federative state.
 I see the following directions of its formation:
 - a streamlined structure of the bodies of state
authority and management,
 higher professionalism, more discipline and
responsibility of civil servants,
 keener struggle against corruption;
 - a restructuring of the state personnel policy on
the basis of a selection of the
 best staffs;
 - creating conditions beneficial for the rise in
the country of a full-blooded
 civil society to balance out and monitor the
authorities;
 - a larger role and higher authority of the judiciary;
 - improved federative relations, including in the
sphere of budgets and
 finances; and
 - an active offensive on crime.
 Amending the Constitution does not seem to be an
urgent, priority task. What
 we have is a good Constitution. Its provisions
dealing with the individual rights
 and freedoms are seen as the best Constitutional
instrument of its kind in the
 world. It is a serious task, indeed, to make the
current Constitution and the
 laws made on the basis thereof, the norm of life of
the state, society and every
 individual, rather than draft a new Basic Law for
the country.
 The Constitutional nature of laws in the making is
a major problem in this
 respect. Russia currently operates over a thousand
federal laws and several
 thousand laws of the republics, territories,
regions and autonomous areas. Not
 all of them correspond to the above criterion. If
the justice ministry, the
 prosecutor's office and the judiciary continue to
be as slow in dealing with this
 matter as they are today, the mass of questionable
or simply un-Constitutional
 laws may become critical legally and politically.
The Constitutional safety of
 the state, the federal Center's capabilities, the
country's manageability and
 Russia's integrity would then be in jeopardy.
 Another serious problem is inherent in that tier of
authority which the
 government belongs to. The global experience
prompts the conclusion that the
 main threat to human rights and freedoms, to
democracy as such emanates
 from the executive authority. Of course, a
legislature which makes bad laws
 also does its bit. But the main threat emanates
from the executive authority. It
 organizes the country's life, applies laws and can
objectively distort,
 substantively and not always maliciously, these
laws by making executive
 orders.
 The global trend is that of a stronger executive
authority. Not surprisingly,
 society endeavors to better control it in order to
preclude arbitrariness and
 misuses of office. This is why I, personally, am
paying priority attention to
 building partner relations between the executive
authority and civil society, to
 developing the institutes and structures of the
latter, and to waging an active
 and tough onslaught on corruption.

 (C) Efficient Economy

 I have already said that the reform years have
generated a heap of problems that
 have accumulated in the national economy and social
sphere. The situation is
 complex, indeed. But, to put it mildly, it is too
early to bury Russia a great
 power. All troubles notwithstanding, we have
preserved our intellectual
 potentiality and human resources. A number of R&D
advances, advanced
 technologies have not been wasted. We still have
our natural resources. So the
 country has a worthy future in store for it.
 At the same time, we must learn the lessons of the
1990s and ponder the
 experience of market transformations.
 1. I see one of the main lessons in that throughout
these years we have been
 groping in the dark without having a clear
understanding of national objectives
 and advances which would ensure Russia's standing
as a developed, prosperous
 and great country of the world. The lack of a
long-range development strategy
 for the next 15-20 and more years, is badly felt in
the economy.
 The government firmly intends to build its activity
on the basis of the principle
 of unity of the strategy and tactics. Without it,
we are doomed to close holes
 and operate in the mode of fire-fighting. Serious
politics, big business are
 done differently. The country needs a long-term
national strategy of
 development. I have already said that the
government has started devising it.

 2. Another important lesson of the 1990s is the
conclusion that Russia needs
 to form a wholesome system of state regulation of
the economy and social
 sphere.
 I do not mean to return to a system of planning and
managing the economy by
 fiat, where the all-pervasive state was regulating
all aspects of any factory's
 work from top to bottom. I mean to make the Russian
state an efficient
 coordinator of the country's economic and social
forces that balances out their
 interests, optimizes the aims and parameters of
social development and creates
 conditions and mechanisms of their attainment.
 The above naturally exceeds the commonplace formula
which limits the state's
 role in the economy to devising rules of the game
and controlling their
 observance. With time, we are likely to evolve to
this formula. But today's
 situation necessitates deeper state involvement in
the social and economic
 processes. While setting the scale and planning
mechanisms for the system of
 state regulation, we must be guided by the
principle: The state must be where
 and as needed; freedom must be where and as required.

 3. The third lesson is the transition to a reform
strategy that would be best
 suited for our conditions. It should proceed in the
following directions.

 3.1. To encourage a dynamic economic growth. The
first to come here should
 be the encouragement of investments. We have not
yet resolved this problem.
 Investments into the real economy sector fell by 5
times in the 1990s,
 including by 3.5 times into fixed assets. The
material foundations of the
 Russian economy are being undermined.
 We call for pursuing an investment policy that
would combine purely market
 mechanisms with measures of state guidance.
 At the same time, we will continue working to
create an investment climate
 attractive to foreign investors. Frankly speaking,
the rise would be long and
 painful without foreign capital. But we have no
time for this. Consequently, we
 must do our best to attract foreign capital to the
country.

 3.2. To pursue an energetic industrial policy. The
future of the country, the
 quality of the Russian economy in the 21st century
will depend above all on
 progress in the spheres that are based on high
technologies and produce
 science-intensive commodities. For 90% of economic
growth is ensured
 today by the introduction of new achievements and
technologies.
 The government is prepared to pursue an economic
policy of priority
 development of industries that lead in the sphere
of research and technological
 progress. The requisite measures include:
 - assist the development of extra-budgetary
internal demand for advanced
 technologies and science-intensive products, and
support export-oriented
 high-tech productions;
 - support non-raw materials industries working
mostly to satisfy internal
 demand;
 - buttress the export possibilities of the fuel and
energy and raw-materials
 complexes.
 We should use the mechanisms, which have long been
used in the world, to
 mobilise the funds necessary for pursuing this
policy. The most important of
 them are the target-oriented loan and tax
instruments and the provision of
 privileges against state guarantees.

 3.3. To carry out a rational structural policy. The
government thinks that like in
 other industrialised countries, there is a place in
the Russian economy for the
 financial-industrial groups, corporations, small
and medium businesses. Any
 attempts to slow down the development of some, and
artificially encourage the
 development of other economic forms would only
hinder the rise of the
 national economy. The policy of the Government will
be spearheaded at
 creating a structure that would ensure an optimal
balance of all economic
 forms of management.
 Another major sphere is the rational regulation of
the operation of natural
 monopolies. This is a key question, as they largely
determine the structure of
 production and consumer prices. And hence they
influence both the economic
 and financial processes, and the dynamics of the
people's incomes.

 3.4. To create an effective financial system. This
is a challenging task, which
 includes the following directions:
 - to raise the effectiveness of the budget as a
major instrument of the
 economic policy of the state;
 - to carry out a tax reform;
 - to get rid of non-payments, barter and other
pseudo-monetary forms of
 settlement;
 - to maintain a low inflation rate and stability of
the rouble;
 - to create civilised financial and stock markets,
and turn them into an
 instrument of accumulating investment resources;
 - to restructure the bank system.

 3.5. To combat the shadow economy and organised
crime in the economic and
 financial-credit sphere. All countries have shadow
economies. But their share
 in the GDP does not exceed 15-20% in industrialised
countries, while the
 figure for Russia is 40%. To resolve this painful
problem, we should not just
 raise the effectiveness of the law-enforcement
agencies, but also strengthen
 the license, tax, hard currency and export control.

 3.6. To consistently integrate the Russian economy
into world economic
 structures. Otherwise we would not rise to the high
level of economic and
 social progress that has been attained in the
industrialised countries. The main
 directions of this work are:
 - to ensure an active support of the state to the
foreign economic operation of
 Russian enterprises, companies and corporations. In
particular, the time is ripe
 for creating a federal agency to support exports,
which would provide
 guarantees to the export contracts of Russian
producers;
 - to resolutely combat the discrimination of Russia
on the world markets of
 commodities, services and investments, and to
approve and apply a national
 anti-dumping legislation;
 - to incorporate Russia into the international
system of regulating foreign
 economic operation, above all the WTO.

 3.7. To pursue a modern agrarian policy. The
revival of Russia will be
 impossible without the revival of the countryside
and agriculture. We need an
 agrarian policy that would organically combine
measures of state assistance
 and state regulation with the market reforms in the
countryside and in land
 ownership relations.

 4. We must admit that virtually all changes and
measures entailing a fall in the
 living conditions of the people are inadmissible in
Russia. We have come to a
 line beyond which we must not go.
 Poverty has reached a mind-boggling scale in
Russia. In early 1998, the
 average-weighted world per capita income amounted
to some 5,000 dollars a
 year, but it was only 2,200 dollars in Russia. And
it dropped still lower after
 the August 1998 crisis. The share of wages in the
GDP dropped from 50% to
 30% since the beginning of reforms.
 This is the most acute social problem. The
Government is elaborating a new
 income policy designed to ensure a stable growth of
prosperity on the basis of
 the growth of real disposable incomes of the people.
 Despite these difficulties, the Government is
resolved to take new measures to
 support science, education, culture and health
care. For a country where the
 people are not healthy physically and
psychologically, are poorly educated and
 illiterate, will never rise to the summits of world
civilisation.
 Russia is in the midst of one of the most difficult
periods in its history. For
 the first time in the past 200-300 years, it is
facing a real threat of sliding to
 the second, and possibly even third, echelon of
world states. We are running of
 time left for removing this threat. We must strain
all intellectual, physical and
 moral forces of the nation. We need coordinated
creative work. Nobody will
 do it for us.
 Everything depends on us, and us alone. On our
ability to see the size of the
 threat, to pool forces and set our minds to hard
and lengthy work.



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