- dersom solen er blå.
Nedenstående forestillinger om at "en løsning er mulig nå" i Midtøsten,
er med den løsningen som skisseres og som tenkes implementert/diktert av
USA "og dets allierte" (som det nå alltid heter for et syns skyld),
selvsagt det rene skjære feberville nonsens, som bare viser at de
professorale forfatterne ikke befinner seg i virkelighetens verden. Hvis
dette skulle finne sted "nå" som de foreslår, måtte først 1) hele den
nåværende israelske Sharon-junta og det oppfanatiserte folkeflertall som
støtter den fjernes og pasifiseres med makt hvilket selvsagt ville bety
blokade av og krig mot Israel og fengsling av Sharon og hans
krigsforbryterske kumpaner og 2) for at det skulle være tenkelig måtte
Bush-familie-juntaen fjernes fra makten i USA, valgsystemet der endres
grunnleggende i demokratisk retning og for å oppnå det hele den sosiale
orden og maktstrukturene i USA forandres radikalt etc. etc. etc. Det
sier seg selv at dette ikke finner sted i overskuelig framtid og
sannsynligvis aldri, ja det er langt mer sannsynlig at klodens øko- og
klimasystem bryter alvorlig sammen innenfor samme tidshorisont og at vi
får en verdenskrig enn at dette vil skje.
Derimot kan det sikkert i nøye samspill med Israel bli forsøkt diktert
en "løsning" som betyr en slags nye forsøk på en sørafrikansk utformning
av Israel, piggtrådsgjerder osv., med en eller annen israelsk
marionettregjering sminket som "palestinsk selvstyre", men å tro at
dette skulle bety annen fred enn evt. kirkegårdens er helt komisk.
Men hvornår vi kan håpe på at alle vrøvlehodene som lever av å sminke
virkeligheten til skal ti still er uvisst.
Karsten Johansen
Guardian:
A solution is possible now
Middle East negotiations have failed. But the US can make a final deal
stick
Hussein Agha and Robert Malley
Friday March 29, 2002
The Guardian
Since the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the
outbreak of the second intifada, two propositions have gained wide
acceptance. The first is that a comprehensive solution to end the
conflict has already been attempted - and at this point, if tried again,
can only fail. The second is that an interim solution is the only way
out of the current crisis. The mounting death tolls on both sides seem
to confirm that conflict management rather than conflict resolution
should be the order of the day.
In fact, now is precisely the time for a US-led international coalition
to put forward an end-of-conflict deal. History demonstrates that the
incremental method has failed. Yet because Israelis and Palestinians did
not reach an agreement at Camp David in 2000 or at the talks in Taba,
proponents of moving toward a final agreement immediately are dismissed
as naive or out of touch.
In truth, however, the final-status negotiations in 2000-1 were not a
departure from the approach that had prevailed since 1993, but rather
its culmination. No common principles guided the discussions; instead, a
vision was meant to emerge from an incremental process of give-and-take.
As a result, neither side was able to rebut its domestic opponents or
rally potential supporters behind a comprehensive vision.
Negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians have now reached the
point of diminishing - even negative - returns. Rather than bringing the
two sides closer, negotiations serve to play up remaining disagreements
and to play down the broad scope of actual convergence. The time for
negotiations has ended. The parties must be presented with a
non-negotiable final agreement.
The case for seeking a comprehensive deal depends on whether it is
possible to design a package that both sides can accept. Israel's basic
interests are to preserve its Jewish character, safeguard its security,
acquire international recognition, maintain its links to Jewish holy
sites and establish that the conflict with the Palestinians and Arab
states has ended once and for all. As for the Palestinians, their basic
interests can be defined as living in freedom, dignity, equality and
security; ending the occupation and achieving national
self-determination; resolving the refugee issue fairly; governing the
Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem; and ensuring that any deal
is accepted as legitimate by the Arab and Muslim worlds.
Past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and informal discussions show that
a solution does exist consistent with both sides' needs. The key concept
on the territorial issue is swaps: Israel would annex a minimal amount
of land in the West Bank and in return provide Palestine with the
equivalent amount of land from Israel proper. Israel would incorporate a
large number of its West Bank settlers and the Palestinians would
achieve their goal of 100% territorial restitution. On security, the
essentials are the non-militarisation of the Palestin ian state and the
introduction of a US-led international force along the border with
Israel. Solving the problem of Jerusalem will require a deal based on
demographic and religious self-governance.
This leaves what is perhaps the most vexing problem of all: the
Palestinian refugees. With one side clamouring for their right of return
and the other adamantly rejecting it, it seems like one on which no
compromises are possible. Throughout the 2000-1 negotiations, the
Palestinians underestimated the degree to which Israelis associate even
a theoretical Palestinian right of return with the prospect of the end
of Israel as a Jewish state. The Israelis, for their part, have
belittled the seriousness of the Palestinians' demand. With two-thirds
of the Palestinian people still living as refugees, the sense of
injustice at being evicted from their land pervades Palestinians'
national consciousness and has defined their struggle, even more than
the desire to establish an independent state.
A solution that appeared to ignore the demands of the refugees would be
inherently unstable. It would have questionable legitimacy, would
undermine the new Palestinian state, and - most alarming from an Israeli
perspective - would leave open the prospect that a sizable number of
Palestinians would decide to carry on the struggle.
But a stable and durable accommodation is possible. Refugees should be
given the choice to return to the general area where they lived before
1948 (along with the choice to live in Palestine, resettle or be
absorbed by their current country of refuge if the host country agrees).
Many of the refugees want to go back to their original homes. But these
homes, and in many cases the entire villages where they were located,
either no longer exist or are now inhabited by Jews. The next best
option from the refugees' own perspective would be to live among people
who share their language, religion and culture - that is, among the Arab
citizens of Israel. Israel would settle the refugees in its
Arab-populated territory along the 1967 boundaries. Those areas would
then be included in the land swap with Palestine and end up as part of
the new Palestinian state.
Together with generous financial compensation, this solution would
promote several key interests. Palestinian refugees would carry out the
right of return. Although they would not return to their original homes,
the refugees would get to live in a more hospitable environment - and
one that would ultimately be ruled not by Israelis, but by their own
people. For Israelis, meanwhile, it would improve the demographic
balance, since the number of Arab Israelis would diminish as a result of
the land transfer.
Some Palestinians might argue that such a plan represents a sleight of
hand, disguising resettlement in Palestine as a return to their pre-1948
lands. But do the refugees actually want to live in Jewish areas that
have become part of an alien country? Would they rather live under
Israeli rule? And short of calling into question Israel's Jewish
identity, is there any other way of implementing the Palestinian right
of return?
Lurking behind every dispute over an Israeli-Palestinian deal is the
problem of its implementation. Achieving a lasting final-status
agreement now will require some means to persuade both parties that this
time commitments will actually be upheld. An international force would
help provide such assurances. The paradox is that, although the outlines
of a solution have been understood for some time, the way to get there
has eluded all sides. Achieving such a deal will require the
intervention of outside actors. Led by the US and sanctioned by a UN
security council resolution, the effort should involve a broad coalition
of European, Arab and other countries capable of providing security, as
well as economic and political support, to Israelis and Palestinians.
Some will argue that anything coming from the outside will be viewed as
a foreign imposition and therefore be rejected. However, if the deal is
based on Israeli-Palestinian discussions it will not be viewed as
imposed; and if it is fair, it is unlikely to be rejected. Moreover,
ratification should be based on popular referenda in Israel and among
the Palestinian people.
The point now should not be to accommodate Israeli and Palestinian
leaders' limitations; it should instead be to make the limitations of
both sets of leaders irrelevant. The time has come for an effort that is
neither top-down nor bottom-up, but outside-in: the forceful
presentation by external actors of a comprehensive, fair and lasting
deal.
·Hussein Agha is senior associate member of St Antony's College, Oxford
and has been involved in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations over many
years. Robert Malley was President Clinton's Special Assistant for
Arab-Israeli Affairs between 1998 and 2001. A longer version of this
article will appear in the May issue of Foreign Affairs.
© 2002 Foreign Affairs Magazine/ NYT Syndicate
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