Nedenfor følger nytt om de innerste sirkler i Nato-aksjonen i Jugoslavia
fra BBC. Medlemmene av "the bombing pause lobby" spesifiseres ikke, men det
er interessant at de fantes. Hørte Vollebæk til blant dem? Våre
bombetilhengere (unnskyld) på venstresiden gjorde det ihvertfall ikke.
Antakelig en trøst for Vollebæk.
"The ruthless alliance management by Washington" synes å være operativ
fremdeles: "America favours independence for the Albanian community". Ikke
så rart Vollebæk "ikke får det til i Kosovo" (dvs hindre etnisk rensing av
serbere) (Dagbladet 22. august 1999).
Knut Rognes
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BBC News, Friday, August 20, 1999 Published at 03:34 GMT 04:34 UK
Nato's inner Kosovo conflict
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_425000/425468.stm
In a special Newsnight programme Mark Urban investigates Nato's handling of
the Kosovo crisis. Interviewing the key players he finds that the Allies
were far from united. (Newsnight - BBC Two - 10.30pm - Friday 20 August)
...
George Robertson: "We had to delegate quite a degree of authority to
military commanders" In return for a promise that Nato would only hit
"strictly military targets", the lukewarm allies were pursuaded to back them.
Gen Clark then hit the Milosevic party HQ, the presidential palace and the
TV stations - all targets taken from the Phase Three list that several
allies had refused to vote for.
The Supreme Commander then proceeded with his escalation, occasionally
phoning the key political leaders to get particularly sensitive targets
okayed.
"I didn't always defer to those who wanted targets withheld," Gen Clark now
reveals.
Many people at Nato feel the Supreme Commander did the only thing he could
to win the war under what were initially very tight political restrictions.
"You cannot fight wars by committee", says one.
... On 13 October last year, when Nato voted through the airstrikes plan
that it actually used this March, its governments ruled out even planning
for a ground war - a restriction which American officials later tried to
blame on the Europeans.
When June's deal was finally done to send in the international Kosovo Force
(K-For), the whole operation had to be postponed for 24 hours because US
troops were not ready to go in.
The reason: the White House had refused to let them go ashore until it was
absolutely clear they wouldn't have to fight their way into Kosovo.
President Clinton was determined to conduct the operation by airpower alone.
And if President Milosevic had still been holding out right now? Then he
might have had to consider seriously using ground troops, but what would
have been the chances of such an operation being approved by Nato as a whole?
Decidedly slim it is now clear.
... The "triumph of Nato resolve" trumpeted by some leaders after Milosevic
agreed to withdraw is therefore emerging now as a triumph of ruthless
alliance management by Washington.
When it suited them - for example in keeping the 'bombing pause' lobby in
check they used Nato's constitution with its stress on unanimity skilfully.
When Washington needed to escalate the bombing and it didn't suit them,
they worked their way around these same rules.
For the decision-makers involved the ends justified the means.
The alternative, a humiliating climbdown for Nato, was too awful to
contemplate.
The war though, did not win them a permanent solution to the Kosovo issue.
Allied splits are once again evident about what should happen there in the
future: America favours independence for the Albanian community, France and
Germany are dead against it.
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