Tiananmen-arkiva er no offentlege. Desse ultrahemmelege dokumenta inneheld
ord for ord diskusjonane mellom dei kinesiske leiarane like før dei
bestemte seg for å knuse studentopprøret på Tienanmen 3. og 4. juni 1989
(rundt tusen drepne). Dei har blitt smugla ut av Kina av ein ansvarleg i
kommunistpartiet som kallar seg "tilhengjar av reformar". Vedkommande
ynskjer sjølvsagt å vera anonym. Det amerikanske tidsskriftet "Foreign
Affairs", som har fått dokumenta autentifisert av tre sinologar,
publiserer dei i januar-februarutgåva. Alt no finst det utdrag her:
http://63.236.1.211/articles/tiananmen0102.html
Sjå også Libération :
http://www.liberation.fr/quotidien/semaine/20010109marj.html
Oddmund Garvik
Foreign Affairs January / February 2001
<<<<<<<
Introduced by Andrew J. Nathan
In China today, economic reform continues apace. Political
liberalization, however, remains essentially frozen -- as it has
been since the tragic suppression of student demonstrations in
the spring of 1989. The massive student protests, which filled
Beijing's Tiananmen Square and other public places in cities
throughout China, were meant to push the country's
authoritarian rulers toward political reform. They failed.
Now, an unprecedented trove of hitherto secret documents
provides an extraordinary account of the divisions among China's
top leaders as they confronted the uprising. Some sought
accommodation through dialogue with the students. These
moderates lost out, however, to those who came to favor
repression by military force. "The Tiananmen Papers" -- adapted
from a forthcoming book of the same title -- reveals through the
minutes of secret meetings and classified reports the power
struggles, changing fortunes, and bloody decisions that still
haunt China's political life today.
The verbatim accounts of the leaders' deliberations are neither
black nor white. All the leaders started with the intention to
resolve the protests peacefully, while maintaining Communist
Party control and enforcing public order. Sentiment for using
military force swelled as key leaders came to fear that
"outsiders" who wanted to topple the regime were encouraging
the demonstrations. Some readers may judge this a story of
pragmatic, if authoritarian, leaders struggling unsuccessfully with
tough problems. Others will render harsher verdicts. Whatever
the interpretation, the Tiananmen tragedy remains compelling
because its effects linger, suffocating political liberalization.
What of the credibility of the documents and of those who
spirited them out of China with the hope of re-energizing
political reform? Extensive efforts at authentication by three
respected American scholars are detailed in the book. The editor
of Foreign Affairs conferred at length with them and with the
Chinese compiler and concurred that there are "convincing
grounds" to assume that the documents are credible and
therefore should be published. An absolute judgment is not
possible, however, given the secretive and close nature of the
Chinese regime.
The 1989 demonstrations were begun by Beijing students to
encourage continued economic reform and liberalization. The
students did not set out to pose a mortal challenge to what
they knew was a dangerous regime. Nor did the regime relish the
use of force against the students. The two sides shared many
goals and much common language. Yet, through
miscommunication and misjudgment, they pushed one another
into positions where options for compromise became less and
less available.
The spark for the student movement was a desire to
commemorate the reformer Hu Yaobang, who had died on April
15. He had been replaced two years earlier as general secretary
(party leader) by another moderate, Zhao Ziyang, after student
demonstrations in December 1986. Once begun, however, the
commemoration quickly evolved into a protest for far-reaching
change. On May 4, a student declaration was read in Tiananmen
Square calling on the government to accelerate political and
economic reform, guarantee constitutional freedoms, fight
corruption, adopt a press law, and allow the establishment of
privately run newspapers.
Zhao Ziyang struggled to achieve consensus within the
leadership around a conciliatory line toward the students. Senior
leader Deng Xiaoping seemed willing to consider anything, so
long as the students were somehow cleared from the square in
time for Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's upcoming summit visit.
But disaster struck for Zhao Ziyang's moderate strategy on May
13, when the protesting students announced a hunger strike.
During the next few days, the intellectuals joined in, incidents in
the provinces began to erupt, and the summit that the
authorities envisioned as a triumphant climax to years of
diplomacy with the Soviet Union was thrown into the shadows.
The huge foreign press contingent that had come to Beijing for
the summit turned its main attention to the student movement.
Over the course of several weeks, the hunger strikers gained
the support of tens of millions of other citizens, who took to the
streets in scores of cities to demand a response from the
government. The government at first tried to wait out the
hunger strikers, then engaged them in limited dialogue, and
finally issued orders to force them from the square. In reaching
that decision, the party suffered its worst high-level split since
the Cultural Revolution. Those favoring political reform lost out
and their cause has been in the deep freeze ever since.
The regime has, to be sure, diminished the range of social
activities it purports to control in comparison with the
totalitarian ambitions of its Maoist years. It has fitted its goals
of control more to its means and no longer aspires to change
human nature. It has learned that many arenas of freedom are
inessential to the monopoly of political power.
The documents in this article provide the first view of the
student demonstrations from Zhongnanhai -- the former imperial
park at the center of Beijing that houses the Party Central
Office, the State Council Office, and the residences of some top
leaders. Although the leaders occupied distinct official posts in a
triad of organizations -- the ruling Chinese Communist Party, the
State Council (government cabinet), and the Central Military
Commission -- behind those red walls they acted as a small and
often informal community of perhaps ten decision-makers and
their staffs.
The eight "elders," retired senior officials who together
mounted to China's extraconstitutional final court of appeal,
joined their deliberations at crucial moments. The final voice
belonged to Deng Xiaoping, who was retired from all government
posts except one and lived outside Zhongnanhai in a private
mansion with his own office staff. It was at this house that the
most crucial meetings of these tormented months took place.
Into Zhongnanhai flowed a river of documentation from the
agencies charged with monitoring and controlling the capital city
of Beijing and the vast nation beyond it. On a daily and hourly
basis Party Central received classified reports from government,
military, and party agencies and diplomatic missions abroad. The
material included reports on the state of mind of students,
professors, party officials, military officers and troops, workers,
farmers, shop clerks, street peddlers, and others around the
country. Also captured in these reports is the thinking of
provincial and central leaders on policy issues; the traffic on
railways; discussions in private meetings; man-in-the-street
interviews; and press, academic, and political opinion from
abroad. Taken as a whole, these reports tell in extraordinary
detail what the central decision-makers saw as they looked out
from their compound on the events unfolding around them, and
how they evaluated the threat to their rule.
The records reveal that if left to their own preferences the
three-man majority of the Politburo Standing Committee would
have voted to persist in dialogue with the students instead of
declaring martial law. But, as the Tiananmen papers reveal, the
Politburo Standing Committee was obligated by a secret
intra-party resolution to refer any stalemate to Deng and the
elders. The documents further show that Deng exercised
absolute control over the military through his associate Yang
Shangkun, who was president of the prc and standing vice chair
of the Central Military Commission. Had the Standing Committee
refused to honor the elders' wishes, Deng had ample means to
exert his authority.
China's current leader, Jiang Zemin, was party secretary in
Shanghai in 1989. What The Tiananmen Papers reveals is that
his accession to supreme power came about through a
constitutionally irregular procedure -- the vote of the elders on
May 27 -- and that the elders chose him because he was a
pliable and cautious figure who was outside the paralyzing
factional fray that had created the crisis in the first place.
Today's second-ranking member of the party hierarchy, Li Peng,
was premier in 1989. Not only did he advocate a hard line
against the students and go on television to declare martial law,
as is already known, but the papers show that he manipulated
information to lead Deng and the other elders to see the
demonstrations as an attack on them personally and on the
political structure they had devoted their careers to creating.
The Tiananmen Papers also reveals his use of the intelligence
and police agencies to collect information that was used to
persecute liberal officials and intellectuals after the crackdown.
Both Li Peng and Jiang Zemin are scheduled to step down from
their high-level party and state offices in 2002 and 2003. Some
commentators expect Jiang will try to retain his third post, that
of chairman of the Central Military Commission, thus enabling him
to exert influence as a party elder from behind the scenes, as
Deng did in the period described in The Tiananmen Papers.
The events of 1989 left the regime positioned for its responses
to later challenges, such as the Chinese Democratic Party in
1998-99 and the Falun Gong religious movement since 1999. In
both of these incidents and others, the key to the party's
behavior was its fear of independent organizations, whether of
religious followers or students, workers or farmers, with or
without a broad social base, and with or without party members
as constituents. The core political issue has remained what it
was in 1989, even if the sociology has been different: the party
believes that as soon as it gives in to any demand from any
group that it does not control, then the power monopoly that it
views as the indispensable organizational principle of the political
system will be destroyed.
>>>>>>> continue
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