>Objective: Kosovo
>How would a ground war work? Here's one scenario.
>By Robert Killebrew
>Sunday, April 25, 1999; Page B01
>"You can ask me for anything you like, except time."
>--Napoleon
>The United States' and NATO's miscalculation of Serb intransigence has
>led the alliance into a strange, one-sided war of attrition, in which Yugoslav
>President Slobodan Milosevic stands to win by waiting out NATO's air
>attacks. NATO's options seem to be: continue bombing and hope that
>Milosevic capitulates; seek a negotiated settlement; or initiate a combined
>ground-air offensive in Kosovo to secure the province by force.
>There are dangers inherent in all three, but unless Milosevic caves in,
>ground operations provide the only realistic chance NATO and the United
>States have of winning this war.
>Pundits have decried the time it would take to deploy effective ground
>forces to the region and to do the job. Some estimates amount to
>"months." But the estimates are wrong.
>Despite difficulties in establishing ground operations--notably distance,
>terrain and weather--my experience in more than 20 years of planning and
>executing rapid force deployment operations tells me that NATO could get
>the right forces there in weeks, not months, and that its combined
>air-ground campaign could defeat decisively the estimated 40,000 regular
>and irregular Yugoslav forces now in Kosovo as well as reinforcements
>from elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Sadly, American and other NATO
>casualties will be unavoidable as combat soldiers enter the risky world of
>face-to-face war.
>NATO has no shortage of rapidly deployable, tough and lethal ground
>units. If NATO decides to use them, land operations should resemble the
>lightning U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 rather than the massive armored
>juggernaut of Desert Storm in 1991. In fact, a protracted Persian Gulf
>War-style buildup would be counterproductive, allowing time for the
>Yugoslav army to entrench further.
>First, however, NATO forces need a clear mission. For starters, a NATO
>objective to establish a broad and comprehensive settlement across the
>Balkans, one that leads to security and peace for its inhabitants, would give
>military commanders the scope and authority they need to plan and
>conduct a winning campaign in and around Kosovo.
>Second, once NATO enters a ground war, the combined air-ground
>campaign must employ overwhelming power to force a rapid and decisive
>conclusion. That has not been the case thus far in the air war for many
>reasons, but primarily because although air power can sometimes prompt
>negotiation, it is never decisive on its own.
>The list of available Western forces already in the Balkans is impressive.
>Britain, France and Germany have around 12,000 troops in Macedonia.
>They have some very effective helicopter-borne units, and enough British
>Challenger, German Leopard and French AMX-30 tanks there to form a
>significant armored force on Kosovo's southern border, along one of the
>few feasible tank routes into the area. The United States has deployed an
>Apache antitank helicopter unit and rocket artillery to Albania, along with a
>contingent of infantry for local security. Military engineers from other
>NATO countries--soon to be deployed to support refugees--could also
>build and maintain ground supply routes and resupply points around
>Kosovo's periphery that would support combat forces.
>The best-suited U.S. ground forces available for a Kosovo intervention
>come not from Europe, but from the Army's XVIII Airborne Corps, which
>is frequently the "tip of the spear" of U.S. military power. Its four
>U.S.-based infantry divisions (roughly 14,000 to 18,000 troops in each)
>deploy quickly: It conducted the fast-moving Operation Just Cause in
>Panama, and it led the U.S. initial ground defense of Saudi Arabia during
>the Persian Gulf crisis.
>The size and design of the corps' infantry divisions allow them to be moved
>rapidly in Air Force transport planes, particularly the new C-17, designed
>specifically for airdrops or landing on crude airstrips. Once in the battle
>area, the infantry of the 82nd and 101st Airborne and 10th Mountain
>Divisions would speed around the battle area in Humvees or low-flying
>Blackhawk helicopters. The corps' aviation and artillery, teamed with
>NATO aircraft flying close support, would provide crushing firepower, and
>its highly trained infantry are prepared for the grim business of killing or
>disarming paramilitaries. Its heavy punch is the 3rd Mechanized Infantry
>Division, composed of M1A2 main battle tanks and mechanized infantry.
>This division, and its supporting cargo ships, maintain constant readiness to
>load combat-ready armored forces on short notice and steam at more than
>25 knots from Savannah, Ga., to distant ports. They are days, not weeks,
>from the Balkans.
>Campaign planning for Kosovo must take into account the area's relative
>isolation, as well as its rugged terrain, poor roads and rotten weather. If
>Greece permits, the use of its ports and roads from Greece through
>Macedonia would considerably ease the movement of supplies.
>Geography would restrict the rapid deployment of large armored
>formations into Kosovo. Fortunately, the Adriatic Sea is nearby, raising the
>possibility of ship-to-shore support to forward bases in Albania.
>The Yugoslav army and paramilitaries are not impressive. This is an
>outdated, Soviet-style force whose only recent exercise has been shelling
>civilians. Knowledgeable former Yugoslav military men have low opinions
>of the fighting ability of the present crop of city-bred Serbian conscripts,
>and think NATO could prevail with fewer troops than the standard
>three-to-one ratio of attack to defense.
>Last Thursday, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana authorized the
>alliance's military command to review plans for the possible use of ground
>troops in Kosovo. I have operated with some of these forces, I have seen
>them in action and studied the results of their campaigns. Their methods are
>well-known, and the scenario that follows reveals nothing that would
>compromise their mission or aid their enemy. Based on my experience and
>on publicly available information, here's one theory of how a combined
>air-ground NATO campaign might unfold:
>The campaign would likely consist of three distinct phases. In the first 48
>hours of an assault, NATO forces would attack hardened Yugoslav
>positions, armor and forces that could offer serious resistance.
>In the second phase, NATO forces would secure the avenues of approach
>to Kosovo from the rest of Yugoslavia. NATO infantry would seek out
>and destroy or disarm paramilitaries and police. This phase would last
>considerably longer, perhaps several weeks.
>The third phase would bring a gradual return of law and order to the
>province, the return of refugees and begin the process of reconstruction.
>NATO forces would secure the border, suppress terrorism and conduct
>peace operations. This phase would continue indefinitely.
>The Scenario Begins
>A campaign designed to destroy the Yugoslav forces in Kosovo quickly
>actually begins weeks before the fighting starts. Troops and their antitank
>and transport helicopters are airlifted into Albania or elsewhere in the
>region. These deployments will be unavoidably public, since movements of
>this size cannot be completely hidden. But once in field locations,
>operational and tactical secrecy is possible, given the rugged and isolated
>terrain in the Balkans. Yugoslav forces in the field would be unaware of the
>extent of the NATO force buildup in Albania, particularly if their
>communications and intelligence systems are destroyed by NATO action.
>The Airborne Corps' 3rd Mechanized Division's equipment puts to sea. At
>the same time, NATO special forces infiltrate Kosovo to pick up
>intelligence on enemy troops, and NATO troop commanders scrutinize
>intelligence on their positions and prepare to attack.
>Day One
>Intensified air attacks crash down on enemy forces along the
>Albania-Kosovo and Macedonia-Kosovo borders on the first day of the
>NATO strike. Yugoslav forces near the borders are driven underground or
>destroyed. Other strikes hit Yugoslav forces anywhere in Yugoslavia that
>could reinforce their forward forces or react against a NATO incursion.
>Under cover of darkness, special units secure the summits of key peaks
>overlooking Kosovo's long valleys.
>Simultaneously, brigade-size task forces of 1,500 to 2,000 soldiers and
>their equipment launch into Kosovo in darkened Blackhawk helicopters.
>Wearing night-vision goggles, the pilots fly fast and low across the jagged
>terrain, bypassing Yugoslav positions and striking deeply into rear areas.
>British, German and French armor, supported by air power, attack north
>from Macedonia toward Kosovo's capital, Pristina. Since Kosovo is
>relatively small, much of NATO's logistic support remains in Albania or
>Macedonia, to be called forward as required.
>Within 24 hours of the ground attack, tank-killing Apaches, Marine
>Cobras from ships off Albania and infantry teams fan out across the
>province by day and by night, searching for Serb units, positions and
>headquarters already located by satellite and aerial reconnaissance.
>Apache and Cobra attack helicopters, supported by NATO firepower
>from the sky and from ground-based artillery, seek out surviving Yugoslav
>army armored forces as a first priority and strike them from outside the
>tanks' effective gun range. Infantry troops, either moving in assault
>helicopters or across country in Kevlar-hardened Humvees with machine
>guns or rapid-fire 40mm grenade launchers, clear villages of Yugoslav
>forces, while covered by armed helicopters in the distance.
>Week One and Beyond
>As the days pass, large urban areas are cut off and bypassed by combat
>forces. Psychological warfare units and military police concentrate on
>coaxing out civilians and remaining enemy troops. House-to-house fighting
>is a last resort.
>American casualties are minimized as the troops operate mainly at night,
>capitalizing on their superior night-fighting techniques and training. As
>forces flow into the area behind the infantry, civil affairs units and support
>personnel arrive to begin opening the way for humanitarian organizations
>and medical personnel to address the remaining traumatized population of
>Kosovo. NATO fighter and bomber aircraft with their precision weaponry
>and sophisticated communications are always overhead. Other early
>arriving armored forces unload in Greece and drive north to Macedonia.
>Within a week or two, fighting between large units begins to wind down.
>Most Yugoslav forces have been taken or destroyed. The campaign,
>however, moves toward its truly critical stage--scattered infantry fights that
>continue for weeks and months against snipers, drive-by assassins and
>paramilitary thugs, all of whom are aided by the difficult terrain. The scale
>of the war diminishes from large-scale combat to scattered small-unit
>actions and then to terrorism. NATO forces face the complex challenge of
>restoring the rule of law, rebuilding a civil society and beginning to return
>the refugees to their homes, many of which would be rubble. And as the
>seasons change, NATO also faces the threat of worsening weather. This
>final phase will be long, dangerous and difficult, but we should not be put
>off by the difficulty. Kosovo is not Vietnam, and the paramilitary thugs are
>not the Viet Cong.
>Aftermath
>We should make no mistake that there will be casualties. If this becomes a
>ground war, U.S. infantrymen will be facing it the old-fashioned way,
>across rifle sights, amid the snap and crack of incoming small-arms fire.
>American and NATO infantry are the best there is, though, and recent
>experience in Panama, Iraq and Mogadishu clearly shows that they can
>beat any opposition, and with the fewest possible losses.
>For NATO's military, even the best "end state" of a Kosovo operation will
>be wearying and difficult. Long-term NATO peacekeeping garrisons will
>be established in the Balkans. Since we are now relearning--for the third
>time this century--that the peace and stability of Europe is necessary for
>our own security, garrisoning the Balkans will be a small price to pay for
>having drifted so close to anarchy and the threat of a wider war. But even
>under the most favorable conditions, we're there for the long haul.
>Bob Killebrew retired from the U.S. Army as an infantry colonel in 1997.
>He writes and speaks on defense issues.
>© Copyright 1999 The Washington Post Company
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