Fwd: WAS A PEACEFUL KOSOVO SOLUTION REJECTED BY U.S.?
Kjell S Johansen (kjellsjo@online.no)
Thu, 15 Apr 1999 09:03:34 +0200
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>> FAIR-L
>> Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting
>> Media analysis, critiques and news reports
>
>> ACTION ALERT: WAS A PEACEFUL KOSOVO SOLUTION REJECTED BY U.S.?
>>
>> April 14, 1999
>>
>> Since the beginning of the NATO attack on Yugoslavia, the war has been
>> presented by the media as the consequence of Yugoslavia's stubborn
>> refusal to settle for any reasonable peace plan, in particular its
>> rejection of plans for an international security force to implement a
>> peace plan in Kosovo.
>>
>> An article in the April 14 New York Times stated that Yugoslavian
>> President Milosevic "has absolutely refused to entertain an outside
>> force in Kosovo, arguing that the province is sovereign territory of
>> Serbia and Yugoslavia."
>>
>> Negotiations between the Serb and Albanian delegations at the
>> Rambouillet meeting in France ended with Yugoslavia's rejection of the
>> agreement adopted, after much prodding, by the Albanian party.
>>
>> But is that the whole story? On February 21, the Yugoslavs assented to
>> the terms of the political portion of the Rambouillet agreement. Their
>> rejection stemmed from their opposition to the requirement that 28,000
>> NATO troops be stationed in Kosovo to oversee the implementation of
>> the accord. This military clause, requiring NATO troops, was inserted
>> without the knowledge of the Russian representatives, who opposed the
>> provision.
>>
>> By the close of the first round of the Rambouillet talks in late
>> February, Serb President Milan Milutinovic had already declared
>> Serbia's willingness to to discuss "an international presence in
>> Kosovo" to monitor the implementation of the accords. On February 21,
>> Madeleine Albright responded by insisting that "We accept nothing less
>> than a complete agreement, including a NATO-led force."
>>
>> On March 23, the day before the NATO bombing began, the Serbian
>> parliament adopted a resolution again rejecting the military portion
>> of the accords, but expressing willingness to review the "range and
>> character of an international presence" in Kosovo. According to the
>> Toronto Star's correspondent in Belgrade on March 24, "There have been
>> hints Serbia might ultimately accept a U.N. force."
>>
>> But the U.S. appears to have been unwilling to consider any option
>> other than NATO troops. At a March 24 State Department press briefing,
>> spokesman James Rubin was asked about this development:
>>
>> QUESTION: Was there any follow-up to the Serbian Assembly's yesterday?
>> They had a two-pronged decision. One was to not allow NATO troops to
>> come in; but the second part was to say they would consider an
>> international force if all of the Kosovo ethnic groups agreed to some
>> kind of a peace plan. It was an ambiguous collection of resolutions.
>> Did anybody try to pursue that and find out what was the meaning of
>> that?
>>
>> MR. RUBIN: Ambassador Holbrooke was in Belgrade, discussed these
>> matters extensively with President Milosevic, left with the conclusion
>> that he was not prepared to engage seriously on the two relevant
>> subjects. I think the decision of the Serb Parliament opposing
>> military-led implementation was the message that most people received
>> from the parliamentary debate. I'm not aware that people saw any
>> silver linings.
>>
>> QUESTION: But there was a second message, as well; there was a second
>> resolution.
>>
>> MR. RUBIN: I am aware that there was work done, but I'm not aware
>> that anybody in this building regarded it as a silver lining.
>>
>> In other words, the State Department was aware that the Serbian
>> parliament expressed openness to an "international presence," but this
>> was not seen as a "silver lining," apparently because only a NATO
>> force was acceptable to the U.S.
>>
>> Those who support the bombing of Yugoslavia argue that all peaceful
>> options for arriving at a settlement in Kosovo had been exhausted.
>> Journalists need to do more reporting on the Rambouillet process to
>> see if that in fact was the case.
>>
>> ***
>>
>> ACTION: Please contact local and national media and call on them to
>> report on the U.S. State Department's insistence that only a NATO-led
>> force in Kosovo could keep the peace there. Did this position make it
>> more or less likely that the rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo
>> would be protected?
>>
>> You can contact the New York Times at:
>>
>> Andrew Rosenthal-- Foreign Editor
>> mailto:letters@nytimes.com; andyr@nytimes.com
>>
>> Contact information for other media outlets can be found at:
>> http://www.fair.org/media-contact-list.html
>>
>> For more information on media coverage of the war in Yugoslavia, see
>> http://www.fair.org/international/yugoslavia.html .
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