Mvh. Kai Braathen
----------
>From: smirnowb@ix.netcom.com (Robert Smirnow)
>To: democracy@pacifica.org
>Subject: Fwd: Y2K and nuclear power
>Date: fre 11. des 1998 21:10
>
>----
>
>Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1998 16:40:21 -0500
>From: Michael Mariotte <nirsnet@igc.org>
>Reply-To: nirsnet@igc.org
>Organization: NIRS
>
>To: nirsnet@igc.org
>Subject: Y2K and nuclear power
>
>Sender: owner-nukenet@envirolink.org
>
>
>Dear Friends, today (December 10, 1998), NIRS submitted three emergency
>petitions to the NRC about the Y2K issue and nuclear power. A news
>release and fact sheet are below; the petitions themselves and other
>material is available on the NIRS website.
>
>Michael Mariotte
>NIRS
>
>NEWS FROM NIRS
>Nuclear Information and Resource Service
>1424 16th Street NW, #404, Washington DC 20036
>202-328-0002; fax: 202-462-2183; nirsnet@nirs.org, www.nirs.org
>
>FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Contact: Michael Mariotte, Paul Gunter,
>Mary
>Olson
>December 10, 1998 202-328-0002
>
>
>NAT'L GROUP SUBMITS THREE EMERGENCY RULEMAKINGS TO NRC
>
>Y2K COMPUTER BUG MAY AFFECT SAFETY OF ATOMIC REACTORS
>AND ABILITY TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY CONDITIONS
>
>Washington, DC. The Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS)
>today submitted three emer-gency petitions for rulemaking to the
>federal
>Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to address problems that may be
>caused to atomic power reactors and the electric power grid by the Y2K
>computer bug.
>
>"The Y2K computer problem is greater than most people imagined even a
>year ago," said NIRS' execu-tive director Michael Mariotte, "and it is
>becoming clear that not every nuclear utility will be Y2K com-pliant in
>time for the millennium. Further, the possibility of electrical grid
>instability and local and re-gional blackouts cannot be ruled out, and
>nuclear power reactors require large amounts of electricity for
>essential cooling even when closed. Moreover, few-if any-utilities have
>actually tested emergency plans to cope with potential Y2K
>difficulties.
>Our petitions address each of these issues."
>
>The first NIRS petition would require the NRC to close by December 1,
>1999 any reactor that cannot prove, through full testing, that it is
>Y2K
>compliant until it can prove such compliance. The second peti-tion
>would
>require nuclear utilities to install additional backup power units to
>ensure a steady supply of electricity to reactors. The third petition
>would require each utility to engage in a full-scale emergency response
>exercise during 1999 in which plant personnel must attempt to address a
>Y2K-related problem.
>
>The petitions were submitted under 10 CFR 2.802, a formal legal process
>that can lead to the establish-ment of binding regulations. NIRS
>requested that the petitions be treated in an expedited manner.
>
>"The nuclear industry and the NRC say they are working diligently to
>resolve the Y2K problem," said Mariotte, "and we believe them.
>Unfortunately, the magnitude of the problem is so large that not every
>nuclear utility is likely to complete their work in time. The actions
>we
>are requesting today are prudent, modest steps-some would say too
>modest-to help ensure that the Y2K computer bug does not lead to
>catastrophe. The probabilities of severeY2K problems for some nuclear
>utilities fall well within the prob-abilities for which the NRC has
>promulgated other major safety rules."
>
>"The NRC and the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) consistently have said
>that they have not identified any Y2K safety-related issues at nuclear
>reactors," said Paul Gunter, Director of NIRS' Reactor Watchdog
>Project.
>"But a November 6, 1998 audit of Y2K issues at the Seabrook, New
>Hampshire reactor found 12 safety-related systems affected by the Y2K
>bug, another 13 systems that could cause a reactor trip, and more than
>800 affected systems "significant to business.
>
>"A key issue for all nuclear utilities, even those able to put their
>house in order, is stability of the electri-cal grid," said Gunter.
>"There are thousands of utilities and independent power generators in
>the U.S. and Canada and it is highly unlikely all will resolve their
>Y2K
>problems in time. Instability of the grid could lead to local and
>regional blackouts, and the NRC has identified Æin NUREG-1150, the
>agency's basic safety documentÅ station blackout as the single largest
>contributor to risk at many reactors."
>
>Gunter explained that nuclear utilities typically use diesel-powered
>generators to provide necessary power to cool reactor cores in the
>event
>of a blackout. This cooling power is necessary for months even when
>reactors are shut down. But a NIRS investigation of the generators,
>attached as an appendix to the peti-tion, found that they frequently
>don't work and are subject to multitudes of problems. "This is just the
>tip of the iceberg," said Gunter, "our investigation of these
>generators
>is continuing and we are finding they are even less reliable than we
>had
>believed."
>
>High-level atomic waste fuel pools at every reactor site also must be
>cooled; otherwise, the water cover-ing the fuel rods could boil off,
>and
>their lethal radioactive inventory released. "The NRC currently does
>not
>even require that these fuel pools have back-up power," noted NIRS
>radioactive waste specialist Mary Olson. "But any extended blackout
>would place these pools at severe risk. We are demanding that the NRC
>add backup power capability, and to classify these pools as
>safety-related and requiring cooling."
>
>Mariotte noted that current rules only require nuclear utilities to
>conduct emergency plan exercises once every two years, meaning that
>half
>the nation's utilities will not even address the Y2K issue in their
>exer-cises unless the rule is changed. "Every utility must have
>hands-on
>experience in coping with these is-sues," Mariotte said. "The
>unpredictability of how systems may respond to Y2K bugs, questions of
>the reliability of off-site emergency responders, including
>telecommunications, fire, police and other officials, all beg for
>additional training and practice."
>
>"We are not suggesting people head for the hills at the Millennium,"
>said Mariotte. "But when I was a Boy Scout, the motto was 'Be Prepared'
>and right now we aren't prepared. The potential problems are real, and
>deserve the type of measured and appropriate response we are urging
>today. It clearly would be irresponsible and negligent to allow non-Y2K
>compliant reactors to operate, and we trust the NRC will agree with us
>on that. It is also simple prudence to require emergency plan exercises
>and additional back-up power sources. It is perhaps ironic that it may
>require renewable energy resources to rescue the nuclear power industry
>from its own shortcomings, but the future begins now."
>
>Mariotte noted that some Y2K-related problems may surface even before
>January 1, 2000. A Swedish utility recently turned its computer clocks
>to January 1, 1999, and its reactor unexpectedly shut down. "It would
>have been a cold New Year's Eve in Sweden if that reactor hadn't been
>tested," said Mariotte. "Testing and ensuring Y2K compliance is the
>critical issue here, and too many utilities have left them-selves too
>little time for proper testing, and fixing the new unexpected bugs
>testing reveals."
>
>NIRS also announced that it is contacting funders in an effort to
>launch
>a Y2K awareness campaign through its existing Eastern
>Europe/Commonwealth of Independent States program. "On one hand, the
>relatively poor reactor designs in those countries have a silver
>lining:
>they are much less dependent on digital technology," said Mariotte. "On
>the other hand, very little work is being put into identifying and
>repairing both their potential direct nuclear problems and problems
>associated with their electrical grid. A massive public awareness
>campaign and development of effective contingency/emergency plans are
>des-perately needed. One Chernobyl was too many."
>
>"The Millennium should be a time of celebration and joy," concluded
>Mariotte, "not an occasion of fear or panic. The actions we are
>proposing today will go a long way toward providing assurance of our
>health and safety as we enter the excitement and promise of the 21st
>century.
>
>Copies of the NIRS petitions and background materials are available
>from
>NIRS and on the NIRS web-site, www.nirs.org.
>--30--
>
>
>NUCLEAR POWER AND Y2K
>
>In mid-1998, a nuclear utility in Sweden decided to see what would
>happen if it switched the clocks in its reactor's computers to read
>January 1, 1999. The response surprised utility officials, who had
>expected business as usual. The reactor's computers couldn't recognize
>the date (1/1/99) and thus turned the reactor off. If the utility had
>waited to run this test, New Year's Eve would have been rather cold in
>Sweden. The Y2K computer bug caused the problem.
>The Y2K computer bug has the potential to affect the safety and
>operation of commercial nuclear power reactors, other major nuclear
>facilities, and the entire electrical power grid. This is true in the
>U.S. and abroad. While utilities are working to correct their Y2K
>vulnerabilities, it is not clear that all such problems will be fixed
>in
>time. Citizens can play an important role in ensuring that any
>Y2K-related disruptions are minimized by encouraging their utilities,
>state and local governments, and federal regulators and officials to
>devote the resources necessary to address the issue and to make
>appropriate contingency and emergency plans to cope with unexpected
>circumstances.
>
>BACKGROUND
>The Y2K computer bug stems from the early days of computers, when
>memory
>was very expensive. Software designers saved on memory costs by writing
>date-sensitive functions with a two-digit year (i.e. 98 instead of
>1998). Thus, when the program reaches the year 2000, it may read it as
>1900, with unpredictable ramifications. Many of these early programmers
>assumed their programs would be obsolete by 2000. Unfortunately, the
>practice continued for many years, and affects not only the early
>mainframe computers, but also personal computers and other electronic
>devices that use preprogrammed "embedded chips."
> In addition, depending on how programs were written, other dates
>may
>set off problems, including January 1, 1999, September 9, 1999,
>February
>29, 2000, and others.
>
>Y2K AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
>The federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the nuclear power
>industry, through its trade association Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI),
>claim that the Y2K bug does not affect the safety of atomic reactors.
>This attitude, while reassuring, may be overly optimistic. For example,
>an NRC audit of the Seabrook reactor in New Hampshire, released
>November
>6, 1998, found, in this single power plant, 1,304 separate software
>items and embedded chips that were affected by the Y2K bug. Twelve of
>these were described as having "safety implications," including the
>critical Reactor Vessel Level Indication System; another 13 could cause
>the reactor to trip (itself a potential safety issue); 160 affected
>systems required by regulations; and 800 were "significant to
>business"-in other words, keeping the supply of electricity from the
>plant running. Only about 40% of the items were described as having
>"minimal" or "no impact" on plant operations.
> The NRC plans to conduct audits of only 12 reactor sites (out of
>more
>than 70) and, by December 1, 1998, had completed and published only
>three of these. All showed some potential compromise of safety-related
>systems.
> In addition, the unpredictable nature of computer and embedded chip
>responses to an unreadable date means that some failures of systems not
>directly related to safety could adversely affect safety systems or
>operator responses to unrelated emergencies (e.g., by providing
>incorrect data).
>
>REACTORS NEED ELECTRICITY
> The Y2K bug threatens to disrupt the electrical grid, and could
>cause
>local or regional blackouts. Some have predicted a national electrical
>blackout. Consider that there are more than 1,000 different utilities,
>public and private, and non-utility generators of electricity in the
>U.S. and Canada. In June 1998, a U.S. Senate Committee issued a survey
>of the ten largest U.S. utilities. The Committee concluded that "there
>is significant cause for concern" about utilities efforts to remedy the
>Y2K problem, that "assurances of timely Y2K compliance ÆareÅ little
>more
>than a hope," and that, because the utilities surveyed are the largest
>in the nation, "we are pessimistic about the implications for the rest
>of the utility sector."
> Failure of some small utilities could cause instability in the
>electrical grid, leading to localized blackouts; failure of one or more
>larger utilities could lead to regional blackouts. While this would be
>inconvenient at best for most people, it is potentially disastrous for
>nuclear reactors.
> A little-known reality of nuclear power is that atomic reactors
>need a
>steady source of electricity to cool their cores and irradiated fuel
>pools even when they are shut down. Without this cooling ability, even
>closed reactors would melt down; fuel pools would boil dry and release
>their highly-radioactive inventories. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
>considers this "station blackout" scenario to be among the largest
>contributors to risk of operating reactors.
> To compensate, nuclear plants are required to have back-up power
>sources. These are normally giant generators that run on diesel oil and
>each reactor is required to have two of them (although some
>multi-reactor sites share generators). But these diesel generators can
>be unreliable. At best, the NRC says they are 95% reliable. That means
>that if all 200 or so generators were required at one time, 10 may
>fail.
>Moreover, there is reason to believe, given the operating history of
>these generators, that the 95% level is little more than wishful
>thinking.
>
>WE'VE GOT EMERGENCY PLANS, OR DO WE?
>Nuclear utilities have been slow to design and implement contingency
>plans to cope with unforeseen Y2K-related problems. The Senate
>Committee
>found, in June 1998, that "none of the utilities surveyed had completed
>contingency plans=85"
> For the most part, contingency plans will be folded into existing
>emergency response plans at nuclear utilities. But these emergency
>plans, which include emergency evacuation capabilities, are tested only
>once every two years, meaning that under current regulations, at least
>half the utilities will never even test their Y2K-related plans.
> All nuclear emergency plans rely heavily on off-site sources of
>assistance, including police, fire and other essential services. But
>these services, as well as critical communications abilities, also may
>be vulnerable to the Y2K bug if not properly assessed, remedied and
>tested.
>
>THE INDUSTRY RESPONSE TO Y2K
>The utility industry, including the nuclear utilities and the NRC, has
>been working to resolve Y2K issues. For the most part, they say they
>will be "Y2K ready" (which does not necessarily mean compliant) by the
>turn of the millennium.
> But many utilities began working on the problem late, and some have
>not
>even completed their initial assessments of the scope of their
>problems.
>Once the assessments are completed, utilities must repair the problems,
>if possible, or purchase and install new systems. Then systems must be
>tested, itself a time-consuming process that may reveal still more bugs
>and incompatibilities. Few utilities have allowed themselves more than
>a
>few months to fully test all systems and repair any new problems found.
>
>WHAT YOU CAN DO
>Citizens can take several proactive steps to help assure that
>Y2K-related disruptions will be minimized and that effective emergency
>and contingency plans are implemented.
> In December 1998, the Nuclear Information and Resource Service
>(NIRS)
>submitted three emergency petitions for rulemaking to the NRC. These
>call for:
>1) the shutdown of all reactors that are not demonstrably Y2K compliant
>through full testing, by December 1, 1999 until they are compliant;
>2) installation of additional sources of back-up power to replace or
>supplement the existing diesel generators. These may include solar,
>wind, natural gas, hydro or other dedicated power systems;
>3) a requirement that every nuclear utility test a full-scale emergency
>plan during 1999 with a scenario that includes a Y2K-related component.
>Concerned people should write to the NRC (U.S. NRC, Washington, DC
>20555, Attn: Docketing and Service Branch) in support of these
>petitions. Copies of the petitions are available from NIRS.
> People can also contact your state and local officials and urge
>them to
>institute separate emergency and contingency plans for your state,
>paying special attention to the possibility of electrical blackouts and
>telecommunications failures.
> Finally, people should contact their federal legislators and demand
>continued congressional hearings on the nuclear industry and Y2K, and
>ask their Congressmembers to support the NIRS petitions.
> The Y2K issue is, by its very nature, rapidly changing. New
>information
>continually is being developed. For the latest information, check the
>NIRS website (http://www.nirs.org) or contact NIRS.
>
>Michael Mariotte, December 1998
>Nuclear Information and Resource Service
>1424 16th Street NW, #404, Washington DC 20036
>202.328.0002; fax: 202.462.2183
>nirsnet@nirs.org; http://www.nirs.org
>
>
>