From the Ecologist, July/August 1994, Vol 24, No. 4: MISSHAPING EUROPE - THE EUROPEAN ROUND TABLE OF INDUSTRIALISTS by Ann Doherty and Olivier Hoedeman* * (Ann Doherty and Olivier Hoedeman work with Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Development (A SEED), a worldwide network of environment and development organizations.) ------------------------- The European Round Table of Industrialists, a discrete body of 40 heads of European-based multinationals, is the eminence grise behind the economic integration of the 12 member countries of the European Union. With access to the top national and European decisionmakers, it is influencing, if not directing, policy for the multinationals' benefit in areas as diverse as transport, education, employment, environment and the Third World. In the l980s, there was a dramatic change in the economic and political landscape of Europe with the introduction of the Single Market between the 12 member countries of the European Community and, more recently, the proposed European Union (EU), as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty.[1] Some of the major advocates of this European integration have been a handful of European-based multinational companies who reap the greatest benefits. Behind the scenes, these corporations are orchestrating the present and future shape of Europe. One of their main channels of influence is a corporate lobby group called the European Round Table of Industrialists, or ERT. Membership is exclusive: approximately 40 men (no women), all Chairs or Chief Executives of large multinationals, mainly, though not exclusively, based in the European Union. Member companies include ll of the 20 largest European companies - British Petroleum, Daimler-Benz, Fiat, Siemens, Unilever, Nestle, Philips, Hoechst, Total, Thyssen and ICI - all of which are listed among the world's top 50 companies. In 1991, the combined sales of the 40 ERT member companies exceeded 500 billion dollars, accounting for approximately 60 per cent of total EU industrial production.[2] The Origins of the ERT In 1983, a handful of multinational business leaders created the ERT to express their concern that industry was playing an insufficient role in European policy-making; what was urgently needed was a coalition of like-minded corporate leaders to provide input and vision to Brussels, the home of the European Commission. Umberto Agnelli of Fiat, Wisse Dekker of Philips and Pehr Gyllenhammar of Volvo were the initiators; for the first few months of its existence, the ERT's accounts were run through the spare parts division of Volvo's Paris headquarters.[3] They were encouraged by Europe's Commissioner for Industry and the Internal Market, Viscount Etienne Davignon, and the Commissioner for Finance, Francois Xavier Ortoli. In 1986, Davignon left the Commission and joined the ERT representing the Societe Generale de Belgique (a holding company which includes the largest bank in Belgium), while Ortoli joined it as President of the French oil company, Total. But bonds between the ERT and the Commission were maintained under Jacques Delors's regime. In March 1985, early in his tenure as President of the European Commission, Delors set up an "on the record" meeting with the ERT "to discuss ERT goals,"[4] meetings which have continued at regular intervals. Corporate Vision The ERT has consistently striven for "effective decision-making bodies at a European level, even when implementation is better left in national and regional hands,"[5] and has organized itself into policy groups mirroring the main issues considered by these bodies. These groups, which cover education, competition policy, infrastructure, Central and Eastern Europe, North-South issues, trade and GATT, environment and social policy, produce reports which are eagerly received by both national governments and Brussels; there have been more than 20 of them over the past decade. When the ERT issues a new report, the Commission jumps to attention. In 1991, ERT members sent an advance copy of its agenda for the 1990s, 'Reshaping Europe', to Commission President Jacques Delors and then arranged a series of high-level consultations with Delors and European Commissioners to discuss the contents. A press conference in December 1993 to launch the ERT's report on competitiveness in Europe, 'Beating the Crisis', was held one week before the release of the Commission's White Paper on the same subject; both events were attended by Delors. On the national level too, ERT member companies arrange regular consultations with leading politicians: Presidents Kohl of Germany and Mitterand of France have had regular dealings with the ERT;[6] Dutch Ministers had several meetings with Floris Maljers of Unilever to discuss the content of 'Reshaping Europe';[7] and, during its presidency of the European Council, the Italian government met with the ERT in May 1985 to discuss infrastructure policy.[8] According to ERT Secretary-General Keith Richardson, "access" is the key to the ERT's success: "Access means being able to 'phone Helmut Kohl and recommend that he read a report... Access also means John Major 'phoning ... to thank the ERT for its viewpoints, or having lunch with Swedish Prime Minister just prior to the Swedish decision to apply for EC membership."[9] This easy access to EU decision-makers stands in sharp contrast with the influence wielded by other non-governmental groups such as trade unions, small businesses and environmental groups.[10] Eurogroup, a lobby group representing small businesses (a category into which 99 per cent of European firms fall) has to wait weeks for an appointment with a civil servant, and the highly-regarded, Brussels-based European Environmental Bureau has managed to meet only once in two decades with the Commission President. Other lobby groups, when questioned about the influence of the ERT, respond that the ERT is no longer a lobby group, but has become part of the EU apparatus.[11] This relationship between the ERT and European policy-makers over the past 10 years has, in many cases, resulted in an unmistakable influence by the ERT on European policies, most obviously in the implementation of the Single Market; in the creation of the Trans-European Network infrastructure scheme; in the restructuring of European education policy; and in the whittling away of social protection measures. The ERT is clear in its agenda: "What industry cannot accept is that the pursuit of other objectives is used as an excuse for damaging the wealth creating machine itself, whether by raising its costs or blocking its development. There can be no healthy society or healthy environment without a healthy economy to pay for them."[12] This agenda is fraught with dangers for workers, students, local business, rural areas, traditional cultures, the environment and the developing world. Pushing the Single Market The ERT's first campaign was an attempt to accelerate the sluggish progress towards a European single market. In 1984, its report, 'Europe 1990: An Agenda for Action', ambitiously proposed a five-year plan to eliminate trade barriers, harmonize regulations and abolish fiscal frontiers. Wisse Dekker of Philips, co-drafter of the report with Umberto Agnelli of Fiat, explained the urgent need for integration: "Only in this way can industry compete globally by exploiting economies of scale, for what will be the biggest home market in the world today, the European Community Home market."[13] After publication, ERT members vigorously lobbied government leaders in EC countries and EC Commissioners. The strategy paid off: proposals from the ERT's 'Europe 1990' were rehashed in the 1985 EC White Paper, "Completion of the Internal Market", which became the basis of the 1986 Single European Act. The only rather trivial difference between the ERT report and the White Paper was the postponement of the ERT's optimistic 1990 deadline for internal market completion to 1992. Britain's Lord Cockfield, who directed the drafting of the White Paper, has admitted that it was influenced by the ERT's action plan,[14] while Jacques Delors recognized the "continuing pressure" of the ERT in a television interview in 1993, claiming that it was "one of the main driving forces behind the single market."[15] ERT lobbying activities around the single market were meticulously coordinated. In 1986, the ERT founded an Internal Market Support Committee (IMSC), on the initiative of Wisse Dekker, to ensure "that the White Paper would indeed be implemented, above all, that these directives should be implemented at the national level." All of this required numerous meetings between industry and the Commission, as well as "thousands of contacts on an ad hoc basis" between ERT members and EC officials.[16] In the Commission's eagerness to comply with industry's agenda for the single market, they ignored other EC regulations and reports, as well as the admonitions of environmental groups. For instance, in 1989, the Commission ordered an investigation into the effects of the single European market upon the environment. The resulting Task Force Report listed an ominous inventory of negative effects including large-scale waste transport, obligatory acceptance of products with less stringent controls, diminished opportunity for environmental taxes on the national level, and increased road traffic and resulting emissions. Subsequently, the European Environment Bureau issued a dire warning that: "The internal market programme promotes cost reduction through mass production. Ecological and cultural diversity are thereby becoming eroded by the uniformity of mass production inherent to the globalized economy."[17] Both these reports fell on deaf ears, or at any rate ears receptive primarily to the desires of Euro-corporations. The triumphant ERT member companies, with a malleable home market of 340 million consumers now secured, turned their focus to their next free market objective: the creation of "Europe's Infrastructure ... a single interacting system or meganetwork with a single output: mobility."[18] Missing Links, Missing Networks In 1984, the ERT published 'Missing Links', outlining the grave shortcomings of European transport infrastructure which it claimed acted as a "barrier to European economic and social progress." They used the implementation of the single market to argue for the speedy creation of this infrastructure. Some particularly urgent deficiencies were pinpointed: the Scan Link bridge project linking Germany, Denmark and Sweden, high-speed trans-European train links and the Channel Tunnel.[19] The ERT contributed two new arguments to the Channel debate: they suggested that it would be cost-effective if it were plugged into a European network, and that it could be funded by "Euroshares" rather than public money. Particularly influential in the formation of this policy was ERT member Ian MacGregor, then head of British Steel, who chaired the Euroroute consortium promoting the tunnel.[20] Later in 1984, MacGregor was employed by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to dismantle the British coal industry, and became the British government's major protagonist in the 1984-5 miner's strike. Through its intensive lobbying of European transport ministers, and also the support of French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius, the ERT was astonishingly successful in introducing European power brokers to its vision of a future infrastructure. In 1985, Volvo's Pehr Gyllenhammar could report to ERT members that the Italian government, "on behalf of all the ministers of transportation within the Community, is referring to the 'Missing Links' as a master plan for European infrastructure."[21] By the early 1990s, Scan-Link, the Channel Tunnel and the high-speed rail networks were all under construction, while the obligation to develop "trans-European networks" was being written into the Maastricht Treaty. In its subsequent 1991 report, 'Missing Networks', the ERT's infrastructure plans are even more grandiose, including proposals for new roads through the "Alpine and Pyrenean barrier and to Eastern Europe." The ERT has also worked with six other road lobby groups in the Motorways Working Group,[22] an ad hoc organization created to advise the Commission on the EC's 1992 Trans-European Network (TEN) programme which includes plans for 12,000 kilometres of new motorways by the year 2002, increasing the network by 32 per cent, and for spending over 124 billion ECU (US$ 143 billion) in the first six years.[23] However, as if to recognize that the projected expansion of the network could never keep up with potential demand, 'Missing Networks' also advocates the introduction of "user charges ... to distribute the existing scarce transport resources more rationally" and "to generate funds for improving effective capacity". In effect, this means privately-built toll roads, affordable only by wealthier motorists, in particular company cars. In September 1992, a leading article in The Economist - part of which bears a striking resemblance to a passage in 'Missing Networks' comparing traffic congestion to Russian shopping queues - argued vigorously for a road-pricing policy to stimulate investment in infrastructure.[24] A few months later, both Britain and Germany announced that they would be introducing private toll motorways. 'Missing Networks' also promises the creation of a new organization "for prospective analysis on infrastructure" which would "place infrastructure at the top of the European political agenda" and "act as a friendly watchdog over European, national and municipal authorities". Such a body has now appeared - the European Centre for Infrastructure Studies (ECIS). Founding members, personally solicited by Fiat's Agnelli, include corporations, government officials and research institutes. The claims of ECIS to provide "a background of unbiased and broadly accessible assessment,"[25] are highly suspect, given the ERT's wish to "accelerate the construction of Trans-European infrastructure networks - with greater political determination (and) a commitment to more resources." Lifelong Learning Education is another area where the ERT has pushed its corporate agenda. The 1989 ERT publication, 'Education and European Competence', complains mainly about the inadequacy of the European educational system in preparing "human resources" for industry. It advocates a major overhaul of education and condemns the present system which "allows and even encourages its young individuals to take the liberty of pursuing 'interesting', not directly job-related studies which in many cases have little prospect of practical application."[26] The ineptitudes of Europe in the field of education are compared with more streamlined systems in Japan and the US. "Industry cannot accept the pursuit of other objectives used as an excuse for damaging the wealth creating machine itself." The ERT has several remedies. One recommendation is the greater involvement of industrialists in education, including positions on the administrative bodies of educational institutions, and "participation in the development of the curricula and other teaching tools."[27] A second is that "in order to make university and college education more related to the world of work, it is desirable that teachers and professors should have working experience in industry."[28] And a third remedy is "lifelong learning" - regular training to keep up with technological change - in order for European industry to maintain competitiveness. Since the Maastricht Treaty, the field of education has been formally assigned as a competence of the European Union. In 1991, the EC Memorandum on Higher Education was published, a document with striking similarities to the arguments for educational reform provided by the ERT. According to the Memorandum, not only should cooperation between higher educational institutes and industry increase, but in addition academic structures and methods should be adapted to facilitate this partnership. The concept of lifelong learning also rears its head, with the goal of rehabilitating workers who are no longer "useful" for the labour market. These parallels between ERT brain storms and EU policy in the area of education are no coincidence. The Memorandum was prepared in a series of workshops and conferences in which ministries, industry and a select number of representatives from higher education were invited. No students were involved. The same exclusivity was exemplified at a meeting in December 1993 of the ERT working group on education to discuss the draft version of a new report 'Reshaping European Education'. Participants included senior representatives from Petrofina, Hoffman LaRoche and Societe Generale de Belgique, members of the EU Commission, and representatives from the administrations of the Universities of Dublin, Brussels and Louvaine. Such collaborations are likely to result in the sacrifice of academic freedom, diversity and objectivity to a single-minded drive for industrial efficiency and output. Social Protection The basic message of the ERT with respect to labour is that "financing social security must not be allowed to become an obstacle to economic growth."[29] In its several reports dealing with employment and social security, it claims that the labour market is too rigid in areas including hiring and firing laws, regulation of working hours, minimum wage regulations, and even housing policies. Again, the ERT seeks "flexibility" in the labour market: workers that can be shuttled around Europe, flexible hours, seasonal contracts, job sharing and part-time work. All of these arrangements indicate the rootless employment practices of transnational plants, which are prone to spontaneous relocation depending upon the most profitable operating conditions. The Round Table also wishes to exclude workers from corporate decision- making for fear that they will jeopardize "the local flexibility needed to compete in an international market." In December 1993, seven years after the publication of 'Making Europe Work' (a relatively long period given the speed with which other ERT demands have gained political respectability), the European Commission presented a White Paper on "Growth, Competitiveness and Employment: The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century". Flexibility is a key word in the text, paving the way for the removal of social protections. The European Trade Union Confederation reacted swiftly and angrily to the White Paper, deploring the "short-sighted and counter-productive measures ... which sometimes go as far as cutting wages, making it easier to sack people, reducing employment benefits, and even attacking basic trade union rights."[30] The opinions of the labour movement, however, have attracted far less attention from European decision- makers than those of big business. Disagreements about Free Trade ... Despite the smooth facade represented by the ERT's glossy reports, internal dissension has not been unknown to the group; conflict has arisen in particular around the thorny issues of protectionism versus unfettered free marketism. In the 1980s, the outlook of member companies was predominantly protectionist, defensive against imports from other trade blocs, and dependent on a strong European state.[31] Evidence of this tendency can be gleaned by examining the changes in membership; early drop-outs included the more globally-oriented, deregulatory-inclined companies, Shell, Unilever and ICI. The "Europrotectionist" approach also grated with some politicians including Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, the only political leader of a major European country who refused to meet the ERT.[32] However, in recent years, clear transformations in both the strategy and the membership of the ERT can be discerned. In part, the ERT's new, more globally aggressive, freemarket approach can be attributed to the merger of the ERT with the "Groupe des Presidents", an elite industrialists' dining club which, according to former member Floris Maljers of Unilever, grouped together "more liberals than protectionists".[33] The merger encouraged Shell, Unilever and ICI to return to the fold - indeed Maljers is now one of ERT's vice-chairs. Furthermore, the headquarters of the ERT moved from Paris (where policy tended to be infiltrated by strongly nationalist French firms) to Brussels, "symbolizing the development of a symbiotic relationship between the ERT and the Commission over the years, involving close and intense mutual consultation supported by a network of personal contacts."[34] Given the current globalization of capital and industry, and the potential access to developing markets, it seems likely that the ERT will maintain this neo-liberal posture. ... and the Environment Internal disputes have also arisen over environmental policy. In recent months, billionaire Stephan Schmidheiny, head of the Swiss company, Anova, (whose "Eternit" products have provided the French language with its word for asbestos sheeting) has defected from the ERT. Schmidheiny is well-known in environmental and development circles for his collaboration with 1992 UNCED "Earth Summit" Secretary-General Maurice Strong in creating the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) in 1990. The goal of the BCSD - which boasted among its supporters industrial giants such as DuPont, Dow Chemical, Ciba Geigy, Asea Brown Boveri, Chevron, and ERT members Daimler Benz and Norsk Hydro - was "to provide a business perspective on sustainable development for the UNCED conference"[35] The BCSD became famous during the UNCED process for ensuring that language supporting the regulation of transnational corporations was cut from final declarations. In many ways, the BCSD resembles the ERT except that it cloaks all of its activities in "greenwash" - unsubstantiated babble about the necessity of unregulated free trade in ensuring "sustainable development", and glowing accolades of the environmental achievements of member companies. In 'Reshaping Europe', the ERT commended the "powerful idea" of the BCSD, which "can replace entirely the piecemeal approach of many existing programmes that seek to control polluters through punitive measures."[36] This unsubtle praise was probably viewed by the BCSD as harmful to its carefully cultivated green image. Since, according to Schmidheiny's assistant, "the ERT is acting like an industry lobby, but not always in harmony with the BCSD philosophy," Schmidheiny's desertion is not surprising.[37] The ERT's approach to the environment is more muted, although it has made some of its views on environmental policy clear, preferring voluntary adherence to vague codes of conduct rather than enforcement of taxation methods. "We recommend energy efficiency, which has several advantages over other energy conservation policies, many of them punitive, such as the taxation of green-house gases."[38] An ERT environmental watchdog group, composed largely of chemical, automobile and oil companies (Pilkington, British Petroleum, Pirelli, Thyssen, Fiat, Petrofina, Hoechst, Volvo and Solvay, for example) is rumoured to be formulating a reaction to a proposed EU energy tax, although information on the group's activities is hard to come by. The ERT Secretariat is vague on this subject while the representative of Philips recently denied any involvement in the group.[39] Looking Ahead In the near future, the ERT is likely to concentrate its activities in several fields. Firstly, its involvement in the monetary union is likely to be intensified, particularly in hastening its implementation. "Japan has one currency," bleats the ERT, "The US has one currency. How can the Community live with twelve?"[40] A precedent in this area has already been set; the timetable for fiscal union presented in 'Reshaping Europe' was snapped up a few months later by the Commission and published in the Maastricht Treaty. Secondly, in its December 1993 report 'Beating the Crisis', the ERT proposes a "Charter for Industry" and proposes that the European Council formally adopts an outline for a "strategic approach to economic recovery ... in such a way as to give industry full confidence in Europe's political direction."[41] It also recommends the creation by the EU of a European Competitiveness Council comparable to a similar (but recently defunct) US body set up to oversee the deregulation of industry. This would be given "an official mandate to keep competitiveness at the top of the policy agenda" - together with infrastructure - "and to report back on how the Charter is being implemented."[42] Enlargement of the Union to include aspiring member countries from Eastern Europe is a third likely target for future ERT lobbying. "The West gave a lead to inspire Eastern Europe along the path towards democracy and free market economics. We cannot now refuse to help. The Community must open up to its neighbours."[43] The deeper motivations are also candidly explained: a bigger market for goods and services, with up to 200 million "new" customers, and "access to natural resources, including fuels, minerals and land, which are generally in short supply in Western Europe".[44] Global Reach But the largest potential market and source of raw materials for European industry remains the Third World, which is surveyed in the 1993 report of the ERT's North-South working group (chaired by Nestle head Helmut Maucher) entitled 'European Industry: a Partner of the Developing World.' The $100 billion per year debt of developing countries is not seen as a major problem since "a flow of finance from slow-growth areas to higher growth areas is a normal phenomenon of credit allocation through market forces"[45] - in other words, the rich get richer while the poor get poorer. Nonetheless, the aggregate of people burdened by this debt are characterized as "a vast potential in non-saturated markets." The report is peppered with tempting illustrations of these markets: for example, "two-thirds of any increase in world demand for cars ... will come from Asia in the next few years."[46] The ERT's approach to these markets is unabashedly partisan and aggressive: "Adopting a global perspective ... will help us manage our companies in an environment where our markets, our financing and our investment are increasingly to be found in new regions of the world ... We must learn to compete globally, or risk being pushed aside by competitors who do."[47] The competitors that the ERT is most worried about are the US and, more especially, Japan, which doubled its share of investment in the Third World between 1980 and 1991, while the EC's share dropped by six per cent. But it also acknowledges that the real losers are likely to be smaller businesses in the South. It encourages "rivalry between domestic companies as well as between domestic and foreign companies (and no nursing of national champions)."[48] "Multinational companies", the ERT insists, "are champions of brand-oriented marketing, and they introduce the culture related to it wherever they become active."[49] The ERT's brazen contempt for Third World culture, epitomized by the importance it attaches to "brands", is at times staggering: "A subsidiary well-rooted in the local markets will be able to mobilize indigenous resources and to commercialize them with a strong brand. Hindustan Lever (Unilever) scientists have considerably advanced substitute oils for soap-making. Over 70,000 tons of unconventional and previously neglected indigenous oils (such as sal, neem, kusum, karanja etc.) have been adapted for making soap and other products."[50] In fact, such "unconventional and previously neglected" oils have been used for centuries. The neem tree, which is now subject to a number of US and Japanese owned patents, has become a symbol of a movement in India involving demonstrations of up to 500,000 farmers, irate that their knowledge of plants is being pirated by multinational compa- nies.[51] The "brand culture" and "brand-oriented economy" which the ERT champions is at root a device for taking locally produced commodities out of the hands of ordinary people and placing them at the disposal of a multinationally-controlled hierarchy, from whose ranks will emerge the crucial new market for cars and similar ERT products. It is not surprising, therefore, that the ERT has been an ardent supporter of the recent negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which started in Uruguay in 1986. As ERT Assistant Secretary-General Caroline Walcot said in October 1993: "We are very, very firm believers in the Uruguay Round; we believe it must be completed, and the ERT has individually [and] together, different members together [and] as a group, we have spoken to everybody, we've made press statements, we've written to Prime Ministers, we've done everything we can think of to try and press for the end of the Uruguay Round."[52] Bypassing Democracy The ERT courts publicity selectively, seeking to publicize their views rather than themselves and their influence as a lobby organization. Within one month of the 1984 publication of 'Missing Links', over 90 articles about European infrastructure appeared in the European press, while the 1993 publication of 'Beating the Crisis' evoked articles con- cerning the need for "efficiency" in the workplace and "flexibility" of the labour force in various European newspapers. Rarely has a critical word been written in the mainstream European media about the ERT or its policies. This one-sided and complimentary coverage results from close connections that the ERT has fostered with select members of the press including journalists from the Financial Times, The Economist, Le Monde, Sud Deutsche Zeitung De Standaard, La Repubblicca and Der Spiegel. It is only recently that environmental and social activists have become aware how much of what is now taken for granted as the policy and the vocabulary of European economic and political integration has been formed by a handful of organizations that stand to profit. At a recent demonstration at the ERT's headquarters in Brussels, British activist Kate Geary stated: "The ERT is not comparable with the other lobbying groups at Brussels. Through its personal contacts, it is setting the agenda for Europe. The problem is not so much the ERT, as the fact that the EC is still highly undemocratic." The ERT's response to activists who have thrown down the gauntlet and challenged the groups on its operations and its secrecy can be gleaned from 'Missing Networks': "The increasingly effective organization of those arguing for environmental citizens' rights must be matched by a more effective organization of the advocates of change, adaption and growth."[53] It remains to be seen whether the knights of the European Round Table will pursue their battle against citizens' rights in the public arena; or whether they will simply carry on whispering into the ear of compliant politicians. _____________________________________________________ A SEED Europe has published two critical reports about the ERT, 'Misshaping Europe' and 'Boosting the Crisis', available for 5 pounds each, including postage and packing, from A SEED Europe, Postbus 92066, 1090 AB Amsterdam, THE NETHERLANDS. A 20-minute video about the ERT, dERTy business, is available from Small World Media Ltd, la Waterlow Road, London N19 9JF, UK. Fax: 071-272 9243. Price: institutions 21.50 pounds; individuals and groups 9.50 pounds; students 5.50 pounds. ERT publications are available free from ERT, Avenue Henri Jaspar 113, B-1060 Brussels, BELGIUM. _______________________________________________________ Notes and References 1. See Hildyard, N., "Maastricht: The Protectionism of Free Trade", The Ecologist Vol, 23. No. 2, March/ April 1993. 2. ERT, 'Reshaping Europe', Brussels, 1991, p.2. 3. Green, M. L.,"The Politics of Big Business in the Single Market Program", paper presented at the European Community Studies Association, Third Biennial Conference, 27 May 1993, Washington, DC, p.l6. The ERT members who wield the greatest influence are the founding members and are also from the largest and most globally oriented companies of the group. The number of ERT members fluctuates frequently, but floats between 40 and 45. When heads of companies leave the group, new ones are recruited, but former members often retain close links with ERT. For example, Shell is no longer an official member of the ERT but still participates actively in working groups. For example, it contributed to the 1993 ERT report European Industry: A Partner of the Developing World; Foreign Direct Investment as a Tool for Economic Development and Cooperation - Suggestions for Future Improvements. 4. Ibid.. p.35. 5. ERT, 'Beating the Crisis', Brussels, 1993, p.1 6. Green. M., op. cit. 3, p.33. 7. van Apeldoom, B., and Holman, O., "Transnational Class Strategy and the Relaunching of European Integration: The Role of the European Round Table of Industrialists", paper presented at the 35th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Washington, DC, 28 March - 1 April, 1994, p.21. 8. Green, M., op. cit. 3, p.33. 9. Hellen, J. and Thoren, R., "Det henger paa kontakterna", Metallarbetaren, April 1993, p.3. 10. There are thousands of professional lobbyists working for industry in Brussels; together they account for 96 per cent of all lobbying at the European level. See Hallen, J. and Thoren, R., op.cit.9. 11. Ibid. 12. ERT, 'Beating the Crisis', op. cit. 5, p.15. 13. A SEED Europe, 'Misshaping Europe', Amsterdam, 1993, p.11. 14. van Apeldoorn, B., and Holman, O., op. cit.7, pp.10-11. 15. ERT Brochure, September 1993. 16. van Apeldoorn, B., and Holman, O., op. cit. 7, p.11. 17. A SEED Europe, op. cit 13, p.12. 18. ERT, 'Missing Networks', Brussels, 1991, p.17. 19. See Bower, C., "Europe's Motorways: The Drive for Mobility", The Ecologist, Vol. 23, No. 4, July/August 1993, pp.125-131. 20. Green, M., op. cit. 3, p.l8-19. 21. Gyllenhammer, P., letter to Hans Merkle, Chair of the German engineering company, Bosch, quoted in Green, M., op cit. 3. 22. The Motorway Working Group is composed of several road and industry lobby groups as well as EC Commissioners. 23. Since Pehr Gyllenhammer's departure from Volvo earlier this year, he has been personally recruited by EU Commissioner Martin Bangemann to join a special Commission working group (which includes ERT members Carlo de Benedetti of Olivetti, Jan Timmer of Philips and Heinrich von Pierer of Siemens), to implement the Trans-European Networks. 24. "The Case for Central Planning," The Economist, 12 September 1992, p.13. 25. ERT, European Centre for Infrastructure Studies brochure. ECIS annual membership fees begin at 2,500 ECU (US$ 2,890). Based in Rotterdam, the Secretariat hopes to support at least 15 staff in the near future. 26. ERT, Education and European Confidence, Brussels, 1989, p.4. 27. Ibid., p.8. 28. Ibid., p.9. 29. ERT, 'Reshaping Europe', op. cit. 2, p.25. 30. European Trade Union Confederation, Preliminary European Trade Union Confederation contribution to the Commission White Paper, Brussels, 1993, p.4. 31. van Apeldoorn, B., and Holman, O., op. cit. 7, p.12. 32. Green, M., op. cit. 3, p.34.. 33. van Apeldoom, B., and Holman, O., op. cit.7, p.19. Shell has since left the ERT. See reference 3. 34. Ibid., p.15. 35. BCSD Annual Report, Geneva, 1993. 36. ERT, 'Reshaping Europe', op. cit. 2, p.37. 37. Personal communication, 14 March 1994. 38. ERT, 'Reshaping Europe', op. cit. 2, p.33. 39. Interview between Joris van Rooij, A SEED Netherlands and Henk de Bruin, Philips, May 1994. 40. ERT, 'Reshaping Europe', op. cit. 2, p.46. ERT member Etienne Davignon, chair of Societe de Generale de Belgique and former EEC Commissioner for Industry, is chair of another lobbying group, the ECU Banking Association, which is seeking fast implementation of European Monetary Union. See De Financieel Ekonomische Tijd, 18 June 1994. 41. ERT, 'Reshaping Europe', op. cit. 2, p.49. 42. Ibid., p.48. 43. Ibid., p.49. 44. Ibid., p.48. 45. ERT, European Industry: A Partner of the Developing World, Brussels, October 1993, p.l8. 46. Ibid., p.7. 47. E. Reuter of Daimler-Benz, quoted in ibid, p.8, original emphasis. 48. Ibid., p.43. 49. Ibid., p.l5. 50. Ibid., p.l5. 51. See Shiva, V. and Holla-Bhar, R., "Intellectual Piracy and the Neem Tree", The Ecologist, Vol. 23, No. 6, pp.223-227. 52. Walcot, C., interviewed for dERTy business (video), Small World Media Ltd, London, 1993. 53. ERT, 'Missing Networks', op. cit. 18, p.16. A GUIDE TO 1993 ERT MEMBERS NAME COMPANY (COUNTRY) ACTIVITIES SUBSIDIARIES, BRANDS COMMENT Torvil Aakvaag Norsk Hydro(N) Dams, metals,petrochem. Fisons Fertilizers. Norway's largest company. Umberto Agnelli Fiat (I) Cars, aviation, robotics Lancia, Alfa Romeo, Iveco Part of Agnelli's "dynasty-led, government-fed" empire Americo Amorim Amorim (P) Transport, haulage, agribus Wilkering Ltd One of the largest companies in Portugal Nigel Broackes Trafalgar House (UK) Construction, shipbuilding Davy Co, John Brown, Cement. Intl. Plans to build Britain's first toll motorway north of Birmingham Jean-Louis Beffa St Gobain (F) Glass, paper, building materials Norton Co, TSL Group Largest French glassmaker; criticized for asbestos production in Brazil Marcus Bierich Robert Bosch (D) Car motors, electronics Blaupunkt, BSH, Telenorma Germany's largest supplier to the auto industry Vincent Bollore Groupe Bollore (F) Tobacco, shipping Job, Zig-Zag, Seita, Philip Morris Ship poisonous chemicals to Africa and tropical hardwoods to France Yves Boel Sofina (B) Electric utilities, watenworks SOFILEC, REBELCO, SIDRO Various interests in metal production and finances Bertrand Collomb LafargeCoppee (F) Cement, building materials Cementia Holding AG Second largest producer of cement worldwide Francois Cornblis Petrofina (B) Oil, petrochemicals Sigma Coatings, Fina, Beverol Drilling for oil in Vietnam and Siberia Gerhard Cromme Fried. Krupp (D) Machines, electronics, telecom. Hoesch, Moulinex, Polysius Quarter of the shares owned by Iranian Ayatollahs Etienne Davignon Ste Generale de Belg (B) Banking CBR Cimenteries, Gechem Interests in finance, machines, mining, metal, chemical industry Carlo de Benedetti Olivetti (I) Typewriters, computers Acom, Triumf Adler Bribery charges brought against de Benedetti Casimir Ehrnrooth Kymmene Corp (FIN) Wood pulp, paper Irvine, Caledonian paper (UK) Largest Finnish forestry company, with mills in UK, France and Germany Raul Gardini Ferruzzi (I) Agroindustry, chemicals Eridiana Beglin-Say, Lesieur Gardini committed suicide in 1993 after being charged with bribery Jose Antonio Garrido Iberdrola (E) Electricity, construction Garona, Trillo, Almaraz Second largest Spanish company in 1992 in turnover; involved in nuclear Fritz Gerber HoHmann-La Roche (CH) Pharmaceuticals Now called Roche holdings Advocates of gene patents and human genetic engineering Pehr Gyllenhammer Volvo (S) Cars, trucks Links to Procordia (S), Renault Gyllenhammer toppled in 1993 after failed merger with Renault Denys Henderson ICI (GB) Chemicals Zeneca, ICI Main UK producer of ozone-depleting chemicals Wolfgang Hilger Hoechst (D) Chemicals Schwarzkopf, Herberts GmbH Notorious for pesticide policies, especially in the Third World Daniel Janssen Solvay (B) Chemicals, oil, transport, finance lnterox, Venilia Interox fined 12,000 pounds plus costs in 1993 for polluting River Mersey Heinz Kriwet Thyssen (D) Steel, motor vehicle parts ------- Alleged to have supplied military equipment to Iraq Andre Leysen Gevaert (B) Film, transport, chemicals AGFA Owned by Bayer, alleged violator of pharmaceutical and pesticide regulations Luis Magana CEPSA (E) Petroleum refining Asfaltos Espanoles --- Floris Maljers Unilever (NL) Food, household products John West, Brooke Bond Tropical cash crops (plantations, prawns); owns India's largest sales network Helmut O. Maucher Nestle (CH) Food Rowntree, Perrier Boycotted because of baby Milk sales in Third World Maersk McKinney Moeller AP Moller (DK) Shipping Maersk Air, Roulund -- Jerome Monod Lyonnaise des Eaux (F) Utilities, transport, finance Dumez SA, SITA, SMD, GTM Second largest French water company; accused of corruption Harald Norvik Statoil (N) Oil, petrol Joint ventures with BP Becoming increasingly multinational because of North Sea Oil revenues Theodore Paplexopoulos Titan Cement (GR) Building materials Intercement Second largest Greek company Heinrich von Pierer Siemens (D) Electrical, arms, nuclear Osram, Nixforf, Arco Solar, Plessey Europe's biggest employer; world's fifth largest nuclear company Antony Pilkington Pilkington (GB) Glass SOLA Dependent on auto industry because of its automotive glass products Edzard Reuter Daimler-Benz (D) Cars, arms. AEG, Messerschmidt,Dornier, MTU Part owned by Deutsche Bank; alliances with Mitsubishi 8 Aerospatiale Antoine Riboud BSN (F) Processed foods HP Trades with Third World Tony Ryan GPA (IRE) Airplane leasing Pacific Aviation Group, Air Tora Largest airplane leaser worldwide Stephan Schmidheiny AnovaAG (CH) Construction materials Eternit, Intergips Pioneered asbestosproducts H M Sekyra Austrian Industries (A) Chemicals, metal VOEST, Agrolinz, Chemie Linz Everything from aluminium and packaging materials to chemicals Patrick Sheehy BAT Industries (UK) Diversified inc. tobacco Kent, Lucky Strike, Pall Mall Exports 45 billion cigarettes from UK; markets in 3rd World, Asia, Russia David Simon British Petroleum (UK) Oil, plastics, chemicals, mines Gulf, Kennecott, Purina, Distillers Globally aggressive: "Our focus is on SE Asia" Poul Svanholm Carlsberg (D) Beverages Allied/Tetley Tenth largest brewery worldwide Serge Tchuruk Total (F) Oil, petrol ------- Second largest French oil company; maintains links with Iraq and Burma Jan Timmer Philips (NL) Electrical goods Polygram Affiliates in 60 countries; ex-Volvo CEO and ex-Hoechst chair on board Marco Tronchetti Provera Pirelli (I) Tyres, cables Standard Motor Major sponosor of Formula One motor-racing Cendido Velesquez Telefonica (E) Communications Links with AT&T, ENTEL Largest Spanish company in 1992 in terms of turnover Lo Van Wachem Shell (NUUK) Oil, petrol, plastics, chemicals Billiton, Montedison Vies with Exxon and General Motors to be "world's biggest company" A=Austria; B=Belgium; CH=Switzerland; D=Germany; E=Spain; F=France; FIN=Finland; GR=Greece; I=ltaly; IRE=Eire; N=Norway; NL=Netherlands; P=Portugal; UK=United Kingdom